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Lincoln  and  His  Generals 

Clarence  Edward  Macartney 


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Lincoln  and  His  Generals 


B* 


Clarence  Edward  Macartney),  D.D. 


Illustrated  witk  Official  Pkotograpks  from 
me  War  Department,  Washington. 


DOPRANCE--  COMPANY 

Publisher* 


COPYRIGHT    1925 
OORRANCE   a    COMPANY    INC 


MANUFACTURED    IN    THE    UNITED   STATES   OF   AMERICA 


773.7  LL?> 

38  M  II 


To  the 
122,388  Surviving  Followers 

Lincoln  and  His  Generals 


CONTENTS 

Lincoln  and  Scott    15 

Lincoln  and  Fremont    29 

Lincoln  and  Butler    46 

Lincoln  and  McClellan   68 

Lincoln  and  Sherman   98 

Lincoln  and  Burnside   117 

Lincoln  and  Hooker   135 

Lincoln  and  Meade  166 

Lincoln  and  Halleck   186 

Lincoln  and  Grant 203 

Authorities    226 


LIST  OF  ILLUSTRATIONS 


Lincoln  at  Antietam Frontispiece 

Winfield   Scott    Facing  page     18 

John  C.  Fremont "  30 

Benjamin  F.  Butler "  "       46 

George  Brinton  McClellan "  68 

William  Tecumseh  Sherman "  98 

Ambrose  E.  Burnside "  "      118 

Joseph  Hooker    "  "      136 

George  Gordon  Meade "  "      166 

Henry  Wager  Halleck "  "      186 

Ulysses  S.  Grant "  "     204 


PREFACE 

The  visitor  to  Philadelphia's  beautiful  Fairmount 
Park  will  see  on  a  hill  overlooking  the  Schuylkill 
River  a  plain  board  shanty  with  the  United  States 
flag  flying  over  it.  It  is  the  cabin  used  as  head- 
quarters by  Grant  at  City  Point  on  the  James 
River,  in  1864  and  1865.  In  that  room  the  orders 
were  written  which  directed  the  far  flung  armies 
of  the  nation  in  the  last  year  of  the  Civil  War.  As 
one  passes  the  cabin  it  is  not  difficult  to  see,  in 
imagination,  some  of  the  chief  military  and  political 
actors  of  the  great  drama:  the  severe  and  scholarly 
Meade,  the  dynamic  Sheridan,  the  'superb'  Han- 
cock, the  thoughtful  Warren,  the  big  and  manly 
Burnside,  the  restless  Sherman,  with  the  fire  of 
genius  burning  in  his  eyes,  the  capable  Porter, 
Grant  smoking  a  cigar,  a  hand  thrust  into  his 
pocket,  and  Lincoln  with  his  high  silk  hat  and  frock 
coat,  and  melancholy  countenance. 

Of  the  making  of  many  books  about  Lincoln 
there  is  no  end.  But  in  this  book  the  reader  is 
invited  to  enter  a  field  which  has  been  little  tra- 
versed by  others.  Lincoln  as  a  lawyer,  as  a  poli- 
tician, as  an  executive,  as  a  story-teller,  as  an 
orator,  as  a  master  of  men,  as  a  man  of  sorrows 
and  acquainted  with  grief,  we  all  know.  But  there 
is  a  side  to  Lincoln's  character  which  cannot  be 
understood  save  by  a  study  of  his  relationships 
with  the  chief  generals  of  the  Union  armies  during 
the  war.  It  is  that  side  which  I  have  tried  to  bring 
out  in  this  series  of  papers.    In  contrast  with  Jeffer- 


PREFACE 

son  Davis,  who  had  been  trained  at  West  Point, 
who  had  served  in  the  Mexican  War  and  had  been 
Secretary  of  War  under  President  Pierce,  Lincoln 
had  no  knowledge  of  military  affairs,  save  a  brief 
and  rather  farcical  experience  as  captain  of  a  com- 
pany of  volunteers  in  the  Black  Hawk  War.  Most 
of  the  officers  whom  Jefferson  Davis  appointed  to 
high  commands  at  the  beginning  of  the  war  con- 
tinued to  occupy  places  of  prominence  until  its 
close.  But  in  the  United  States  Army  generals 
were  exalted  one  day  only  to  be  put  down  the  next. 
Until  Grant  came  on  the  stage  as  commander-in- 
chief,  nearly  every  great  battle  saw  a  new  com- 
mander for  the  Union  army  engaged. 

Major-General  W.  F.  Smith  said  of  Lincoln,  "I 
have  long  held  to  the  opinion  that  at  the  close  of 
the  war  Mr.  Lincoln  was  the  superior  of  his  gen- 
erals in  his  comprehension  of  the  effect  of  strategic 
movements  and  the  proper  methods  of  following 
up  victories. "  After  Bull  Run  Lincoln  gave  himself 
assiduously  to  the  study  of  the  campaigns  and 
mapped  out  plans  of  his  own.  Neither  McClellan 
nor  Grant  thought  highly  of  the  plans  which  he 
submitted  to  them,  and  the  student  of  Lincoln's 
relationships  to  his  generals  will  hardly  hold  the 
high  opinion  entertained  by  General  Smith.  The 
campaigns  with  which  Lincoln  had  the  most  to  do 
were  the  least  successful,  and  those  with  which  he 
had  the  least  to  do  were  the  most  successful.  After 
Grant  took  supreme  command  Lincoln  gave  the 
details  of  the  campaign  little  attention,  for  he  felt 
that  he  now  had  what  he  told  Grant  he  had  long 
been  waiting  for,  a  man  who  would  take  the  re- 

[x] 


PREFACE 

sponsibility  and  act.  Lincoln  told  Grant  when  they 
first  met  at  Washington  that  he  did  not  profess  to 
know  how  to  conduct  military  campaigns,  but  that 
the  procrastination  of  former  commanders  and  the 
pressure  from  the  people  and  from  Congress, 
always  with  him,  had  compelled  him  to  take  a  hand 
in  military  matters  and  issue  orders.  He  confessed 
that  many  of  his  orders  were  wrong. 

If  anyone  expects  that  Lincoln  will  be  held  up  in 
these  pages  as  a  military  genius,  adding  that  crown 
to  the  many  others  already  resting  upon  his  brow, 
he  will  be  disappointed.  Lincoln  was  far  from  that. 
But  he  who  would  have  some  fresh  view  of  the  in- 
finite patience  of  Lincoln,  the  peculiar  trials  and 
vexations  to  which  he  was  subjected,  the  jealousies 
and  quarrels  which  hampered  him,  the  Gethsem- 
anes  of  sorrow  and  disappointment  through  which 
he  passed,  and  his  magnificent  faith  in  the  nation 
and  in  the  cause,  may  be  repaid  by  the  reading  of 
this  book. 

Clarence  Edward  Macartney 


[xi] 


Lincoln  and  His  Generals 


LINCOLN  AND  SCOTT 

History  affords  few  instances  of  a  man  so  ad- 
vanced in  years  bearing  such  heavy  military  re- 
sponsibilities as  those  which  rested  on  the  shoul- 
ders of  Lieutenant-General  Winfield  Scott  at  the 
outbreak  of  the  Civil  War.  He  was  then  seventy- 
five  years  old,  very  heavy  and  unwieldy  in  body, 
suffering  from  a  painful  affliction  of  the  spine,  and 
for  a  number  of  years  had  been  unable  to  mount  a 
horse.  Yet  his  great  age  and  evident  infirmity  had 
not  in  any  way  diminished  the  high  regard,  and 
even  reverence,  in  which  he  was  held  when  the  be- 
ginning of  the  conflict  made  the  nation  ask  itself 
in  whom  it  could  put  its  confidence.  For  half  a 
century  he  had  played  a  great  part  in  the  affairs  of 
the  nation.  Victories  such  as  Lundy's  Lane,  won 
in  the  remote  period  of  the  War  of  1812,  and  his 
more  recent  successes  in  the  campaign  against 
Mexico,  where  with  a  small  army  of  twelve  thou- 
sand men  he  conquered  a  nation,  and  where  his 
successive  victories  seemed  to  revive  the  memo- 
ries of  Cortez,  had  won  him  great  military  renown 
both  at  home  and  abroad.  Nor  was  he  altogether 
unworthy  of  this  high  regard  as  a  soldier  and 
strategist.  His  Mexican  campaign  was  a  splendid 
piece  of  military  thinking  as  well  as  execution,  and 
it  has  been  said  that  there  are  few  battles  where 
the  history  of  the  engagements  coincided  with  the 
plans  and  orders  of  the  commander  as  they  did  in 
Scott's  battles  in  Mexico.     When  the  Civil  War 

[15] 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

came,  General  Scott,  although  old  and  infirm,  had 
a  far  clearer  conception  of  the  problems  of  the  war 
than  many  a  younger  officer  or  statesman.  His 
chief  fault  was  vanity.  Grant,  who  served  under 
him  in  Mexico,  thus  refers  to  this  trait:  "General 
Scott  was  precise  in  language,  cultivated  a  style 
peculiarly  his  own;  was  proud  of  his  rhetoric;  not 
averse  to  speaking  of  himself,  often  in  the  third 
person,  and  he  could  bestow  praise  upon  the  per- 
son he  was  talking  about  without  the  least  em- 
barrassment. " 

In  the  dark  and  uncertain  months  toward  the 
close  of  Buchanan's  administration,  Scott  under- 
stood thoroughly  the  perilous  situation  of  the 
United  States  forts  which  stood  within  the  states 
threatening  to  secede,  and  urged  that  measures  be 
taken  for  their  defense.  But  in  this  he  was  balked, 
partly  through  the  timidity  of  Buchanan,  partly 
through  the  treasonable  plans  of  men  in  his  ad- 
ministration, and  partly  through  the  lack  of  means 
and  men.  As  far  back  as  1857  Scott  had  said  to 
Sherman,  just  returned  from  California,  "The  coun- 
try is  on  the  verge  of  a  terrible  civil  war."  When 
South  Carolina  threatened  to  secede  from  the 
Union  in  1832  Scott  was  in  command  of  the  forces 
sent  to  Charleston  by  President  Jackson,  and  his 
experience  upon  that  occasion  undoubtedly  made 
him  anxious  for  the  outcome  of  the  new  agitation. 
In  October,  1860,  he  submitted  to  President 
Buchanan  his  "Views  suggested  by  the  imminent 
danger  of  a  disruption  of  the  Union  by  the  seces- 
sion of  one  or  more  of  the  Southern  States."  In 
this  document,  sent  to  the  president-elect  Lincoln 

[16] 


LINCOLN  AND  SCOTT 

also,  Scott  states  his  fear  that  if  the  Union  is 
broken,  an  effort  to  restore  it  by  military  force 
would  create  a  state  of  anarchy  in  the  nation.  As 
a  lesser  evil  he  suggested  the  formation  of  four 
new  unions,  the  Eastern  Northern  States,  the  Old 
South,  the  Middle  West,  and  the  Far  West.  That 
so  distinguished  a  man  as  Scott  should  have  made 
this  curious  and  preposterous  suggestion  shows 
how  much  men's  confidence  in  the  perpetuity  of 
the  Union  had  been  shaken. 

Before  Lincoln  came  to  Washington,  Scott  had 
entered  into  correspondence  with  him,  telling  him 
of  his  wish  to  co-operate  with  him  in  the  effort  to 
save  the  Union.  In  response  to  some  complimen- 
tary words  from  the  president-elect,  Scott  wrote, 
using  the  third  person  style  to  which  Grant  refers, 
"Lieutenant-General  Scott  is  highly  gratified  with 
the  favorable  opinion  entertained  of  him  by  the 
president-elect,  as  he  learns  through  Senators 
Baker  and  Cameron,  also  personal  friends  of 
General  Scott,  who  is  happy  to  reciprocate  his 
highest  respect  and  esteem.  The  president-elect 
may  rely  with  confidence  on  General  Scott's  ut- 
most exertions  in  the  service  of  his  country  (the 
Union)  both  before  and  after  the  approaching 
inauguration."  To  this  Lincoln  replied,  "Permit 
me  to  renew  to  you  the  assurance  of  my  high  ap- 
preciation of  the  many  past  services  you  have  ren- 
dered the  Union,  and  my  deep  gratification  at  this 
evidence  of  your  present  active  exertions  to  main- 
tain the  integrity  and  the  honor  of  the  nation." 

As  the  day  for  inauguration  approached  General 
Scott  was  greatly  concerned  for  the  safety  of  Lin- 

[17] 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

coin.  He  warned  him  at  Philadelphia  of  the  plot 
to  assassinate  him,  and  it  was  on  the  strength  of 
this  warning  that  the  change  of  plans  was  made 
and  the  president-elect  hurried  to  Washington 
secretly  and  by  night.  On  the  day  of  the  inaugura- 
tion Scott  had  troops  posted  throughout  the  city, 
and  was  himself  not  far  from  a  battery  of  guns 
placed  in  a  commanding  position.  The  day  pre- 
vious he  had  written  to  Governor  Seward  a  letter 
dealing  with  the  possible  courses  to  be  taken 
by  the  new  President.  He  suggested  four: 
1.  Adopt  the  conciliatory  measure  of  the  Critten- 
den Compromise.  2.  Collect  duties  outside  the 
ports  of  seceding  states,  or  blockade  them.  3.  Con- 
quer the  seceding  states  by  invading  armies.  4. 
Say  to  the  seceded  states,  "Wayward  sisters,  go 
in  peace."  General  Longstreet  in  his  book,  Manassas 
to  Appomattox,  says  that  if  that  policy  had  been  fol- 
lowed and  the  "wayward  sisters"  permitted  to  go 
out  in  peace,  it  would  have  been  but  a  short  time 
before  they  would  have  come  back  into  a  stronger 
Union.  But  He  who  decrees  the  destinies  of  men 
and  nations  had  determined  otherwise,  for  not  only 
was  the  Union  to  be  preserved  and  restored,  but 
the  whole  nation  was  to  drink  a  cup  of  woe  due  to 
those  by  whom  the  offense  of  slavery  had  come. 

General  Scott's  great  wish  to  avoid  a  conflict  in 
arms  was  due  to  the  fact  that  he  was  one  of  the  few 
men  who  foresaw  the  desolation  and  suffering  such 
a  war  would  bring  in  its  train.  In  commenting  on 
his  third  possible  course  for  Lincoln  to  follow,  that 
is,  conquer  the  seceding  states  by  invading  armies, 
he  said,  "No  doubt  this  might  be  done  in  two  or 

[18] 


WINFIELD  SCOTT 


LINCOLN  AND  SCOTT 

three  years,  by  a  young  and  able  general — a  Wolfe, 
a  Dessaix,  or  a  Hoche — with  three  hundred  thou- 
sand disciplined  men  (kept  up  to  that  number), 
estimating  a  third  for  garrisons,  and  the  loss  of  a 
yet  greater  number  by  skirmishes,  sieges,  battles 
and  Southern  fevers.  The  destruction  of  life  and 
property  in  the  other  side  would  be  frightful,  how- 
ever perfect  the  moral  discipline  of  the  invaders. 
The  conquest  completed  at  enormous  waste  of  life 
to  the  North  and  the  Northwest,  with  at  least  two 
hundred  and  fifty  million  dollars  added  thereto, 
and  cui  bono?  Fifteen  desolated  Provinces!  Not  to 
be  brought  into  harmony  with  their  conquerors,  to 
be  held  for  generations  by  heavy  garrisons,  at  an 
expense  quadruple  the  net  duties  or  taxes  which  it 
would  be  possible  to  extort  from  them,  followed  by 
a  Protector  or  Emperor."  However  far  the  vener- 
able general  was  from  understanding  the  temper 
of  the  North,  his  certainly  was  a  true  and,  among 
his  contemporaries,  a  rare  understanding  of  what 
civil  war  would  mean. 

Lincoln  had  not  been  in  office  long  before  he 
directed  General  Scott  to  send  him  a  daily  report 
of  the  military  situation.  Thus  did  the  new  pilot 
of  the  ship  of  state  at  the  very  beginning  put  him- 
self into  the  closest  relationship  with  the  direction 
of  the  military  efforts  of  the  nation.  Colonel  A.  K. 
McClure  in  his  Lincoln  and  Men  of  War  Times  relates 
a  meeting  which  he  and  Governor  Curtin  of  Penn- 
sylvania had  with  Scott  and  Lincoln  at  the  White 
House,  a  few  days  after  the  firing  on  the  flag  at 
Sumter.  McClure  and  Curtin  found  Scott  waiting 
for  them  in  the  reception  room.     The  punctilious 

[19] 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

old  general  who  could  stand  only  with  great  dis- 
comfort, refused  to  be  seated  because  there  were 
only  two  chairs  in  the  room,  and  remained  stand- 
ing during  the  wait  of  half  an  hour.  McClure 
asked  Scott  if  the  capital  was  not  in  danger.  "No, 
sir,"  answered  Scott.  "No,  sir;  the  capital  is  not 
in  danger."  McClure  then,  with  some  hesitation, 
for  he  had  shared  in  the  reverence  with  which  the 
public  regarded  Scott,  asked  him  how  many  men  he 
had  in  Washington  for  its  defense.  Scott  replied, 
"Fifteen  hundred,  sir;  fifteen  hundred  men  and  two 
batteries."  McClure  ventured  yet  further  and 
asked  if  Washington  was  a  defensible  city.  With  a 
shadow  on  his  face,  Scott  answered,  "No,  sir, 
Washington  is  not  a  defensible  city."  He  then 
pointed  to  a  sloop  of  war  which  was  visible  in  the 
distant  Potomac  and  said,  "You  see  that  vessel? — 
a  sloop  of  war,  sir,  a  sloop  of  war."  McClure  re- 
flected how  a  battery  on  the  heights  of  Arlington 
would  make  short  work  of  the  sloop  of  war  and 
was  not  reassured.  He  then  asked  the  old  warrior 
how  many  men  Beauregard  had  under  him  at 
Charleston.  In  tremulous  tones  Scott  replied, 
"General  Beauregard  commands  more  men  at 
Charleston  than  I  now  command  on  the  continent 
east  of  the  frontier."  McClure  then  repeated  his 
question,  "General,  is  not  Washington  in  danger?" 
This  roused  Scott,  who  said  with  soldierly  dignity 
and  finality,  "No,  sir,  the  capital  can't  be  taken; 
the  capital  can't  be  taken,  sir."  During  the  dialogue 
between  McClure  and  Scott,  Lincoln  remained  a 
quiet  listener,  twirling  his  spectacles  around  his 
fingers.     When  Scott  gave  his  final  answer,  Lin- 

[20] 


LINCOLN  AND  SCOTT 

coin  said  to  him,  "It  does  seem  to  me,  General,  that 
if  I  were  Beauregard  I  could  take  Washington." 
But  this  only  brought  from  Scott,  with  renewed 
emphasis,  his  former  assertion,  "Mr.  President, 
the  capital  can't  be  taken,  sir;  it  can't  be  taken." 
McClure  and  Curtin  went  away  from  the  interview 
convinced  that  the  "great  Chieftain  of  two  wars 
and  the  worshipped  Captain  of  the  Age  was  in  his 
dotage  and  utterly  unequal  to  the  great  duty  of 
meeting  the  impending  conflict." 

However  unfit  he  may  have  been  for  military 
execution  and  leadership,  and  none  is  disposed  to 
doubt  that  he  was,  Scott  grasped  the  problems  of 
the  war  and  comprehended  the  gigantic  task  that 
was  before  the  nation.  He  was  opposed  to  a  direct 
attack  through  Virginia  and  proposed  instead  the 
blockade  of  the  ports  of  the  South,  while  a  large 
and  well-drilled  army  advanced  down  the  Missis- 
sippi Valley  to  New  Orleans.  This  plan  was  out- 
lined in  a  letter  Scott  wrote  to  McClellan,  in  which 
he  said  the  Government  proposed  to  raise  twenty- 
five  thousand  more  regular  troops  and  sixty  thou- 
sand volunteers  for  three  years.  After  the  autumnal 
frosts  had  killed  the  virus  of  malignant  fevers  in 
the  river  bottoms  the  invading  army  of  eighty 
thousand  men,  moving  partly  on  the  rivers  and 
partly  by  land,  was  to  proceed  down  the  Missis- 
sippi and  clear  the  Mississippi  Valley  to  the  Gulf. 
But  the  populace  at  the  North  could  not  tolerate 
the  thought  of  waiting  until  November  before 
marching  against  the  enemy,  and  heaped  derision 
upon  Scott's  soldierly  plan.  The  newspapers  pub- 
lished cartoons  showing  a  monster  serpent,  with 

[21] 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

General  Scott's  head,  coiled  round  the  Cotton 
States,  and  called  it  "Scott's  Anaconda."  But  wis- 
dom was  justified  of  her  children.  The  ports  of 
the  South  had  to  be  blockaded  and  a  much  larger 
army  than  even  Scott  had  proposed  had  to  fight  its 
way  to  the  Gulf,  ere  the  Father  of  Waters  "flowed 
unvexed  to  the  sea." 

General  Scott  was  a  Virginian,  and  when  that 
state  seceded  from  the  Union  to  whose  glory  it 
had  made  so  notable  a  contribution,  there  were 
hopes  in  the  South  that  Scott  would  do  as  Lee  and 
other  Virginians  had  done  and  throw  in  his  lot  with 
the  Confederacy.  Had  not  Virginia  presented 
Scott  with  a  handsomely  engraved  gold  sword 
after  his  victories  in  the  War  of  1812?  But  they 
reckoned  not  with  their  man.  Stephen  A.  Douglas, 
on  his  way  to  the  West  to  arouse  loyalty  to  the 
Government,  answered  the  questions  about  the 
loyalty  of  Scott  by  relating  a  conversation  he  had 
with  the  Chairman  of  the  Committee  of  the  Vir- 
ginia Convention  appointed  to  wait  on  Scott  and 
offer  him  the  command  of  the  Virginia  troops. 
Scott  heard  them  patiently  and  then  said,  "I  have 
served  my  country  under  the  flag  of  the  Union  for 
more  than  fifty  years,  and  as  long  as  God  permits 
me  to  live  I  will  defend  that  flag  with  my  sword, 
even  if  my  own  native  state  assails  it."  When  the 
spokesman  of  the  Committee  had  intimated  some- 
thing about  the  honor  and  prestige  which  might 
be  his  if  he  led  the  troops  of  Virginia,  Scott  held 
up  his  hand  in  solemn  protest  and  said,  "Friend 
Robertson,  go  no  farther.     It  is  best  that  we  part 

[22] 


LINCOLN  AND  SCOTT 

here  before  you  compel  me  to  resent  a  mortal 
insult." 

Other  Virginians  who  put  their  country  above 
their  state  were  Admiral  Farragut  and  General 
Thomas.  Robert  E.  Lee  had  been  Scott's  Chief  of 
Staff  in  Mexico  and  Scott  entertained  the  highest 
opinion  of  his  ability.  In  his  memorial  address  for 
Lee,  at  Louisville,  General  Preston  said  that  long 
before  the  Civil  War  Scott  had  said  to  him  that 
Lee  was  America's  greatest  living  soldier,  and 
added,  "I  tell  you  that  if  I  were  on  my  deathbed 
tomorrow,  and  the  President  of  the  United  States 
should  tell  me  that  a  great  battle  was  to  be  fought 
for  the  liberty  or  slavery  of  the  country,  and  he 
asked  my  judgment  as  to  the  ability  of  a  com- 
mander, I  would  say  with  my  dying  breath,  "Let  it 
be  Robert  E.  Lee."  When  the  Civil  War  came, 
Scott  had  not  changed  his  opinion  of  Lee,  and  it 
must  have  been  he  who  suggested  to  Lincoln  that 
Lee  be  asked  to  take  command  in  the  field.  Three 
days  after  Virginia  had  seceded,  Lincoln  sent  F.  B. 
Blair,  senior,  to  ask  Lee  his  intentions  and  unoffi- 
cially offer  him  the  command  of  the  Union  army. 
Lee  declined  the  offer,  saying  that  although  op- 
posed to  secession  and  deprecating  war,  he  could 
take  no  part  in  an  invasion  of  the  Southern  States. 
Without  a  doubt  one  of  the  reasons  why  Lincoln 
regarded  Scott  with  such  admiration  and  affection 
was  his  steadfast  loyalty  to  the  Union. 

With  scores  of  officers  in  the  army  and  navy  sur- 
rendering their  commissions  and  going  over  to  the 
side  of  the  South  every  day,  Lincoln  must  have  had 
deep  anxiety  concerning  the  loyalty  of  the  remain- 

[23] 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

ing  officers.  The  resignation  of  no  officer  caused 
him  such  pain  and  amazement  as  that  of 
Colonel  John  B.  Magruder,  1st  Artillery,  in  com- 
mand of  a  light  battery  on  which  Scott  placed  par- 
ticular reliance  for  the  safety  of  Washington.  When 
he  heard  of  this  officer's  defection  Lincoln  ex- 
claimed, "Only  three  days  ago  Magruder  came  vol- 
untarily to  me  in  this  room,  and  with  his  own  lips 
and  in  my  presence  repeated  over  and  over  again 
his  asseveration  and  protestations  of  loyalty  and 
fidelity."  Scott,  at  least,  Lincoln  knew  he  could 
trust.  Beneath  his  boasting  and  pomposity  there 
lay  a  real  veneration  for  the  Constitution  and  a 
love  for  the  flag  he  had  served  for  more  than  fifty 
years.  Even  if  his  contribution  to  the  military 
efforts  of  the  country  in  the  crisis  of  the  war  was 
small,  the  old  warrior's  patriotic  example  was 
worth  many  regiments  of  soldiers  to  the  North. 

With  the  impatient  and  outraged  North  clamor- 
ing for  action,  and  the  New  York  Tribune  printing 
every  day  at  the  head  of.its  columns  the  words,  "On 
to  Richmond!  The  rebel  Congress  must  not  be 
allowed  to  meet  there  on  the  20th  of  July;  by  that 
date  the  place  must  be  held  by  the  National  army!" 
Lincoln  and  his  political  advisers  finally  decided 
upon  a  forward  movement  of  the  army  which  had 
been  assembled  about  Washington.  The  fateful 
council  was  held  at  the  White  House  on  the  29th 
of  June,  with  the  Cabinet  and  the  chief  military 
officers  in  attendance.  General  Scott  opposed  the 
move  against  the  Confederate  army  at  Manassas, 
and  favored  longer  preparation  and  then  a  move 
down  the  Mississippi  Valley.    But  when  his  advice 

[24] 


LINCOLN  AND  SCOTT 

was  overruled  he  read  to  the  council  a  plan  of 
action  against  Manassas  which  General  McDowell 
had  prepared  and  which  Scott  had  approved. 
Scott  has  been  criticized  for  dividing  his  forces, 
one  army  under  McDowell  and  the  other  under 
Patterson  near  Harper's  Ferry.  But  he  was  con- 
fident that  Patterson  could  keep  watch  on  the  force 
under  Joseph  E.  Johnston  opposing  him,  and 
should  Johnston  try  to  go  to  reinforce  Beauregard 
at  Bull  Run,  follow  hard  on  his  heels.  In  all  this 
Patterson  failed  dismally,  and  McDowell's  plans  at 
Bull  Run  went  for  nothing  because  Johnston's 
army  reinforced  Beauregard  at  the  critical  moment. 
All  through  the  hours  of  that  eventful  Sabbath, 
Scott  was  confident  of  victory,  for,  as  in  his  Mexi- 
can campaigns,  he  had  not  let  the  army  go  forward 
until  the  whole  movement  had  been  thoroughly 
worked  out.  In  the  afternoon,  when  the  President 
came  to  his  office  and  awakened  him  out  of  his 
sleep,  asking  for  news,  Scott  reassured  him  and 
went  off  to  sleep  again! 

When  the  full  story  of  the  disaster  at  the  bridge 
of  Bull  Run  was  known,  Scott  reproached  himself 
for  having  permitted  the  army  to  undertake  a  cam- 
paign which  had  been  against  his  best  judgment. 
In  conversation  with  the  President  and  the  Secre- 
tary of  War,  Scott  lost  control  of  himself  and  ex- 
claimed to  the  President,  "Sir,  I  am  the  greatest 
coward  in  America.  I  will  prove  it.  I  have  fought 
this  battle,  sir,  against  my  judgment;  I  think  the 
President  of  the  United  States  ought  to  remove 
me  for  doing  it.  As  God  is  my  judge,  after  my 
superiors  had  determined  to  fight  it,  I  did  all  in  my 

[25] 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

power  to  make  the  army  efficient.  I  deserve  re- 
moval because  I  did  not  stand  up  when  my  army 
was  not  in  condition  for  fighting  and  resist  it  to 
the  last."  To  this  Lincoln  answered,  "Your  con- 
versation seems  to  imply  that  I  forced  you  to  fight 
this  battle?"  General  Scott  then  replied,  "I  have 
never  served  a  President  who  has  been  kinder  to 
me  than  you  have  been." 

After  this  interview  it  must  have  been  plain  to 
the  President  that  Scott's  usefulness  as  the  com- 
mander-in-chief was  at  an  end.  For  some 
months  after  McClellan  came  to  take  command  of 
the  army  in  the  field  Scott  was  retained  in  supreme 
command.  But  McClellan  paid  him  little  deference, 
and  reported  to  the  Secretary  of  War  and  the  Presi- 
dent over  Scott's  head.  At  length  Scott,  accept- 
ing the  inevitable,  removed  himself  from  this  im- 
possible position  by  requesting  that  he  be  relieved 
of  his  command,  pleading  old  age  and  infirmity. 
In  the  order  announcing  the  retirement  of  Scott, 
Lincoln  said,  "The  American  people  will  hear  with 
sadness  and  deep  emotion  that  General  Scott  has 
withdrawn  from  active  control  of  the  army,  while 
the  President  and  a  unanimous  Cabinet  express 
their  own  and  the  nation's  sympathy  in  his  personal 
affliction,  and  their  profound  sense  of  the  impor- 
tant public  services  rendered  by  him  to  his  country 
during  his  long  and  brilliant  career,  among  which 
will  ever  be  gratefully  distinguished  his  faithful 
devotion  to  the  Constitution,  the  Union  and  the 
flag  when  assailed  by  parricidal  rebellion."  In  his 
message  to  Congress,  on  December  3,  1861,  Lin- 
coln called  the  attention  of  Congress  to  the  retire- 

[26] 


LINCOLN  AND  SCOTT 

ment  of  Scott  in  these  words,  "Since  your  last  ad- 
journment Lieutenant-General  Scott  has  retired 
from  the  head  of  the  army.  During  his  long  life 
the  nation  has  not  been  unmindful  of  his  merit; 
yet,  on  calling  to  mind  how  faithfully,  ably  and 
brilliantly  he  has  served  the  country,  from  a  time 
far  back  in  our  history  when  few  of  the  now  living 
had  been  born,  and  thenceforward  continually,  I 
cannot  but  think  we  are  still  his  debtors.  I  submit, 
therefore,  for  your  consideration  what  further  mark 
of  recognition  is  due  to  him  and  to  ourselves  as  a 
grateful  people."  In  1863,  General  Scott,  who 
hitherto  had  been  only  a  Brevet  Lieutenant-General 
was  made  a  full  Lieutenant-General. 

General  McClellan  relates  how  at  four  o'clock  on 
a  dark  November  morning  he  saw  his  former  chief 
off  on  the  train  when  he  left  Washington.  In  a 
philosophical  turn  of  mind  he  thus  meditates  on  the 
exit  of  Scott:  "The  sight  of  this  morning  was  a 
lesson  to  me  which  I  hope  not  soon  to  forget.  I 
saw  there  the  end  of  a  long,  active  and  ambitious 
life,  the  end  of  the  career  of  the  first  soldier  of  his 
nation;  and  it  was  a  feeble  old  man,  scarce  able  to 
walk,  hardly  any  one  there  to  see  him  off  but  his 
successor.  Should  I  ever  become  vainglorious  and 
ambitious,  remind  me  of  that  spectacle. "  In  less 
than  a  year  General  McClellan,  stripped  of  his  high 
command,  departed  from  the  same  station  and 
made  way  for  his  successors.  So  passes  the  glory 
of  this  world. 

Only  twice  again  did  Lincoln  and  Scott  meet  in 
this  world.  The  first  meeting  was  at  West  Point 
in  the  latter  part  of  June,  1862.     The  only  record 

[27] 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

of  this  mysterious  meeting  is  a  memorandum  from 
the  hand  of  Scott  for  the  President,  giving  his  ad- 
vice on  the  military  situation  and  urging  that  Gen- 
eral McDowell's  division  which  was  being  held 
back  from  McClellan  be  sent  forward  at  once.  This 
letter  was  written  just  two  days  before  Lee  at- 
tacked McClellan's  right  at  Cold  Harbor  and  began 
the  Seven  Days'  battle.  It  is  significant  that  at  so 
critical  a  juncture  Lincoln  should  have  absented 
himself  from  the  capital  and  gone  to  West  Point 
to  consult  with  the  retired  Lieutenant-General. 
There  could  be  no  better  evidence  of  how  highly 
Lincoln  esteemed  his  counsel.  It  is  generally  sup- 
posed that  at  this  meeting  General  Scott  advised 
Lincoln  to  call  Halleck  to  Washington  as  Com- 
mander-in-Chief and  unite  the  three  independent 
armies  of  Fremont,  Banks  and  McDowell  under 
General  Pope.  This  was  the  course  soon  followed 
by  Lincoln.  The  second  and  last  meeting  between 
Scott  and  Lincoln  was  when  the  latter  lay  in  state 
at  the  City  Hall  in  New  York,  and  the  venerable 
Lieutenant-General  was  the  most  conspicuous 
among  the  thousands  of  mourners  who  passed  by 
the  still  form  of  the  martyred  President,  whose 
military  and  political  perplexities  were  now  forever 
at  an  end. 


[28] 


LINCOLN  AND  FREMONT 

When  the  Civil  War  broke  out  there  was  no  man 
to  whom,  as  an  organizer  of  victory,  the  people  of 
the  North  looked  with  greater  hope  and  confidence 
than  they  did  to  John  C.  Fremont.  He  was  in 
France  when  hostilities  commenced,  but  returned 
at  once.  The  leaders  of  the  Government  regarded 
him  with  the  same  favor  in  which  he  was  held  by 
the  people  at  large.  As  early  as  December,  1860, 
Seward  had  suggested  him  to  Lincoln  for  Secretary 
of  War,  and  upon  his  return  from  Europe,  July  1, 
1861,  when  he  landed  at  New  York  he  was  handed 
his  commission  as  major-general  in  the  regular 
army,  and  three  days  later  was  assigned  to  the 
Department  of  Missouri,  with  headquarters  at  St. 
Louis.  Meade  was  not  made  a  major-general  in 
the  regular  army  until  after  Gettysburg,  and 
Thomas  not  until  after  Nashville;  but  Fremont,  as 
soon  as  he  appeared  on  the  shores  of  his  native 
land  was  given  this  high  rank  and  appointed  to  one 
of  the  most  important  commands  in  the  whole  field 
of  military  operations.  But  not  many  months 
were  to  pass  by  before  the  people  and  the  Govern- 
ment suffered  a  great  disappointment  and  disillu- 
sionment as  to  the  capacities  of  their  hero.  No 
man  in  the  Union  Army  rose  so  quickly  to  so  high 
an  eminence;  none  suffered  so  complete  an  eclipse 
of  fame. 

It  will  be  clear  to  the  reader  that  the  man  who 
was  given  so  high  a  rank  and  so  important  a  post 

[29] 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

by  his  Government,  and  with  the  unanimous  ap- 
proval of  the  people  of  the  country,  must  have 
possessed  a  more  than  ordinary  personality.  What 
was  it  about  Fremont  that  had  captured  the  public 
admiration  and  won  the  esteem  of  the  thoughtful 
men  who  were  anxiously  casting  about  for  captains 
who  should  lead  the  armies  to  victory  and  put  down 
the  rebellion?  The  best  answer  to  this  is  a  brief 
sketch  of  Fremont. 

John  C.  Fremont  was  born  in  Savanah,  Georgia, 
in  1813,  the  son  of  a  French  father  and  a  Vir- 
ginian mother.  As  a  student  at  the  College  of 
Charleston  he  showed  marked  ability  in  the  field 
of  mathematics,  but  his  disregard  of  discipline  led 
to  his  expulsion  from  the  college.  Some  years  later 
he  was  appointed  an  instructor  of  mathematics  on 
board  the  sloop  of  war  Natchez,  and  after  his  return 
from  a  long  cruise  to  South  America  was  ap- 
pointed a  professor  in  the  United  States  Navy.  But 
he  chose  instead  to  take  employment  in  companies 
surveying  routes  for  railroads  over  the  mountains 
from  Charleston  to  Cincinnati.  In  1838  he  was 
commissioned  Second  Lieutenant  of  Topographical 
Engineers  in  the  United  States  Army,  and  served 
for  three  years  as  an  assistant  to  Nicollet,  the 
French  surveyor,  who  had  been  engaged  by  the 
Government  to  survey  the  territory  lying  between 
the  upper  waters  of  the  Mississippi  and  the  Mis- 
souri Rivers.  The  young  engineer  had  strength- 
ened his  position  by  marrying  Jessie  Benton,  the 
gifted  and  beautiful  daughter  of  the  famous  senator 
from  Missouri,  Thomas  H.  Benton.  Through  the 
influence  of  Benton,  Fremont  secured  successive 

[30] 


JOHN  C.  FREMONT 


LINCOLN  AND  FREMONT 

commissions  to  explore  and  survey  the  whole 
Rocky  Mountain  territory.  His  official  reports  of 
the  experiences  of  his  party,  the  lakes,  mountains, 
rivers,  thrilling  escapes  in  rushing  torrents  or  from 
encounters  with  wild  beasts  or  wilder  savages,  were 
read  with  the  greatest  avidity  by  the  people,  and 
Fremont's  name  was  upon  every  lip.  At  the  time 
of  the  outbreak  of  the  Mexican  War,  Fremont, 
then  on  the  Pacific  Coast,  helped  to  complete  the 
conquest  of  California.  His  activities  brought  him 
into  conflict  with  the  military  commander,  General 
Philip  Kearny,  afterwards  killed  at  the  second  bat- 
tle of  Bull  Run,  and  Fremont  was  sent  to  Wash- 
ington under  arrest.  There  a  court-martial  found 
him  guilty  of  mutiny,  disobedience  and  conduct 
prejudicial  to  military  discipline,  and  sentenced 
him  to  be  dismissed  from  the  service.  President 
Polk  approved  the  findings  of  the  court-martial, 
except  as  to  mutiny.  This  trial  did  no  injury  what- 
ever to  Fremont's  growing  reputation.  He  con- 
tinued under  private  auspices  his  explorations  and 
surveys  in  the  West,  and  in  1849  was  elected  as  one 
of  the  first  senators  from  California. 

At  the  Convention  of  the  National  Republican 
party  in  Philadelphia  in  1856  Fremont  was  unan- 
imously and  enthusiastically  elected  as  the  first 
standard  bearer  of  the  Republican  party,  his  youth, 
good  looks,  superior  education,  the  thrill  and 
romance  of  his  exploits  in  the  great  West  and  his 
denunciations  of  slavery,  all  combining  to  make 
him  an  ideal  candidate  fitted  to  kindle  the  enthu- 
siasms of  the  young  voters  and  lead  to  victory  the 
newborn  party.   In  the  exciting  and  feverish  cam- 

[31] 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

paign  which  followed,  Fremont  was  defeated  by 
Buchanan.  Yet  his  popular  vote  was  not  far  be- 
hind that  of  the  successful  candidate.  One  of  the 
incidents  of  the  campaign  was  the  charge  that  Fre- 
mont was  a  Catholic,  it  being  the  time  when  there 
was  a  party  in  the  field  with  an  anti-Catholic  plank 
in  its  platform.  One  of  the  chief  things  brought 
forward  as  evidence  that  Fremont  was  a  Catholic 
was  the  fact  that  he  had  carved  the  Cross  on  the 
side  of  one  of  the  mountains  he  had  discovered  in 
the  far  West,  thus  following  in  the  path  of  De  Soto 
and  Columbus  and  other  Roman  Catholic  dis- 
coverers. 

Although  defeated  for  the  Presidency,  Fremont's 
fame  was  secure,  and  when  the  Civil  War  began  it 
was  inevitable  that  he  should  be  regarded  as  one  of 
the  men,  if  not  the  man,  for  the  hour.  It  will  be 
observed  that  the  career  of  Fremont,  from  his 
youthful  escapades  down  to  his  leading  the  Repub- 
lican party  in  its  first  battle,  had  in  it  all  those  ele- 
ments which  arouse  the  interest  of  the  people  and 
invest  personality  with  a  halo  of  romance  and  pop- 
ular interest.  When  the  great  day  came  which  was 
to  try  men's  souls,  everybody  looked  for  great 
things  from  Fremont,  the  "Pathfinder."  As  he  had 
found  a  path  to  the  Pacific  through  the  wilderness 
of  the  West,  so  now,  it  was  confidently  held,  he 
would  show  the  way  for  the  subjugation  of  the 
South  and  the  salvation  of  the  Union. 

For  his  chief  political  backing,  if  indeed,  with  his 
popularity  in  the  nation,  he  required  such  backing, 
Fremont  had  the  support  of  the  remarkable  Blair 
family  of  Missouri.     The  senior  Blair,  Francis  P., 

[32] 


LINCOLN  AND  FREMONT 

had  been  for  many  years  editor  of  the  Globe  at  St. 
Louis.  One  son,  Montgomery,  was  the  Postmaster- 
General,  and  Francis  P.,  Jr.,  the  ablest  of  the  three, 
had  long  been  prominent  in  Democratic  politics. 
His  energy  and  loyalty  played  a  great  part  in  sav- 
ing Missouri  for  the  Union.  Two  years  after  the 
resignation  of  Fremont  from  the  service  Lincoln 
said  that  it  was  at  the  earnest  solicitation  of  the 
Blairs  that  he  was  made  a  general  and  sent  to  St. 
Louis.  But  before  Fremont  had  finished  his  chap- 
ter in  the  military  history  of  the  war,  the  Blairs, 
who  had  brought  him  forward,  became  his  bitter 
enemies. 

Fremont  received  his  commission  as  major- 
general  in  the  Regular  Army  on  July  1,  1861,  and 
had  the  Western  Department,  comprising  the  ter- 
ritory of  Missouri,  Illinois,  Kentucky  and  Kansas, 
created  for  him  on  July  3rd.  But  two  weeks  passed 
before  he  accepted  his  commission  and  almost  a 
month  before  he  appeared  at  St.  Louis,  and  that  in 
spite  of  the  critical  state  of  affairs  in  that  sector. 
Montgomery  Blair,  the  Postmaster-General,  re- 
lates how  embarrassed  he  was  during  this  period 
of  delay  by  the  President's  daily  inquiries  as  to  the 
movements  of  Fremont.  The  creation  of  a  new 
army  is  always  a  difficult  undertaking,  and  Fre- 
mont soon  showed  his  complete  ineptitude  for  his 
task.  Honest  himself,  he  became  the  prey  of 
contractors  and  rogues  who  exploited  his  depart- 
ment for  their  own  profit.  General  Sherman  tells 
how,  on  a  visit  to  Fremont's  headquarters,  he  was 
surprised  to  find  there  in  places  of  trust  and  in- 
fluence so  many  of  the  rogues  and  knaves  he  had 

[33] 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

known  when  in  California,  and  says  that  when  he 
saw  them  there  came  to  his  mind  the  saying, 
"Where  the  vultures  are,  there  is  a  carcass  close 
by."    And  such  indeed  proved  to  be  the  case. 

Fremont's  utter  lack  of  ability  to  organize  an 
army  and  plan  for  victory  was  accompanied  by 
extreme  military  pomp  and  parade.  He  had  for  his 
bodyguard  a  band  of  horsemen  most  of  whom  were 
Hungarians,  among  them  the  gallant  Major 
Zagonyi.  Of  all  high  commanders  Fremont  was 
the  most  difficult  of  access,  and  that  very  isolation 
and  inaccessibility  was  one  of  the  causes  of  his 
downfall.  On  August  10,  1861,  the  heroic  General 
Lyon  was  killed  while  leading  a  charge  against 
the  immensely  superior  Confederate  force  at  Wil- 
son's Creek,  and  the  army  he  had  commanded  re- 
treated northward.  This  reverse,  due  to  the  dila- 
toriness  of  Fremont  in  sending  up  reinforcements, 
made  Fremont,  heretofore  accustomed  only  to 
popular  favor,  the  object  of  severe  criticism.  He 
now  began  to  bestir  himself,  but  his  activities 
seemed  to  arouse  everywhere  complaint  and  suspi- 
cion, and  it  was  openly  hinted  that  he  had  some 
secret  purpose  of  trying  Aaron  Burr's  scheme  of 
setting  up  a  dictatorship  in  the  southwest. 

When  these  complaints  about  Fremont  began  to 
come  through  to  Washington,  Lincoln  sent  by  the 
hand  of  the  Postmaster-General  a  letter  to  General 
David  Hunter,  one  of  the  division  commanders  of 
Fremont,  requesting  Hunter  to  use  his  influence 
and  ability  in  helping  and  advising  Fremont.  This 
letter,  which  shows  how  kind  and  considerate  Lin- 
coln was  in  dealing  with  men  whom  he  had  ap- 

[34] 


LINCOLN  AND  FREMONT 

pointed  to  high  office  and  who  were  not  fulfilling 
his  expectations,  ran  as  follows: 

My  dear  Sir : 

General  Fremont  needs  assistance  which  it  is  diffi- 
cult to  give  him.  He  is  losing  the  confidence  of  men 
near  him,  whose  support  any  man  in  his  position  must 
have  to  be  successful.  His  cardinal  mistake  is  that  he 
isolates  himself,  and  allows  nobody  to  see  him;  and 
by  which  he  does  not  know  what  is  going  on  in  the 
very  matter  he  is  dealing  with.  He  needs  to  have  by 
his  side  a  man  of  large  experience.  Will  you  not,  for 
me,  take  that  place?  Your  rank  is  one  grade  too 
high  to  be  ordered  to  it;  but  will  you  not  serve  the 
country  and  oblige  me  by  taking  it  voluntarily? 

In  the  meantime  there  had  come  an  open  rupture 
between  Colonel  Francis  P.  Blair  and  Fremont, 
Blair  preferring  charges  against  Fremont  for  mal- 
administration, and  Fremont  placing  Blair  under 
arrest.  On  his  way  to  Fremont,  Montgomery  Blair 
passed  Mrs.  Fremont  on  her  way  to  Washington 
as  an  indignant  and  zealous  advocate  of  her  hus- 
band's cause  and  fortune.  She  sought  an  inter- 
view with  Lincoln  at  midnight,  asked  for  copies 
of  the  confidential  letters  about  her  husband's  case 
and  intimated  that  if  General  Fremont  should  de- 
cide to  try  conclusions  with  Lincoln,  he  could  set 
up  for  himself  without  difficulty.  In  speaking  of 
this  interview  Lincoln  said,  "She  taxed  me  so 
violently  with  many  things  that  I  had  to  exercise 
all  the  awkward  tact  I  have  to  avoid  quarreling 
with  her." 

In  the  newspapers  of  August  30,  1861,  Lincoln 
read  the  report  of  a  proclamation  which  had  just 

[35] 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

been  issued  by  Fremont  in  his  department.  In  this 
startling  proclamation  Fremont  declared  martial 
law  throughout  the  State  of  Missouri  and  further 
ordered  that  all  persons  taken  with  arms  in  their 
hands  within  his  lines  should  be  tried  by  court- 
martial  and,  if  found  guilty,  shot.  He  further  de- 
clared that  the  property  of  all  persons  in  arms 
against  the  United  States  was  confiscated  to  the 
public  use,  and  their  slaves,  if  they  possessed  them, 
were  freemen.  It  has  generally  been  supposed  that 
Fremont  had  been  stung  by  the  criticism  which  had 
been  directed  towards  him  since  the  Union  re- 
verse at  Wilson's  Creek,  and  that  he  hit  upon  this 
method  of  restoring  himself  to  public  favor. 

As  soon  as  he  had  an  authentic  copy  of  the 
despatch,  Lincoln  wrote  to  Fremont  remonstrating 
with  him  and  asking  him  to  modify  the  confisca- 
tion and  slave  clause  so  as  to  conform  to  the  act  of 
Congress.     In  this  letter  the  President  said: 

i 

My  dear  Sir : 

Two  points  in  your  proclamation  of  August  30  give 
me  some  anxiety : 

First. — Should  you  shoot  a  man,  according  to  the 
proclamation,  the  Confederates  would  very  certainly 
shoot  our  best  men  in  their  hands  in  retaliation ;  and 
so,  man  for  man,  indefinitely.  It  is,  therefore,  my 
order  that  you  allow  no  man  to  be  shot  under  the 
proclamation  without  first  having  my  approbation  or 
consent. 

Second. — I  think  there  is  great  danger  that  the  clos- 
ing paragraph,  in  relation  to  the  confiscation  of  prop- 
erty and  the  liberating  slaves  of  traitorous  owners, 
will  alarm  our  Southern  Union  friends  and  turn  them 
against  us,  perhaps  ruin  our  rather  fair  prospect  for 
Kentucky.    Allow  me,  therefore,  to  ask  that  you  will, 

[36] 


LINCOLN  AND  FREMONT 

as  of  your  own  notion,  modify  that  paragraph  so  as 
to  conform  to  the  first  and  fourth  sections  of  the  act 
of  Congress  entitled  "An  Act  to  confiscate  property 
used  for  insurrectionary  purposes,"  approved  August 
6,  1861,  and  a  copy  of  such  act  I  herewith  send  you. 
This  letter  is  written  in  a  spirit  of  caution,  and  not 
of  censure.  I  send  it  by  my  special  messenger,  in 
order  that  it  may  certainly  and  speedily  reach  you. 

In  answer  to  the  President's  letter  Fremont 
wrote  that  the  proclamation  had  been  the  inspira- 
tion of  a  single  night,  and  that  it  was  designed  to 
meet  the  dangers  which  he  foresaw  in  the  situa- 
tion which  confronted  him,  the  combination  of  the 
rebel  armies,  the  Provisional  Government  and 
home  traitors.  He  declared  that  he  could  not  of 
his  own  volition  withdraw  or  modify  the  proclama- 
tion, for  that  would  imply  that  he  had  changed  his 
mind  as  to  its  necessity  and  wisdom,  which  he  had 
not;  but  he  would  so  modify  it  in  obedience  to  an 
order  from  the  President.  This  order  was  forth- 
coming at  once  and  the  proclamation  modified  as 
the  President  had  directed.  As  for  the  shooting 
clause,  Fremont  correctly  stated  that  what  he 
meant  was  the  shooting  of  civilians  who  took  up 
arms  against  an  army  of  occupation  and  that  he 
had  no  thought  of  shooting  prisoners  of  war.  One 
of  the  Confederate  commanders  in  Missouri  issued 
a  counter-proclamation,  as  the  President  had  an- 
ticipated, declaring  that  for  every  soldier  of  the 
state  guard  or  Southern  army  so  put  to  death  he 
would  "hang,  draw  and  quarter  a  minion  of  Abra- 
ham Lincoln's."  How  much  of  this  was  pure 
bluff,  only  the  rigid  enforcement  of  Fremont's 
proclamation   could    have    determined.      But    the 

[37] 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

careful  student  of  the  first  months  of  the  war  will 
be  impressed  with  the  fact  that  while  Fremont's 
policy  of  dealing  with  the  insurrectionary  popula- 
tion was  perhaps  too  severe,  as  he  outlined  it  in  his 
proclamation,  that  pursued  by  Lincoln  was  far  too 
mild  and  conciliatory.  A  little  more  severity  in 
those  first  months,  teaching  the  people  that  it  was 
not  a  summer  picnic  to  rebel  against  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  United  States,  might  have  saved  the 
life  of  many  a  soldier,  North  and  South. 

Lincoln's  chief  objection  to  Fremont's  proclama- 
tion, however,  was  to  the  clause  about  emancipat- 
ing the  slaves  of  persons  in  arms  against  the  Gov- 
ernment. This  attitude  of  not  molesting  the  slaves 
was  the  policy  of  the  Chicago  platform  on  which 
Lincoln  stood  when  elected,  and  a  principle  he  had 
carefully  enunciated.  The  grim  logic  of  military 
and  political  history  was  soon  to  compel  him  to  de- 
part from  that  policy.  But  the  hour  was  not  yet 
come.  He  was  particularly  solicitous  about  the 
border  states  and  the  effect  Fremont's  proclama- 
tion would  have  upon  them,  especially  upon  Ken- 
tucky, then  in  the  balance.  In  a  letter  to  the  Hon- 
orable O.  H.  Browning  on  this  subject,  Lincoln 
cites  the  case  of  a  company  of  Union  volunteers 
from  Kentucky  who  threw  down  their  arms  and 
went  home  when  they  heard  of  Fremont's  emanci- 
pation proclamation.  Moreover,  he  regarded  Fre- 
mont's action  as  a  piece  of  usurpation  of  civil  au- 
thority on  the  part  of  the  military  authority.  Here 
again  the  verdict  of  history  will  be  that  Lincoln 
overestimated  the  damage  that  might  have  been 
done  by  Fremont's   proclamation   and  underesti- 

[38] 


LINCOLN  AND  FREMONT 

mated  its  good  effects.  In  a  little  more  than  a 
year  Lincoln  himself,  after  the  battle  of  Antietam, 
issued  a  preliminary  proclamation  of  emancipation 
as  a  military  measure,  precisely  on  the  grounds  of 
Fremont's.  But  by  that  time  the  suffering  of  the 
war,  the  perils  of  the  government,  and  the  sweep 
of  sentiment  in  the  North,  with  the  effect  such  a 
proclamation  would  have  upon  foreign  govern- 
ments, particularly  upon  the  British  Government, 
making  it  impossible  that  England  should  inter- 
vene in  the  war  as  against  the  side  which  had  set 
out  to  destroy  slavery — all  these  made  emancipa- 
tion natural  if  not  inevitable.  Undoubtedly,  if  a 
proclamation  of  emancipation  was  to  be  made  it 
should  have  been  universal  and  by  the  government, 
and  not  by  any  one  commander  in  the  field.  In 
this  Lincoln  was  right.  But  that  such  a  proclama- 
tion issued  in  the  summer  of  1861  would  have  seri- 
ously damaged  the  Union  cause,  or  would  have 
failed  to  meet  with  support  in  the  North,  cannot 
now  be  seriously  entertained.  As  it  was,  the  proc- 
lamation of  Fremont  aroused  the  greatest  enthu- 
siasm in  the  North.  Herndon,  Lincoln's  law  partner, 
said,  "Fremont's  proclamation  was  right;  Lincoln's 
modification  of  it  was  wrong."  Senator  Grimes  of 
Iowa  said,  "The  people  are  all  with  Fremont  and 
will  uphold  him  through  thick  and  thin — every 
body  of  every  sect,  party,  sex,  and  color  approves 
his  proclamation  in  the  Southwest  and  it  will  not 
do  for  the  administration  to  causelessly  tamper 
with  the  man  who  had  the  sublime  moral  courage 
to  issue  it."  Henry  Ward  Beecher  said  in  his  pul- 
pit, "I  cannot  but  express  my  conviction  that  both 

[39] 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

our  government,  and  in  some  greater  degree  the 
community,  have  done  great  injustice  to  the  cause 
in  Missouri,  in  the  treatment  it  has  bestowed  upon 
that  noble  man,  General  Fremont." 

After  the  disaster  which  befell  Colonel  Mulli- 
gan's force  at  Lexington,  on  the  Missouri  River,  a 
disaster  attributed  to  the  dilatoriness  and  incom- 
petence of  Fremont,  Lincoln  grew  anxious  and  dis- 
patched the  Secretary  of  War,  Cameron,  accom- 
panied by  the  Adjutant-General  of  the  Army,  to 
Fremont's  headquarters.  In  a  letter  to  the  Presi- 
dent, Cameron  tells  how  he  interviewed  Fremont 
and  of  the  latter's  grief  and  mortification  when 
Cameron  showed  him  an  order  for  his  removal.  In 
response  to  his  urgent  appeal  Cameron  promised  to 
withhold  the  order  until  he  had  returned  to  Wash- 
ington, thus  giving  Fremont  time  to  take  some 
decisive  action,  with  the  understanding  that  if  he 
should  be  successful  he  would  not  be  removed,  but 
if  he  remained  inactive  or  failed,  another  officer 
would  take  his  place.  Cameron  asked  General 
Hunter  point  blank  if  he  thought  Fremont  fit  for 
his  command  and  Hunter  replied  that  he  did  not. 
Another  officer,  General  Samuel  R.  Curtis,  in 
answer  to  the  President's  questions,  declared  that 
Fremont  lacked  the  "intelligence,  experience  and 
sagacity"  necessary  to  such  a  command,  and  that 
his  removal  was  only  a  question  of  manner  and 
time.  Public  opinion  is  an  element  of  war  which 
must  not  be  neglected.  None  knew  this  better  than 
Lincoln,  and  without  question,  public  opinion 
played  its  part  in  holding  back  the  hand  of  Lincoln 
when  it  ought  to  have  removed  Fremont  from  the 
command  for  which  he  was  obviously  unfitted. 

[40] 


LINCOLN  AND  FREMONT 

At  length  the  long-delayed  order  for  the  removal 
came  to  Fremont  through  Curtis.  But  the  letter  of 
Lincoln  to  Curtis  again  shows  his  wonderful  pa- 
tience and  kindness  and  too  great  reluctance  to 
wound  an  officer's  feelings,  even  when  the  good 
of  the  cause  was  involved.  In  this  letter  to  Curtis 
Lincoln  said: 

Dear  Sir: 

On  receipt  of  this  with  the  accompanying  enclos- 
ures, you  will  take  safe,  certain  and  suitable  measures 
to  have  the  enclosure  addressed  to  Major-General 
Fremont  delivered  to  him  with  all  reasonable  dispatch, 
subject  to  these  conditions  only,  that  if,  when  General 
Fremont  shall  be  reached  by  the  messenger — yourself 
or  any  one  sent  by  you — he  shall  then  have  in  per- 
sonal command,  fought  and  won  a  battle,  or  shall  be 
in  the  immediate  presence  of  the  enemy  in  expectation 
of  a  battle,  it  is  not  to  be  delivered,  but  held  for  fur- 
ther orders.  After,  and  not  until  after  the  delivery 
to  General  Fremont,  let  the  enclosure  addressed  to 
General  Hunter  be  delivered  to  him." 

The  agent  of  Curtis  found  Fremont  far  from  any 
engagement,  and  the  President's  orders  were  car- 
ried out  and  he  was  superseded  by  Hunter.  The 
remark  in  Lincoln's  letter  to  Curtis  about  taking 
"safe,  certain  and  suitable  measures"  to  deliver  to 
Fremont  the  order  for  his  removal  reveals  a  degree 
of  anxiety  in  the  President's  mind  as  to  the  pos- 
sible effect  of  this  order  upon  the  supporters  and 
defenders  of  Fremont,  for  through  his  ante-bellum 
record  and  his  personal  charm  Fremont  was  still 
most  popular  with  his  army  and  the  people  of 
Missouri.     But  like  a  true  soldier  Fremont  obeyed 

[41] 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

the  order  for  his  removal  with  promptness  and  dig- 
nity and  the  change  was  effected  with  hardly  a 
ripple  of  excitement.  When  Fremont  returned  to 
St.  Louis  the  people  gave  him  a  remarkable  demon- 
stration and  presented  him  with  a  gold  sword.  It 
was  more  like  the  return  of  a  victorious  marshal 
than  the  retirement  of  an  unsuccessful  general. 

Fremont  was  not  long  out  of  employment,  for 
Lincoln  created  for  him  the  Department  of  the 
Mountains,  embracing  the  West  Virginia  moun- 
tains and  adjacent  territory.  His  appointment  was 
due  to  the  great  kindness  of  the  President,  who 
wished  to  give  him  another  chance,  and  also  to  the 
fact  that  he  was  still  a  popular  figure  with  thou- 
sands of  people  in  the  North  who  considered  that 
he  had  been  ill-used  in  Missouri.  In  May,  1862, 
when  McClellan  was  operating  against  Richmond, 
"Stonewall"  Jackson  broke  out  in  the  Shenandoah 
Valley,  defeating  Banks  at  Winchester  and  com- 
pelling him  to  retreat  upon  the  Potomac.  It  was 
at  this  juncture  that  Lincoln  detached  McDowell's 
corps  from  McClellan's  army  and  sent  it  to  aid  in 
the  pursuit  of  Jackson.  Shields,  of  McDowell's 
army,  was  to  go  into  the  Shenandoah  Valley  from 
the  east,  Fremont  from  the  mountains  in  the  west, 
and  Banks  from  the  north.  It  was  a  bit  of  strategy 
worked  out  by  Lincoln  and  it  ought  to  have  suc- 
ceeded, for  Jackson  was  between  three  armies. 
That  it  did  not  succeed  was  due  in  part  to  the 
slowness  of  Fremont,  who  permitted  Jackson  to 
reach  Strassburg  before  he  did,  although  Jackson 
had  been  marching  and  fighting  for  a  month.  Had 

[42] 


LINCOLN  AND  FREMONT 

Fremont  followed  the  route  telegraphed  him  by 
Lincoln  he  would  have  intercepted  Jackson,  but  he 
chose  another  route  and  the  result  was  the  escape 
of  the  Confederate  army.  After  this  fiasco  the 
three  armies,  Fremont's,  Banks',  and  McDowell's, 
were  united  as  the  Army  of  Virginia  with  General 
Pope  commanding.  Fremont  considered  it  an 
affront  to  his  dignity  to  serve  under  Pope,  whom 
he  outranked,  and  resigned  his  commission.  With 
much  better  reason  the  other  two  commanders, 
Banks  and  McDowell,  might  have  resented  being 
put  under  Pope,  but  like  true  soldiers  and  patriots 
they  acquiesced  in  the  new  arrangement.  This 
closing  incident  of  Fremont's  military  career  was 
the  least  creditable  to  him  and  gives  us  an  index 
to  his  character.  In  him  the  ego  was  supreme, 
not  in  the  offensive  manner  of  some,  for  those  who 
came  into  personal  contact  with  him  were  always 
charmed;  but  his  quitting  the  service  of  the  coun- 
try at  one  of  the  darkest  hours  of  the  Civil  War 
reveals  the  fact  that  he  put  self  above  country. 
His  conduct  in  asking  to  be  relieved  when  Pope 
was  appointed  over  him  is  comparable  to  that  of 
another  military  egoist,  General  Hooker,  who  left 
Sherman's  army  in  Georgia  when  Sherman  chose 
Howard  to  succeed  the  fallen  McPherson. 

In  the  spring  of  1863  Lincoln  was  importuned 
to  create  a  new  department  for  General  Fremont, 
putting  him  at  the  head  of  all  the  colored  troops. 
Lincoln,  in  spite  of  his  past  experiences  with  Fre- 
mont, took  the  matter  under  consideration.  For- 
tunately for  the  country  the  appointment  was  not 

[43] 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

made.  The  singular  hold  that  Fremont  had  on  the 
imagination  of  the  people  is  revealed  by  the  fact 
that  when  in  1863  the  administration  was  looking 
about  for  a  new  commander  for  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  to  take  the  place  of  Hooker,  one  faction 
in  the  Cabinet  was  urging  the  appointment  of 
Fremont.  With  Fremont  in  command  at  Gettys- 
burg instead  of  Meade,  it  is  not  hard  to  imagine 
what  would  have  happened. 

General  Sherman  relates  that  when  he  rode  on 
the  train  with  Grant  from  Chattanooga  to  Cincin- 
nati, after  Grant  had  been  made  commander  of 
all  the  armies,  one  of  the  topics  Grant  discussed 
with  him  was  the  possibility  of  getting  back  into 
the  service  high  officers  who  had  retired  from 
active  command.  Among  those  mentioned  were 
Buell,  McClellan,  Crittenden,  McCook  and 
Fremont. 

In  the  summer  of  1864  Fremont  was  nominated 
as  the  candidate  for  President  by  the  convention  of 
radical  Republicans  meeting  in  Cleveland.  In  this 
convention  were  many  malcontents,  and  men  who 
had  fallen  out  with  the  administration.  When  he 
was  reading  the  reports  coming  in  from  the  Cleve- 
land convention  and  was  told  that  instead  of  the 
thousands  who  were  expected  to  be  present,  the 
convention  numbered  only  four  hundred,  the 
President  reached  for  the  Bible  which  lay  on  his 
desk  and,  turning  to  the  passage  in  Samuel  I, 
read,  "And  everyone  that  was  in  distress,  and 
everyone  that  was  in  debt,  and  everyone  that  was 
discontented,  gathered  themselves  unto  him;  and 
he  became  a  captain  over  them;  and  there  were 

[44] 


LINCOLN  AND  FREMONT 

with  him  about  four  hundred  men."  This  was  the 
best  possible  comment  on  the  Cleveland  conven- 
tion. After  a  few  denunciations  of  Lincoln  and  his 
policies,  Fremont  saw  the  drift  of  events  and  dur- 
ing the  summer  withdrew  from  the  race.  Thus 
his  political  campaign,  like  his  military  campaigns, 
ended  in  a  fiasco. 


[45] 


LINCOLN  AND  BUTLER 

Many  years  ago  there  could  be  seen  standing  in 
front  of  one  of  the  newspaper  offices  in  New  York 
a  miniature  statue  of  a  man  with  a  spoon  over  his 
shoulder.  The  statue  was  that  of  Benjamin  F. 
Butler  and  had  been  placed  there  by  one  of  his 
numerous  haters.  The  spoon  was  supposed  to  re- 
mind the  passerby  of  Butler's  alleged  graft  and 
spoliation  when  in  command  at  New  Orleans. 
Probably  no  man  in  our  national  life  has  been  so 
fiercely  hated  and  bitterly  denounced  as  General 
Butler.  Even  so  sober  and  restrained  a  man  as 
the  late  Senator  George  F.  Hoar  in  his  Sketch  of 
Seventy  Years  gives  expression  to  what  is  almost  a 
righteous  horror  of  the  character  of  his  dead  an- 
tagonist.    He  says  of  him: 

"No  person  can  adequately  comprehend  the  political 
history  of  Massachusetts  for  the  thirty-five  years  begin- 
ning with  1850  without  a  knowledge  of  the  character, 
career  and  behaviour  of  Benjamin  F.  Butler.  It  is,  of 
course,  disagreeable  and  in  most  cases  unmanly  to  speak 
harshly  of  a  political  antagonist  who  is  dead.  In  the  pres- 
ence of  the  great  reconciler,  Death,  ordinary  human  con- 
tentions and  angers  should  be  hushed.  But  if  there  be 
such  a  thing  in  the  universe  as  a  moral  law,  if  the  distinc- 
tion between  right  and  wrong  be  other  than  fancy  or  a 
dream,  the  difference  between  General  Butler  and  the  men 
who  contended  with  him  belongs  not  to  this  life  alone. 
It  relates  to  matters  more  permanent  than  human  life. 
It  enters  into  the  fate  of  republics,  and  will  endure  after 
the  fashion  of  this  world  passeth  away." 

[46] 


BENJAMIN  F.  BUTLER 


LINCOLN  AND  BUTLER 

From  this  solemn  and  prophet-like  indictment  by 
the  grave  Senator  from  Massachusetts,  clear  down 
to  the  hoarse  screams  of  the  canaille  of  the  streets 
of  New  Orleans,  there  rises  against  "Butler  the 
Beast,"  as  Beauregard  called  him,  a  most  extraor- 
dinary chorus  of  hatred  and  denunciation.  Butler 
was  one  of  those  men  born  to  draw  the  fire  of  their 
fellowmen.  Born  at  Deerfield  and  educated  at  the 
Baptist  College  at  Waterville,  Maine,  now  Colgate, 
Butler  established  himself  as  a  lawyer  at  Lowell, 
Massachusetts,  where  his  ready  repartee  and  rough 
invective  made  him  feared  by  other  lawyers.  He 
espoused  the  cause  of  the  operatives  in  the  fac- 
tories who  were  striving  to  secure  a  ten-hour  law, 
and  when  some  of  the  factories  posted  a  notice 
warning  their  employes  that  all  those  who  voted 
for  the  ticket  advocating  such  a  measure  would  be 
discharged,  Butler  defied  them.  In  characteristic 
language  he  said  that  if  a  single  workman  were 
discharged  he  would  lead  them  in  reducing  Lowell 
to  a  sheep  pasture  and  a  fishing  place,  and  would 
commence  by  applying  the  torch  to  his  own  house. 

In  1860  Butler  was  delegate  to  the  Democratic 
National  Convention  which  met  at  Charleston, 
South  Carolina.  He  had  been  instructed  to  vote 
for  Douglas,  but  distinguished  himself  by  voting 
for  Jefferson  Davis  fifty-seven  times.  As  soon  as 
armed  secession  became  imminent  Butler  let  all 
men  know  where  he  stood.  In  conversation  with 
members  of  the  National  Committee  of  the 
Breckenridge  wing  of  the  Democratic  party,  who 
told  him  of  the  plan  to  secede  and  who  said  that 
Massachusetts  would  not  be  able  to  resist  seces- 

[47] 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

sion  because  such  a  policy  would  be  opposed  by 
thousands  of  her  own  citizens,  Butler  answered: 

"No,  sir;  when  we  come  from  Massachusetts  on  this 
errand,  we  shall  not  leave  a  single  traitor  behind,  unless 
he  is  hanging  on  a  tree." 

"Well,  we  shall  see." 

"You  will  see.  I  know  something  of  the  North  and  a 
good  deal  about  New  England,  where  I  was  born  and  have 
lived  for  forty- two  years.  We  are  pretty  quiet  there  now 
because  we  don't  believe  you  mean  to  carry  out  your 
threat.  We  have  heard  the  same  story  at  every  election 
these  twenty  years.  Our  people  don't  believe  you  are  in 
earnest.  But  let  me  tell  you,  as  sure  as  you  attempt  to 
destroy  this  Union,  the  North  will  resist  the  attempt  to  its 
last  man  and  its  last  dollar.  One  thing  you  may  do,  you 
may  ruin  the  Southern  States,  and  extinguish  your  insti- 
tution of  slavery.  From  the  moment  your  first  gun  is 
fired  on  the  American  flag  your  slaves  will  not  be  worth 
five  years'  purchase.  But  as  to  breaking  up  the  Union,  it 
cannot  be  done.  God  and  nature,  and  the  blood  of  your 
fathers  and  mine  have  made  it  one,  and  one  country  it 
must  and  shall  remain." 

Afterwards,  in  conversation  with  the  South  Caro- 
lina Commissioners,  who  were  in  Washington  to 
present  the  ordinance  of  secession  to  the  President, 
a  similar  conversation  occurred.    They  said  to  him: 

"The  North  won't  fight." 

"The  North  will  fight." 

"If  the  North  fights,  its  laborers  will  starve  and  over- 
turn the  government." 

"If  the  South  fights,  there  is  an  end  of  slavery." 

"Do  you  mean  to  say  that  you,  yourself,  would  fight 
in  such  a  cause?" 

"I  would :  and  by  the  grace  of  God,  I  will !" 

It  is  not  strange  that  the  author  of  such  senti- 
ments should  have  been  one  of  the  first  to  march 

[48] 


LINCOLN  AND  BUTLER 

to  the  defense  of  the  Government  when  the  flag 
was  fired  on  at  Sumter.  His  brigade  of  Massa- 
chusetts militia  was  the  first  to  get  to  Washington, 
one  of  the  regiments,  the  Sixth,  being  attacked  in 
the  streets  of  Baltimore.  Butler  followed  with  the 
other  regiments  of  his  brigade,  and  by  vigorous 
measures  reopened  communications  with  Washing- 
ton by  way  of  Havre  de  Grace  and  Annapolis. 
Made  ranking  major-general  of  volunteers  for  his 
vigorous  and  patriotic  actions,  Butler  commanded 
the  Federal  troops  in  the  fiasco  at  Big  Bethel.  His 
elevation  to  so  high  a  rank  was  due  in  part  to  the 
great  energy  he  had  displayed  at  the  critical  time 
when  Lincoln  was  wondering  whether  there  were 
any  North,  and  whether  the  troops  would  ever 
arrive  for  the  defense  of  the  capital,  and  in  part  to 
the  fact  that  he  was  a  prominent  Democratic  poli- 
tician. As  in  the  case  of  John  McClernand,  of 
Illinois,  Lincoln  was  very  careful  to  give  recogni- 
tion to  prominent  men  in  the  opposition  party  who 
at  the  beginning  of  the  war  took  a  fearless  stand 
for  the  Union,  and  this  exerted  great  influence 
upon  their  followers.  When  he  accepted  this  com- 
mission as  the  ranking  major-general  of  volunteers, 
Butler  said  to  Lincoln: 

"I  will  accept  the  commission  with  many  thanks  to  you 
for  your  personal  kindness.  But  there  is  one  thing  I  must 
say  to  you  as  we  don't  know  each  other.  That  as  a  Demo- 
crat I  opposed  your  election  and  did  all  I  could  for  your 
opponent.  But  I  shall  do  no  political  act,  and  loyally  sup- 
port your  administration  as  long  as  I  hold  your  commis- 
sion ;  and  when  I  find  any  act  that  I  cannot  support  I  shall 
bring  the  commission  back  at  once,  and  return  it  to  you." 

[49] 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

To  this  Lincoln  answered: 

"That  is  frank  and  fair.  But  I  want  to  add  one  thing : 
When  you  see  me  doing  anything  that  for  the  good  of  the 
country  ought  not  to  be  done,  come  and  tell  me  so,  and  why 
you  think  so,  and  then  perhaps  you  won't  have  any  chance 
to  resign  your  commission." 

In  accepting  the  commission  Butler  had  said 
something  about  whether  or  not  he  ought  to  for- 
sake his  law  practice,  and  how  he  had  left  a  case 
he  was  trying  in  the  courts  at  Boston.  Lincoln 
looked  at  him  with  a  whimsical  expression  and 
said,  "I  guess  we  both  wish  we  were  back  trying 
cases !" 

Butler  was  the  inventor  of  the  happy  phrase 
"Contraband  of  War."  When  in  command  at 
Fortress  Monroe  he  refused  to  return  to  their  own- 
ers slaves  who  had  come  within  the  Union  lines, 
on  the  ground  that  being  useful  to  their  em- 
ployers who  were  in  arms  against  the  Government 
they  were  contraband  of  war.  Three  negroes  be- 
longing to  Colonel  Mallory  had  come  within  the 
Union  works.  The  next  day  a  Confederate  major 
came  in  under  a  flag  of  truce  and  asked  in  the  name 
of  Colonel  Mallory  for  the  return  of  the  negroes. 
When  Butler  declared  his  intention  to  hold  them, 
the  major  asked  him  how  he  could  thus  set  aside 
the  constitutional  obligation  to  return  them.  But- 
ler responded  that  he  had  taken  Virginia  at  her 
word  in  the  act  of  secession  and  that  regarding  her 
as  a  foreign  country  he  was  conscious  of  no  con- 
stitutional obligation  towards  her.  "But,"  said  the 
major,  "you  say  we  cannot  secede,  and  so  you  can- 
not consistently  detain  the  negroes."    "But  you  say 

[50] 


LINCOLN  AND  BUTLER 

you  have  seceded,"  rejoined  Butler  with  his  ever  ready 
repartee,  "so  you  cannot  consistently  claim  them. 
I  shall  hold  these  negroes  as  contraband  of  war, 
since  they  are  engaged  in  construction  of  your  bat- 
tery and  are  claimed  as  your  property.  The  ques- 
tion is  simply  whether  they  shall  be  used  for  or 
against  the  Government  of  the  United  States." 

Butler  says  that  as  a  lawyer  he  was  never  very 
proud  of  the  phrase  "contraband  of  war,"  but  that 
it  was  a  great  help  to  him  in  the  discharge  of  his 
duty  and  in  meeting  the  difficult  problems  of  run- 
away slaves.  His  policy  was  the  one  adopted  by 
the  armies  operating  against  the  Confederacy. 
Thus  a  most  perplexing  problem  was  solved  in  a 
very  practical  way,  for  the  Union  soldiers  would 
never  have  submitted  to  the  task  of  acting  as  a 
marshal's  posse  in  returning  fugitive  slaves  to  their 
masters. 

From  the  very  outset  of  the  war  Butler  was 
convinced  that  the  Government  exercised  too  much 
clemency  and  leniency  in  dealing  with  the  revolted 
states.  Most  students  of  the  period  will  agree 
that  this  was  true,  and  that  if  war  is  to  be  waged 
it  must  be  sternly  waged.  "I  have  often  been 
asked,"  wrote  Butler,  "why  our  war  was  so  pro- 
tracted. Was  not  the  pusillanimity  and  want  of 
executive  force  of  the  government  as  exhibited  in 
this  transaction,  one  sufficient  answer?  Why  was 
not  Pickett  hanged  for  these  twenty-two  deliberate 
murders  when  he  was  captured  by  us?"  The  ref- 
erence is  to  the  fact  that  General  Pickett  hanged 
twenty-two  men  of  the  Second  North  Carolina 
Regiment  (Federal)  on  the  ground  that  they  had 

[51] 


jnuvERsmropsjuim 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

formerly  been  in  the  ranks  of  the  Confederate  army 
and  were  therefore  deserters. 

This  exercise  of  too  much  leniency  was  the  one 
matter  in  which  Butler  was  at  odds  with  his  tender- 
hearted commander-in-chief.  In  one  of  his  con- 
ferences with  Lincoln,  Butler  spoke  of  the  many 
desertions  in  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  and  advised 
punishment  by  death  as  the  only  effectual  means 
of  stopping  it.  To  this  Lincoln  responded  with  dis- 
tressed face  and  tone,  "How  can  I  have  a  butcher's 
day  every  Friday  in  the  Army  of  the  Potomac !" 
"Better  have  that,"  answered  Butler,  "than  have 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac  so  depleted  by  desertions 
that  good  men  will  be  butchered  on  other  days 
than  Friday." 

Butler's  career  at  New  Orleans  was,  on  the 
whole,  the  most  creditable  in  his  long  service  to 
the  Government.  Whatever  Butler  was  or  was 
not,  no  one  ever  called  him  a  coward.  When  he 
took  his  troops  into  the  turbulent  city,  he  marched 
at  their  head  in  order  to  give  them  confidence. 
From  the  very  beginning  his  administration  was 
marked  with  severity  and  fearlessness,  yet  with 
justice  and  equity.  He  established  his  headquar- 
ters at  the  St.  Charles  Hotel,  and  in  the  morning 
sent  for  the  city  government.  As  he  was  con- 
ferring with  the  mayor  and  other  members  of  the 
city  government,  the  mob  gathered  in  the  street 
below  and  became  so  boisterous  that  it  was  with 
extreme  difficulty  the  negotiations  could  be  car- 
ried on.  Finally  Captain  De  Kay,  one  of  General 
Williams'  staff,  came  in  with  his  uniform  almost 
torn  from  him,   and  reported  that  the   mob  was 

[52] 


LINCOLN  AND  BUTLER 

getting  out  of  hand.  Butler  at  once  responded, 
"Give  my  compliments  to  General  Williams  and 
tell  him  to  clear  the  streets  at  once  with  his 
artillery.,, 

When  the  captain  left  with  the  order  the  city 
officials  jumped  to  their  feet  and  entreated  Butler 
not  to  send  such  an  order.  Butler  answered  that 
if  they  could  quiet  the  mob,  they  were  at  liberty  to 
try.  It  made  no  difference  to  him  how  it  was  done, 
just  so  it  was  done  quickly.  The  mayor  and  another 
gentleman  then  attempted  speeches  from  the  bal- 
cony, but  the  mob  jeered  in  their  faces.  Butler  was 
a  little  withdrawn  from  the  window  when  he  heard 
the  cry  go  up,  "Where's  old  Butler?  Let  him  show 
himself;  let  him  come  out  here  if  he  dare!"  Im- 
mediately Butler  stepped  out  onto  the  balcony  in 
full  view  of  the  mob,  and  with  cap  in  hand  said, 
"Who  calls  me?  I  am  here!"  With  that  a  hush 
began  to  steal  over  the  cowed  mob.  At  that 
moment  Butler  heard  a  sound,  and  looking  up  St. 
Charles  Street  saw  the  Sixth  Maine  Battery's  six 
Napoleons  come  thundering  down  the  roughly 
paved  street,  the  wheels  of  the  guns  bounding  high 
into  the  air  as  they  struck  the  stones  and  ruts. 
Before  the  roaring  avalanche  the  mob  vanished 
and  the  street  became  as  quiet  as  a  children's  play- 
ground. The  mob  never  troubled  Butler  again  in 
New  Orleans. 

From  the  very  beginning  of  his  reign  Butler 
made  it  plain  that  there  was  such  a  thing  as  the 
Government  of  the  United  States  and  that  its 
soldiers  and  officers  could  not  be  insulted  with  im- 
punity.    A  private  went   into  a   shoe   store,   and 

[53] 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

selecting  a  pair  of  shoes,  offered  gold  for  them. 
The  proprietor  declared  that  he  would  not  sell 
shoes  to  a  d —  Yankee.  The  next  day  the  provost 
marshal  had  a  red  flag  floating  over  the  shop  and 
sold  the  whole  stock  at  auction. 

The  filthy  condition  of  the  city,  especially  in  the 
numerous  canals  and  in  the  back  yards  of  the  finer 
homes,  was  a  menace  to  the  lives  of  his  soldiers  and 
an  invitation  to  the  great  pest  of  the  place,  yellow 
fever.  Butler,  using  his  own  common  sense,  made 
New  Orleans  safe  and  healthy  during  the  months 
of  his  stay  in  the  city.  It  was  prophetic  of  the  work 
of  the  United  States  Army  in  Cuba  and  the  Philip- 
pines. 

While  in  New  Orleans  Butler  was  served  by  a 
marvelously  efficient  secret  service  corps,  by  means 
of  which  he  kept  himself  informed  as  to  the  inmost 
councils  of  the  secessionists  in  the  town.  As  it 
was  in  the  day  of  Benhadad  and  Elisha,  the  words 
spoken  in  the  bedchamber  were  soon  repeated  to 
Butler,  not  through  aides  or  officers,  but  to  him 
in  person.  This  information  came  through  the 
negroes.  On  one  occasion  Butler  learned  that  a 
well-to-do  woman  was  having  a  sewing  party  every 
night  at  her  house,  and  that  she  had  just  com- 
pleted a  beautiful  gold  embroidered  Confederate 
flag  for  presentation  to  the  army  at  Corinth.  The 
next  morning  Butler  sent  his  calash  for  the  lady 
and  had  her  wait  upon  him  at  his  office  in  the 
Custom  House.  Butler  informed  her  that  he  had 
learned  of  how  she  had  just  completed  a  hand- 
some flag.  His  own  home  town,  Lowell,  Massa- 
chusetts, he  said,  was  soon  to  have  a  celebration 

[54] 


LINCOLN  AND  BUTLER 

for  the  Sabbath-school  children,  and,  as  many  of 
them  had  never  seen  a  Confederate  flag,  he  would 
like  to  borrow  hers. 

During  the  days  of  McClellan's  unsuccessful  cam- 
paign in  the  Peninsula,  the  most  sensational  ru- 
mors were  abroad  in  New  Orleans  as  to  the  disaster 
which  had  befallen  the  Union  army.  Butler  tested 
the  truth  of  the  rumors  by  having  his  secret  service 
men  report  whether  the  Jew  brokers  were  buying 
or  selling  Confederate  treasury  notes.  If  they  were 
selling  them,  as  was  generally  the  case,  he  knew 
that  no  serious  disaster  had  come  upon  the  Union 
cause.  In  those  days  a  German  bookseller  ex- 
hibited a  skeleton  in  his  window  and  labeled  it 
"Chickahominy  Yankee,"  pretending  that  it  was 
the  skeleton  of  one  of  McClellan's  soldiers.  Another 
individual,  a  cousin  of  Massachusetts'  war  gov- 
ernor, Andrew,  appeared  at  the  Louisiana  Club 
with  a  breast  pin  constructed  (so  he  claimed)  of  the 
thigh  bone  of  a  Yankee  soldier  killed  on  the  Chicka- 
hominy.  Now  the  interesting  and  picturesque 
thing  about  General  Butler  was  the  way  he  dealt 
with  these  insults  and  provocations.  More  cautious 
men  would  have  let  them  pass,  but  be  it  said  to 
Butler's  credit  that  he  never  let  an  insult  to  the 
majesty  of  the  United  States  pass  without  at  least 
an  effort  to  punish  the  offender.  The  man  with 
the  stickpin  was  hailed  before  the  General,  who 
said  to  him: 

"Did  you  exhibit  such  a  pin?" 

"Yes,  sir;  I  was  wearing  it." 

"Did  you  say  it  was  made  of  the  thigh  bone  of  a 
Yankee?" 

[55]  ,    , 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

"Yes;  but  it  was  not  true,  General." 
"Then  you  added  lying  to  your  other  accomplish- 
ments in  trying  to  disgrace  the  army  of  your  coun- 
try.    I  will  sentence  you  to  hard  labor  on  Ship 
Island  for  two  years." 

The  two  most  famous  incidents  of  his  adminis- 
tration at  New  Orleans  were  the  hanging  of  Mum- 
ford  and  the  "woman  order."  Mumford,  who  was 
at  the  head  of  the  gambling  ring  in  New  Orleans, 
and  had  much  power  with  the  people,  led  the  mob 
that  tore  down  the  United  States  flag  which  Farra- 
gut  had  raised  over  the  Mint.  One  of  the  pieces  of 
the  torn  flag  he  wore  in  his  buttonhole  as  an 
ornament.  The  first  day  Butler  was  in  New 
Orleans  he  noted  this  man  Mumford  in  the  mob 
before  the  hotel  wearing  the  bit  of  the  flag.  In- 
quiring who  he  was,  Butler  vowed  he  would  hang 
him  when  caught.  In  due  time  he  was  arrested, 
tried,  convicted  and  sentenced  to  be  hanged.  The 
most  extraordinary  influence  was  brought  to  bear 
upon  Butler  for  his  pardon.  It  was  openly  boasted 
in  the  city  that  Butler  would  not  dare  to  hang  the 
man.  Threats  poured  in  on  him,  warning  him  that 
his  life  would  be  in  forfeit  should  Mumford  be 
executed.  Even  notable  citizens  came  to  plead  for 
the  condemned  gambler,  saying  that  his  execution 
would  let  loose  the  fury  of  the  populace.  As  a  last 
resort  Mumford's  weeping  wife  and  children  were 
sent  to  Butler's  headquarters.  But  nothing  could 
move  him.  Imitating  the  Spanish  custom  which 
places  the  scene  of  the  execution  as  near  as  pos- 
sible to  the  place  of  the  crime,  Butler,  with  poetic 
justice,  ordered  that  the  man  should  be  hanged  at 

[56] 


LINCOLN  AND  BUTLER 

the  Mint,  where  he  had  torn  down  the  nation's 
flag.  A  great  throng  gathered,  shouting  that  But- 
ler would  not  dare  carry  out  the  execution.  Mum- 
ford  made  them  an  oration  declaring  that  he  had 
been  impelled  by  the  highest  patriotism.  As  the 
appointed  hour  drew  near  Mumford  looked  anx- 
iously up  the  street  for  the  expected  reprieve. 
But  none  came.  The  drop  fell  and  the  offense 
against  the  nation's  flag  was  expiated.  It  was  a 
severe  measure,  but  if  more  severity  had  been 
exercised  by  the  Federal  Government  at  the  begin- 
ning of  the  war  many  thousands  of  lives  might 
have  been  spared. 

After  Mumford  had  been  hanged,  Jefferson 
Davis  issued  a  proclamation  declaring  that  Butler 
was  no  longer  to  be  treated  "simply  as  a  public 
enemy  of  the  Confederate  States  of  America,  but 
as  an  outlaw  and  common  enemy  of  mankind,  and 
in  the  event  of  his  capture  the  officer  in  command 
of  the  capturing  force  shall  cause  him  to  be  imme- 
diately executed  by  hanging." 

The  incident  which  made  Butler's  name  ana- 
thema in  the  South  was  the  general  order  which 
he  issued  for  the  protection  of  the  United  States 
soldiers  from  the  insults  of  the  women  of  New 
Orleans.  These  insults  reached  their  climax  one 
Sabbath  morning  when  one  of  Butler's  officers  with 
a  prayer  book  in  hand  was  on  his  way  to  church. 
Meeting  two  well-dressed  young  women  he  stepped 
aside  to  make  way  for  them,  when  one  of  the  ladies 
deliberately  stepped  in  front  of  him  and  spat  full 
in  his  face.  The  humiliated  and  disgusted  officer 
asked  Butler's  permission  to  resign,  saying  that  he 

[57] 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

had  enlisted  to  fight  the  enemies  of  his  country, 
not  to  be  insulted  and  humiliated.  Butler  saw 
that  something  must  be  done.  From  his  legal 
knowledge  he  recalled  the  language  of  an  old  Eng- 
lish ordinance,  and  the  next  day  the  following  or- 
der was  published  in  the  city: 

"As  the  officers  and  soldiers  of  the  United  States  have 
been  subjected  to  repeated  insults  from  the  women  (call- 
ing themselves  ladies)  of  New  Orleans,  in  return  for  the 
most  scrupulous  non-interference  and  courtesy  on  your 
part,  it  is  ordered  that  hereafter  when  any  female  shall,  by 
word,  gesture  or  movement,  insult  or  show  contempt  for 
any  officer  or  soldier  of  the  United  States,  she  shall  be 
regarded  and  held  liable  to  be  treated  as  a  woman  of  the 
town  plying  her  avocation." 

This  order,  as  the  shrewd  Butler  foresaw,  was 
immediately  effective,  for  ladies  would  not  now  in- 
sult a  soldier  for  fear  they  would  be  regarded  as 
common  women,  and  women  of  the  lower  ranks 
also  refrained  from  their  vexatious  abuse  because 
they  wished  to  be  regarded  as  ladies.  No  other 
incident  of  the  war  so  enraged  the  South  as  this 
order.  Officers  of  the  Confederate  army  read  it  to 
their  troops  on  parade  so  as  to  stir  up  their  martial 
ardor.  Palmerston,  British  premier,  affected  to 
be  shocked  by  it,  and  speaking  in  the  House  of 
Commons  said,  "An  Englishman  must  blush  to 
think  that  such  an  act  has  been  committed  by  one 
belonging  to  the  Anglo-Saxon  race."  To  this  sneer 
of  the  British  prime  minister  Butler  made  indirect 
answer  in  his  extraordinary  farewell  address  to  the 
citizens  of  New  Orleans.     In  this  address  he  said: 

[58] 


LINCOLN  AND  BUTLER 

"To  be  sure,  I  might  have  regaled  you  with  the  ameni- 
ties of  British  civilization,  and  yet  have  been  within  the 
supposed  rules  of  civilized  warfare.  You  might  have  been 
smoked  to  death  in  caverns  as  were  the  Covenanters  of 
Scotland  by  the  command  of  a  general  of  the  royal  house 
of  England,  or  roasted  like  the  inhabitants  of  Algiers  dur- 
ing the  French  campaign ;  your  wives  and  daughters  might 
have  been  given  over  to  the  ravisher,  as  were  the  unfortu- 
nate dames  of  Spain  during  the  Peninsular  war;  or  you 
might  have  been  scalped  and  tomahawked,  as  our  mothers 
were  at  Wyoming  by  the  savage  allies  of  Great  Britain  in 
our  own  Revolution.  Your  sons  might  have  been  blown 
from  the  mouths  of  cannon,  like  the  Sepoys  at  Delhi ;  and 
yet  all  this  would  have  been  within  the  rules  of  civilized 
warfare  as  practised  by  the  most  polished  and  most  hypo- 
critical nations  of  Europe." 

The  indignation  aroused  by  the  "woman  order" 
and  the  protests  of  foreign  governments  as  to  the 
trade  restrictions  of  Butler's  administration,  were 
probably  the  reasons  for  his  recall.  When  Butler 
saw  Lincoln  after  his  recall  from  New  Orleans  he 
asked  him  why  he  had  been  recalled.  "Oh,"  said 
Lincoln,  "ask  Seward.  Something  about  foreign 
governments,  I  guess."  Butler,  however,  con- 
tinued to  enjoy  the  confidence  of  Lincoln,  who 
even  offered  him  Grant's  command  on  the  Missis- 
sippi. This  Butler  refused  to  accept,  saying  that  it 
would  be  an  injustice  to  Grant. 

As  commander  of  the  Army  of  the  James,  created 
for  the  purpose  of  co-operating  with  Grant  in  the 
reduction  of  Richmond,  Butler  added  nothing  to 
his  fame.  He  was  hampered  and  hindered  by  two 
unfriendly  and  disobedient  corps  commanders, 
Smith  and  Gilmore,  who  thwarted  him  at  every 
move.  He  was  relieved  after  the  failure  before  Fort 

[59] 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

Fisher  and  returned  to  his  home  at  Lowell.  A  curi- 
ous instance  of  how  a  catch  phrase  will  damn  a  man 
was  the  expression  employed  by  Grant  in  referring 
to  Butler's  movements  at  Bermuda  Hundred, 
when  he  said,  "His  (Butler's)  army,  though  in  a 
position  of  great  security,  was  as  completely  shut 
off  from  further  operations  directly  against  Rich- 
mond as  if  it  had  been  in  a  bottle  strongly  corked." 
When  this  report  was  published,  "Bottled-Up  But- 
ler" was  the  derisive  cry  that  rang  through  the 
land.  The  illustration  about  the  bottle  and  the 
cork  had  been  used  by  Barnard,  Grant's  chief  of 
engineers,  and  Grant  adopted  it  in  his  report  with- 
out intending  to  cast  discredit  or  contempt  upon 
Butler.  In  his  Memoirs  Grant  takes  great  pains  to 
lift  the  stigma  which  he  had  without  intention 
placed  on  the  name  of  Butler. 

One  of  the  mysteries  of  the  Civil  War  is  the 
relationship  between  Grant  and  Butler.  In  re- 
moving Butler  from  his  command  over  the  Army 
of  the  James,  Grant  claims  that  when  he  was  absent 
the  command  devolved,  for  the  whole  army,  on 
Butler,  he  being  the  senior  major-general.  This 
might  have  had  unfortunate  consequences,  for  the 
officers  had  little  confidence  in  him.  At  Butler's  re- 
quest one  of  his  corps  commanders,  W.  F.  Smith, 
was  relieved  from  his  command.  A  few  days  after- 
wards Smith  wrote  a  letter  to  Senator  Foote  in 
which  he  said  that  on  the  first  day  of  July,  1864, 
Grant  said  to  Butler,  "General,  that  drink  of  whis- 
key I  took  has  done  me  good."  He  then  asked 
Smith  for  a  drink.  Smith  produced  a  bottle  and 
let  him  have  a  drink,  but  did  not  drink  himself  nor 

[60] 


LINCOLN  AND  BUTLER 

did  he  offer  one  to  Butler.  After  the  lapse  of  an 
hour,  Grant  called  for  the  bottle  again.  When  he 
left,  Smith  went  out  "to  see  him  on  his  horse." 
When  he  returned  to  his  tent,  an  aide  said  to  Smith, 
"General  Grant  has  gone  away  drunk;  General 
Butler  has  seen  it,  and  will  never  fail  to  use  the 
weapon  which  has  been  put  in  his  hands." 

In  his  Butler's  Book,  Butler  denies  that  any  such 
meeting  ever  took  place.  Yet  the  idea  has  persisted 
that  in  some  way  Butler  had  a  hold  on  Grant  and 
prevented  him  from  acting  for  the  best  interests  of 
the  service.  Senator  Hoar,  in  his  bitter  chapter 
on  Butler,  carefully  preserves  the  tradition:  "I  do 
not  suppose  that  the  secret  of  the  hold  which 
General  Butler  had  upon  General  Grant  will  ever 
be  disclosed.  Butler  boasted  in  the  lobby  of  the 
House  of  Representatives  that  Grant  would  not 
dare  to  refuse  any  request  of  his  because  he  had 
in  his  possession  affidavits  by  which  he  could  prove 
that  Grant  had  been  drunk  on  seven  different  oc- 
casions." When  this  statement  was  repeated  to 
Grant  by  a  member  of  the  House,  Grant  replied 
quietly,  "I  have  refused  his  requests  several  times." 
Was  this  an  admission  or  a  denial?  On  his  tour 
around  the  world  Grant  said  to  his  companion, 
John  Russell  Young,  "I  liked  Butler  and  always 
found  him,  as  all  the  world  knows,  not  only  a  man 
of  great  ability,  but  a  patriotic  man,  and  a  man  of 
courage,  honor  and  sincere  convictions.  Butler  is 
a  man  it  is  the  fashion  to  abuse,  but  he  is  a  man 
who  has  done  to  his  country  great  service  and  who 
is  worthy  of  its  gratitude." 

On  November  2,  1864,  Butler,  in  response  to  a 

[61] 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

telegram,  appeared  at  headquarters  at  the  War  De- 
partment in  Washington.  Stanton  put  a  bundle  of 
papers  in  his  hands.  It  was  a  report  of  the  secret 
service  about  an  impending  outbreak  in  New  York. 
A  prominent  army  officer  was  to  command  the  re- 
bellious organization.  The  Republicans  were  to 
be  driven  from  the  polls  at  the  election  and  the 
whole  vote  of  New  York  City  was  to  be  deposited 
for  McClellan.  The  report  was  exaggerated,  but 
the  situation  was  serious.  In  that  crisis  the  one 
man  of  iron  nerve  and  courage  to  whom  the  Gov- 
ernment turned  was  Butler.  He  did  his  work  as 
well  in  New  York  as  he  had  done  it  in  New 
Orleans.  On  the  day  of  the  election  ferryboats 
lay  in  the  North  River  and  the  East  River  loaded 
with  troops  ready  to  be  landed  at  any  point  in  the 
city  where  disorder  might  break  out.  The  election 
passed  off  as  quietly  as  a  state  fair. 

When  Butler  was  in  command  of  the  Army  of 
the  James  he  came  into  collision  with  the  state 
government  of  loyal  Virginia  as  exercised  by 
Governor  Pierpont,  who  had  moved  his  capital  to 
Alexandria.  In  some  clash  as  to  the  regulations 
for  policing  Norfolk,  Butler  ordered  a  plebescite, 
and  Pierpont  properly  protested  against  this  order 
as  usurping  the  civil  rights.  In  a  characteristic 
arraignment  of  Pierpont  and  his  state  government, 
Butler  described  it  as  a  "useless,  expensive  and 
inefficient  thing,  unrecognized  by  Congress,  un- 
known to  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States, 
and  of  such  a  character  that  there  is  no  command 
in  the  Decalogue  against  worshiping  it,  it  being  in 
the  likeness  of  nothing  in  the  heavens  above  or  the 

[62] 


LINCOLN  AND  BUTLER 

earth  beneath,  or  the  waters  under  the  earth." 
Lincoln  wrote  him  in  reply  a  long  and  patient  let- 
ter, in  which  he  cautioned  Butler  against  trespass- 
ing on  the  rights  of  the  civil  authorities,  and  mak- 
ing the  very  pertinent  suggestion  that  any  meas- 
ure necessary  for  the  health  and  safety  of  Norfolk 
he  should  take  upon  the  ground  of  military  neces- 
sity, and  not  submit  the  matter  to  a  popular  vote, 
for  to  do  so  was  to  raise  the  question  of  its  neces- 
sity. 

One  of  the  last  and  most  interesting  meetings 
between  Lincoln  and  Butler  took  place  shortly  be- 
fore Lincoln's  assassination.  During  the  conversa- 
tion Lincoln  expressed  great  anxiety  about  the 
negroes  when  peace  should  be  established.  He  re- 
verted to  his  favorite  and  fantastic  idea  of  trans- 
porting the  negroes  out  of  the  country,  saying  that 
until  they  were  gone,  North  and  South  could  never 
live  together  in  peace.  He  was  especially  anxious 
about  the  black  soldiers,  saying,  "If  these  black 
soldiers  of  ours  go  back  to  the  South,  I  am  afraid 
that  they  will  be  but  little  better  off  with  their 
masters  than  they  were  before,  and  yet  they  will 
be  free  men.  I  fear  a  race  war,  and  it  will  be  at 
least  a  guerrilla  war  because  we  have  taught  these 
men  how  to  fight.  All  the  arms  of  the  South  are 
now  in  the  hands  of  their  troops,  and  when  we 
capture  them  of  course  we  take  their  arms.  There 
are  plenty  of  men  in  the  North  who  will  furnish 
the  negroes  with  arms  if  there  is  any  oppression 
of  them  by  their  late  masters." 

Lincoln  then  asked  Butler  to  go  carefully  into 
the   practicability   of   transporting   the   blacks    to 

[63] 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

some  other  land,  making  use  of  the  navy,  which  at 
the  end  of  the  war  would  have  no  employment. 
The  second  day  thereafter  Butler  returned  with 
this  report:  "Mr.  President,  I  have  gone  carefully 
over  my  calculations  as  to  the  power  of  the  coun- 
try to  export  the  negroes  of  the  South,  and  I  assure 
you  that  using  all  your  naval  vessels  and  all  the 
merchant  marine  fit  to  cross  the  seas  with  safety, 
it  will  be  impossible  for  you  to  transport  them  to 
the  nearest  place  that  can  be  found  fit  for  them — 
and  that  is  the  Island  of  San  Domingo — half  as  fast 
as  negro  children  will  be  born  here."  In  this  Lin- 
coln reluctantly  acquiesced.  He  then  asked  But- 
ler to  suggest  some  solution  of  the  problem  of  the 
negro  soldiers.  Butler  made  a  very  sensible  sug- 
gestion that  they  be  employed  in  digging  a  canal 
across  the  Isthmus  of  Darien  between  the  Atlantic 
and  Pacific  and  at  the  same  time  establish  a  colony 
there.  Lincoln  greeted  the  idea  with  his  favorite 
phrase,  "There  is  meat  in  that,"  and  asked  Butler 
to  lay  the  proposal  before  Mr.  Seward.  But  before 
Butler  had  an  opportunity  to  do  this  Seward  was 
dangerously  injured  in  a  runaway. 

Butler  would  have  been  President  of  the  United 
States  if  Lincoln's  first  choice  of  nominee  for  the 
Vice-Presidency  in  the  campaign  of  1864  had  been 
that  of  the  Convention  which  met  at  Baltimore. 
Hannibal  Hamlin  had  served  faithfully  and  was 
personally  acceptable  to  Lincoln  and  the  party. 
But  although  Hamlin  was  a  Democrat,  he  was  not 
a  "war  Democrat,"  and  Lincoln  felt  that  the  nom- 
ination and  election  of  a  strong  and  aggressive  "war 
Democrat"   would   greatly   strengthen   the   hands   of 

[64] 


LINCOLN  AND  BUTLER 

his  administration.  He  wished,  if  possible,  to  de- 
sectionalize  the  party  and  get  in  its  councils  some 
strong  and  loyal  men  from  a  Southern  state.  With 
such  a  man  as  Vice-President  the  party  would  ap- 
pear more  national,  and  England  and  France  would 
be  less  likely  to  recognize  the  South.  This  was 
why  the  lot  fell  on  Andrew  Johnson,  of  Tennessee. 
But  Lincoln's  first  choice  was  Butler. 

In  March,  1864,  Lincoln  dispatched  Simon  Cam- 
eron to  visit  Butler  at  Fort  Monroe.  Cameron  said 
to  Butler  that  Mr.  Hamlin  would  probably  not  be 
a  candidate  for  re-election,  and  that,  aside  from 
reasons  of  personal  friendship  and  esteem,  the 
President  would  like  to  have  Butler  on  the  ticket 
with  him,  for  he  felt  that  since  Butler  was  the 
first  prominent  Democrat  to  volunteer  for  the  war, 
his  candidature  would  greatly  strengthen  the  ticket. 
To  this  Butler  made  one  of  his  characteristic  re- 
plies: "Please  say  to  Mr.  Lincoln  that  while  I  ap- 
preciate with  the  fullest  sensibility  this  act  of 
friendship  and  the  compliment  he  pays  me,  yet  I 
must  decline.  Tell  him  I  would  not  quit  the  field 
to  be  Vice-President,  even  with  himself  as  Presi- 
dent, unless  he  will  give  me  bond,  with  sureties,  in 
the  full  sum  of  his  four  years'  salary,  that  he  will 
die  or  resign  within  three  months  after  his  inau- 
guration." Butler  had  had  intimation  that  Grant 
was  to  give  him  a  high  command,  the  Army  of  the 
James,  in  the  operations  against  Richmond,  and 
thought  his  chances  of  service  and  distinction 
much  greater  in  the  field  than  in  the  Vice-Presi- 
dent's chair.  When  Butler  facetiously  said  that 
he  would  not  take  the  Vice-Presidency  unless  Lin- 

[65] 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

coin  gave  him  bond  to  die  or  resign  within  three 
months  after  his  inauguration,  little  did  he  think 
that  he  was  throwing  away  his  chance  to  be  Presi- 
dent of  the  United  States,  for  just  six  weeks  after 
Lincoln's  inauguration  the  assassin's  bullet  vacated 
the  Presidency,  and  Andrew  Johnson  became 
President.* 

Butler  was  born  for  a  riot.  Whether  handling 
the  election  mobs  of  New  York  or  the  secession 
mobs  of  New  Orleans,  he  was  perfectly  at  home. 
He  was  resourceful,  quick,  daring,  and  courageous 
in  the  highest  degree.  I  doubt  if  the  conduct  of 
any  general  in  the  midst  of  battle  during  the  war 
can  rank,  for  sheer  courage,  moral  and  physical,  with 
that  of  Butler  on  the  balcony  of  the  St.  Charles  Hotel 
before  the  raging  mob  that  shouted  for  his  blood. 
He  was  a  real  patriot,  too.  The  Government  of 
the  United  States  of  America  was  to  him  an  august 
reality.  A  sin  against  its  honor  or  its  flag  was  to 
him  an  unpardonable  offense;  it  called  for  punish- 
ment, and  he  always  sought  means  to  inflict  the 
punishment.  Butler  was  the  first  to  arm  the 
negroes  and  give  them  an  opportunity  to  help  win 
their  freedom  with  their  own  blood. 

When  you  have  said  these  things  about  Butler 
you  have  said  the  best  things.  He  was  arrogant, 
boastful,  bombastic,  vindictive,  and  even  vituper- 
ative.    Probably  no  serious  book  ever  written  by 

*  In  their  history  of  Lincoln,  Nicolay  and  Hay  deny  that 
Lincoln  expressed  any  desire  in  the  matter  of  the  Vice-Presi- 
dency. But  the  correspondence  published  by  Col.  A.  K. 
McClure  in  his  "Lincoln  and  Men  of  War  Times"  leaves  no 
doubt  as  to  the  part  played  by  Lincoln  in  the  shelving  of 
Hannibal  Hamlin  and  the  choice  of  Andrew  Johnson. 

[66] 


LINCOLN  AND  BUTLER 

a  person  of  equal  prominence  contains  so  much 
bitter  abuse  and  unmeasured  invective  as  his  auto- 
biography. As  a  politician  it  is  impossible  to  locate 
him  or  classify  him  in  his  frequent  changes  of  front 
and  party.  But  always  he  was  a  fighter.  He  was 
the  last  of  the  vituperative  politicians.  There  was 
a  strain  of  coarseness  in  him.  The  order  against 
the  women  of  New  Orleans  was  to  the  point,  and 
immediately  effective;  but  with  most  of  the  offi- 
cers of  the  Union  army  it  would  have  been  an 
absolute  impossibility.  He  was  of  the  earth, 
earthy. 


[67] 


LINCOLN  AND  McCLELLAN 

Speaking  one  day  in  the  Roman  Senate  of  his 
great  contemporary,  Julius  Caesar,  Cicero  said  of 
him,  "Coming  generations  will  dispute  over  him." 
Among  the  leading  generals  of  the  Civil  War  there 
is  none  over  whom,  both  during  the  war  and  since, 
there  has  been  so  much  dispute  as  over  McClellan. 
The  three  score  years  which  have  elapsed  since  the 
beginning  of  the  war  have  sifted  out  the  merits  and 
character  of  most  of  the  chief  actors  on  that  stage 
and  settled  many  a  controversy.  Warren,  Buell, 
Fitz  John  Porter,  have  emerged  triumphant  from 
the  clouds  which  enveloped  their  fame,  and  a  satis- 
factory account  can  be  given  of  nearly  all  the  chief 
military  and  political  figures  of  that  troubled  day. 
The  one  exception  is  General  McClellan.  Over  him 
the  dispute  still  rages,  and  if  time  has  softened  the 
asperities  of  the  debate  concerning  him,  it  has  not 
yet  shed  any  clear  ray  of  illumination  upon  the 
controversies  which  gather  about  his  name.  To 
some,  McClellan  is  the  prince  of  egoists,  the  grand 
procrastinator,  the  timid  and  doubting  captain  who 
counted  the  enemy's  numbers  and  forgot  his  own. 
To  others,  he  is  a  military  genius  of  the  first  order, 
the  one  first-class  military  mind  among  all  the 
officers  on  both  sides,  but  whose  power  to  strike, 
and  in  a  single  campaign  end  the  war,  was  thwarted 
by  an  incapable  administration  and  the  intrigue  of 
politicians. 

McClellan  was  the  only  prominent  officer  whom 

[68] 


GEORGE  BRINTON  McCLELLAN 


LINCOLN  AND  McCLELLAN 

Lincoln  had  known  well  before  the  war.  When 
McClellan  was  engineer  and  vice-president  of  the 
Illinois  Central  Railroad,  and  Lincoln  was  one  of 
its  counsel,  the  two  men  often  met  in  some  out- 
of-the-way  county-seat  where  a  case  was  being 
tried,  and  on  many  a  night  McClellan  sat  by  the 
stove  in  the  country  tavern  and  heard  Lincoln  tell 
his  stories.  "He  was  never  at  a  loss,"  says  Mc- 
Clellan, "and  I  could  never  quite  make  up  my  mind 
how  many  of  them  he  had  really  heard  before,  and 
how  many  he  invented  on  the  spur  of  the  moment. 
His  stories  were  seldom  refined,  but  were  always 
to  the  point."  Little  could  these  two  men  have 
foreseen  their  future  relationship,  Lincoln  as 
President,  and  McClellan  as  Commander-in-Chief. 
George  Brinton  McClellan,  the  son  of  a  Phila- 
delphia physician,  was  born  in  that  city  in  1826. 
After  two  years  in  the  University  of  Pennsylvania 
he  was  sent  to  West  Point,  where  he  was  grad- 
uated in  1846.  In  that  same  year  he  went  with 
the  army  to  Mexico  and  was  breveted  first  lieu- 
tenant for  gallantry  at  Churubusco  and  made  a 
captain  after  Chapultepec.  After  the  Mexican  War 
he  was  engaged  in  army  engineering  work  and  ex- 
ploration. In  1855  he  was  sent  abroad  with  a  mili- 
tary commission  to  get  information  on  military  sys- 
tems, and  while  abroad  observed  the  operations 
of  the  allied  armies  in  the  Crimea.  In  1857  McClel- 
lan resigned  his  commission  as  captain  in  the  army 
and  became  the  vice-president  of  the  Illinois  Cen- 
tral Railroad,  and  a  little  later  president  of  the 
Ohio  &  Mississippi  Railroad,  with  headquarters 
at  Cincinnati.    At  the  outbreak  of  the  war  he  was 

[69] 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

on  his  way  to  Harrisburg  to  receive  from  Governor 
Curtin  the  command  of  the  Pennsylvania  troops, 
but  by  special  request  stopped  at  Columbus  to  con- 
fer with  Governor  Dennison  on  Ohio's  military 
situation.  Governor  Dennison  offered  him  a  com- 
mission as  major-general  commanding  the  three- 
months  Ohio  militia.  McClellan  accepted  the  offer, 
and  a  month  afterwards  was  made  a  major-general 
in  the  United  States  army  and  placed  in  command 
of  the  Department  of  the  Ohio,  embracing  Ohio, 
Indiana,  and  Illinois.  His  brief  campaigns  in  the 
mountains  of  western  Virginia  killed  secession  in 
that  part  of  the  country  and  were  the  first  suc- 
cesses which  came  to  the  Union  arms.  After  the 
defeat  of  Bull  Run  he  was  summoned  to  Washing- 
ton to  take  command  of  the  troops  in  and  about 
the  capital. 

When  he  arrived  in  Washington  McClellan  found 
everything  in  confusion.  The  loud  cry  of  "On  to 
Richmond"  had  been  silenced.  Streets,  hotels  and 
bar-rooms  were  filled  with  drunken  officers  and 
men  absent  without  leave  from  their  regiments. 
No  proper  steps  had  been  taken  to  secure  the 
safety  of  the  city  and  no  strong  mind  was  guiding 
or  controlling.  Into  this  scene  of  chaos  and  pande- 
monium came  the  young  commander  from  the 
mountains  of  Virginia,  quietly  giving  his  orders, 
riding  day  and  night  through  his  far  flung  camps, 
organizing  his  staff,  drilling  the  regiments  which, 
at  the  rate  of  one  a  day,  came  pouring  in  from  the 
loyal  states,  laying  out  a  system  of  impregnable 
defenses  for  the  city,  and  wherever  he  went,  in- 
spiring confidence  and  winning  the  hearts  of  men. 

[70] 


LINCOLN  AND  McCLELLAN 

Had  McClellan  never  done  anything  else  but  or- 
ganize the  Army  of  the  Potomac  and  bring  order 
out  of  chaos  after  the  battle  of  Bull  Run,  his  service 
to  the  nation  would  have  been  not  far  behind  that 
of  any  of  the  Union  generals.  The  weapon 
which  Grant  finally  used  to  strike  down  the  Con- 
federacy was  the  finely  tempered  sword  of  McClel- 
lan, the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  The  finest  tribute 
that  can  be  paid  to  the  creative  and  organizing 
ability  of  McClellan  is  the  history  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac;  how  it  survived  disaster  after  dis- 
aster in  the  field,  unbroken  in  spirit  and  undimin- 
ished in  power  to  strike.  Many  waters  of  adver- 
sity and  floods  of  defeat  could  not  quench  its  mag- 
nificent spirit. 

McClellan  was  only  thirty-five  when  he  was 
called  to  his  high  post  in  Washington,  and  it  was 
not  strange  that  his  sudden  rise  to  fame,  with  the 
devotion  of  a  great  army,  the  deference  of 
statesmen  and  the  plaudits  of  the  press,  had  a 
deleterious  effect  upon  his  mind.  Of  such  effect 
there  can  be  no  doubt.  The  unwise  publication  of 
his  private  correspondence  as  a  part  of  his  McClellan 's 
Own  Story  shows  plainly  the  unfortunate  effect  that 
his  great  popularity  and  pre-eminent  position  were 
having  upon  him.  Such  sentiments  as  these  we 
find  appearing  in  his  letters:  "I  find  myself  in  a 
new  and  strange  position  here;  President,  Cabinet 
and  General  Scott,  and  all  deferring  to  me.  By 
some  strange  operation  of  magic  I  seem  to  have 
become  the  power  of  the  land;  .  .  .  All  tell  me  that 
I  am  responsible  for  the  fate  of  the  nation;  .  .  . 
I  am  weary  of  all  this ;  I  have  no  ambition  in  the 

[71] 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

present  affairs;  only  wish  to  serve  my  country,  and 
find  the  incapables  around  me  will  not  permit  it. 
They  sit  on  the  verge  of  the  precipice,  and  cannot 
realize  what  they  see.',  McClellan  truly  thought 
that  the  government  was  made  up  of  "incapables" 
and  that  only  a  military  mind  and  administrator 
could  save  the  situation.  The  fatal  mistake  he  made 
was  in  holding  himself  aloof  from  those  in  author- 
ity and  antagonizing  them. 

His  first  quarrel  was  with  the  aged  and  infirm 
Scott.  In  this  McClellan  was  not  wholly  to  blame, 
and  no  one  today  will  deny  that  Lincoln  ought  to 
have  made  him  commander-in-chief  at  once,  for 
the  incapacity  of  Scott  was  apparent  to  all.  On 
the  day  that  McClellan  first  arrived  at  Washington, 
at  his  first  meeting  with  Scott  he  excused  himself 
after  a  brief  interview,  saying  that  the  President 
had  asked  him  to  meet  the  Cabinet  at  one  o'clock. 
To  this  Scott  took  indignant  exception,  saying  that 
the  President  had  no  right  to  give  McClellan  such 
an  invitation  to  his  exclusion.  This  was  a  sample 
of  what  was  to  follow.  McClellan  took  what  was 
probably  the  only  practical  course  and  completely 
ignored  the  Commander-in-Chief,  until  the  old 
veteran  accepted  the  inevitable  and  resigned  his 
post.  This  was  in  October,  and  during  the  three 
months  he  had  been  in  Washington  McClellan  had 
shown  such  a  grasp  of  the  situation  and  such  a 
genius  for  command  and  organization  that  Lin- 
coln and  the  whole  nation  hailed  his  elevation  to 
the  chief  command  with  delight. 

This  new  honor  did  not  do  anything  to  lessen 
McClellan's  extravagant  estimate   of  the  part  he 

[72] 


LINCOLN  AND  McCLELLAN 

must  play  in  saving  the  Union.  So  exalted  was  he 
that  he  committed  almost  unbelievable  acts  of 
arrogance  and  disrespect  towards  those  in  high 
office,  and  even  towards  the  President  of  the 
United  States.  Lincoln,  in  his  friendly  way,  came 
often  to  McClellan's  house.  On  one  occasion  when 
he  called  he  found  the  General  absent  at  the  wed- 
ding of  an  officer.  The  President  sat  down  in  the 
reception  room  to  wait  for  his  return.  After  an 
hour  had  passed  McClellan  returned  and,  disre- 
garding what  the  orderly  said  to  him  about  the 
presence  of  Lincoln,  passed  upstairs  to  his 
rooms.  After  a  time  the  President  sent  a  servant 
to  his  rooms  to  announce  him  again.  The  servant 
returned  with  the  words  that  the  General  had  gone 
to  bed.  Mr.  Lincoln  never  asked  for  an  explanation 
and  seemed  not  to  resent  this  extraordinary  con- 
duct. On  another  occasion  when  an  important 
conference  had  been  kept  waiting  through  the  ab- 
sence of  McClellan,  some  of  those  present  showed 
impatience  and  displeasure  at  the  delay,  whereupon 
Lincoln  remarked,  "Never  mind;  I  will  hold  Mc- 
Clellan's horse  if  he  will  only  bring  us  success." 
Undoubtedly  many  of  Lincoln's  future  troubles 
with  McClellan  were  due  to  the  fact  that  he  had 
been  too  lenient  and  indulgent  towards  him  in  the 
beginning,  and  had  not  sufficiently  impressed  upon 
his  mind  that  in  a  republic  the  civil  authority  is 
supreme. 

As  the  summer  faded  into  autumn,  and  the 
autumn  into  winter,  and  still  nothing  was  done  by 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  the  nation  became  res- 
tive and  apprehensive.     This   dissatisfaction  was 

[73] 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

reflected  in  the  act  of  Congress  appointing  a  Com- 
mittee on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,  one  of  the  most 
important  bodies  of  the  whole  conflict.  This  com- 
mittee began  to  press  Lincoln  with  complaints 
against  McClellan,  insistent  that  the  army  do  some- 
thing. None  was  more  anxious  for  this  than  Lin- 
coln, but  for  a  period  he  loyally  backed  up 
McClellan  and  shielded  him  from  the  rising  storm 
of  protest  and  unrest,  telling  members  of  Congress 
that  McClellan  was  making  sure  that  all  was  ready 
before  he  moved  the  army,  lest  the  mistake  of  Bull 
Run  should  be  repeated.  But  the  President  him- 
self was  beginning  to  have  his  doubts.  He  was  one 
day  at  the  telegraph  office  in  the  War  Department 
when  a  despatch  came  in  saying  that  there  had 
been  no  firing  on  McClellan's  front  since  sunset. 
Lincoln  inquired  in  his  whimsical  way  if  there  had 
been  any  firing  before  sunset,  and  then  related  one 
of  his  characteristic  anecdotes  about  a  man  who 
went  around  telling  of  a  natural  prodigy,  a  child 
who  was  black  from  his  hips  down.  Asked  what 
color  the  child  was  from  his  hips  up,  he  responded, 
"Why,  black,  of  course. " 

In  December  McClellan  fell  ill  with  typhoid  fever 
and  was  incapacitated  for  a  number  of  weeks.  It 
was  at  this  time  that  Lincoln  began  his  serious 
study  of  the  military  situation,  reading  works  on 
war  and  studying  the  maps  and  fields  of  operation. 
His  inquiries  of  Halleck  and  Buell,  the  two  com- 
manders in  the  West,  revealed  to  him  the  startling 
fact  that  both  of  these  men  were  depending  upon 
McClellan  for  orders  and  that  neither  of  them  con- 
templated co-operative  action;  therefore  the  whole 

[74] 


LINCOLN  AND  McCLELLAN 

military  machine,  east  and  west,  was  at  a  stand- 
still. As  McClellan's  illness  showed  no  signs  of 
abatement,  Lincoln  summoned  to  the  White  House 
General  McDowell  and  General  Franklin  and 
sought  their  advice  about  a  campaign,  saying  that 
if  McClellan  did  not  want  to  use  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac,  he  would  like  to  borrow  it.  McDowell 
advocated  a  forward  move  against  Johnston's  army 
at  Manassas,  Franklin  an  attack  upon  Richmond 
by  the  peninsula  between  the  York  and  James 
Rivers,  the  plan  finally  adopted  by  McClellan.  A 
second  meeting  was  held,  and  a  third  was  ar- 
ranged for  on  Sunday,  January  13th.  At  this  meet- 
ing there  were  present  also  three  members  of  the 
Cabinet,  Blair,  Chase,  and  Seward.  Meanwhile 
McClellan  had  got  word  of  these  conferences 
and  made  a  dramatic  appearance  at  the  one 
held  on  the  13th  at  the  White  House.  There  was 
a  good  deal  of  embarrassment  and  awkward  whis- 
perings among  those  present  until  Lincoln  asked 
McDowell  to  state  what  they  had  been  doing,  and 
what  had  been  proposed.  McDowell  did  so,  at  the 
same  time  in  a  courteous  way  disclaiming  any  hos- 
tility towards  McClellan,  and  saying  that  what  had 
been  done  was  in  view  of  the  supposed  critical 
illness  of  the  Commander-in-Chief.  In  a  cold  and 
curt  manner  McClellan  interrupted  him,  saying 
that  as  he  had  again  been  restored  to  health  there 
was  no  further  need  of  examination  into  the  pro- 
posed movements  of  the  army.  Then  Franklin  made 
a  disclaimer  of  any  disloyalty  to  McClellan,  and 
the  whispering  recommenced,  especially  between 
the   President  and   Secretary   Chase.     At   length, 

[75] 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

manifesting  great  excitement  and  irritation,  Chase 
asked  McClellan  to  state  what  he  intended  to  do 
with  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  McClellan  an- 
swered that  he  did  not  recognize  the  Secretary  of 
the  Treasury  as  his  official  superior  and  denied  his 
right  to  question  him  upon  military  affairs,  and 
that  to  the  President  and  the  Secretary  of  War 
alone  would  he  confide  his  plans.  McClellan  then 
resumed  his  conversation  with  Blair,  paying  no 
further  attention  to  the  angry  Chase.  The  latter 
whispered  for  a  few  minutes  with  the  President, 
and  then  Lincoln  said,  in  a  conciliatory  tone,  "Well, 
General  McClellan,  I  think  you  had  better  tell  us 
what  your  plans  are."  To  this  McClellan  re- 
sponded that  if  the  President  had  confidence  in  him 
it  was  not  necessary  that  he  should  entrust  his  de- 
signs to  the  judgment  of  others,  and  that  he  would 
give  out  no  further  information  at  the  meeting  un- 
less ordered  to  do  so  by  the  President  in  writing. 
Lincoln  then  asked  him  if  in  his  own  mind  he  had 
any  particular  time  set  for  a  movement  of  the 
army.  Upon  McClellan  answering  in  the  affirma- 
tive, Lincoln  said,  "Then  I  will  adjourn  this  meet- 
ing." But  according  to  McClellan's  version  of  this 
memorable  day,  the  meeting  was  adjourned  by 
Seward  getting  up  and,  as  he  buttoned  his  coat, 
saying,  "Well,  Mr.  President,  I  think  the  meeting 
had  better  break  up.  I  don't  see  that  we  are  likely 
to  make  much  out  of  General  McClellan." 

McClellan  had  gained  knowledge  of  these  con- 
ferences during  his  illness  through  Stanton,  not  yet 
Secretary  of  War,  who  said  to  him,  "They  are 
counting  on  your  death,  and  are  already  dividing 

[76] 


LINCOLN  AND  McCLELLAN 

among  themselves  your  military  goods  and  chat- 
tels." McClellan  was  altogether  within  his  rights 
in  refusing  to  divulge  his  plans  except  to  the  Presi- 
dent and  Secretary  of  War,  but  he  seems  to  have 
forgotten  that  he  was  in  conference  with  able  and 
patriotic  men  occupying  high  positions  of  respon- 
sibility, all  earnest  in  their  efforts  to  preserve  the 
Union.  His  attitude  towards  them  was  certainly 
anything  but  conciliatory,  and  from  that  day  one 
powerful  member  of  the  Cabinet,  Chase,  was  his 
relentless  foe.  From  the  evidence  at  hand  McClel- 
lan was  unjust  in  his  suspicions  that  McDowell 
had  been  zealous  in  these  private  conferences  with 
the  President  with  the  hope  that  he  would  suc- 
ceed him  in  command. 

From  this  time  on  there  was  a  more  or  less 
organized  warfare  on  McClellan  from  the  rear. 
Stanton,  who  had  entered  the  Cabinet  as  the  friend 
of  McClellan,  became  his  most  determined  enemy. 
Worst  of  all,  McClellan,  about  to  embark  upon  the 
great  movement  against  the  enemy,  was  convinced 
in  his  mind  that  the  radical  element  in  the  adminis- 
tration was  determined  to  undo  him  and  keep  him 
from  being  successful  in  his  campaign.  "Had  I 
been  successful,"  writes  McClellan,  "in  my  first 
campaign,  the  rebellion  would  perhaps  have  been 
terminated  without  the  immediate  abolition  of 
slavery.  I  believe  that  the  leaders  of  the  radical 
branch  of  the  Republican  party  preferred  political 
control  in  one  section  of  a  divided  country  to  being 
in  the  minority  in  a  restored  Union.  Not  only  did 
these  people  desire  the  abolition  of  slavery,  but  its 
abolition  in  such  a  manner  and  under  such  circum- 

[77] 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

stances  that  the  slaves  would  be  at  once  endowed 
with  the  electoral  franchise,  and  permanent  control 
thus  be  secured  through  the  votes  of  the  ignorant 
slaves,  composing  so  large  a  portion  of  the  popu- 
lation of  the  seceded  states.  Influenced  by  these 
motives  they  succeeded  but  too  well  in  sowing  the 
seeds  of  distrust  in  Mr.  Lincoln's  mind,  so  that, 
even  before  I  actually  commenced  the  Peninsular 
campaign,  I  had  lost  the  cordial  support  of  the 
executive  which  was  necessary  to  certain  success." 
If  he  felt  that  way  when  he  was  about  to  com- 
mence his  campaign,  was  it  not  McClellan's  duty, 
it  will  be  asked,  to  resign  the  command?  McClel- 
lan's answer  to  this  is  the  following:  "It  may  be 
said  that  under  these  circumstances  it  was  my  duty 
to  resign  my  command.  But  I  had  become  warmly 
attached  to  the  soldiers,  who  already  had  learned 
to  love  me  well;  all  my  pride  was  wrapped  up  in 
the  army  that  I  had  created,  and  I  knew  no  com- 
mander at  all  likely  to  be  assigned  to  it  in  my  place 
who  could  be  competent  to  conduct  its  operations. 
Nor  did  I  at  that  time  fully  realize  the  length  to 
which  these  men  were  prepared  to  go  in  carrying 
out  their  schemes.  For  instance,  I  did  not  suspect, 
until  the  orders  reached  me,  that  Fort  Monroe  and 
the  1st  Corps  would  be  withdrawn  from  my  con- 
trol; and  when  those  orders  arrived  they  found 
me  too  far  committed  to  permit  me  to  withdraw 
with  honor.  With  the  troops  under  fire  it  did  not 
become  me  to  offer  my  resignation." 

After  the  meeting  at  the  White  House,  on  Jan- 
uary 13,  1862,  Lincoln  waited  patiently  for  a  num- 
ber of  weeks,  and  as  there  was  still  no  sign  of 

[78] 


LINCOLN  AND  McCLELLAN 

activity  on  the  part  of  McClellan's  army  he  issued 
his  General  Order  No.  1,  directing  a  forward  move- 
ment by  land  and  sea  of  all  the  forces  of  the  army 
and  the  navy  on  February  22d.  McClellan  con- 
trived to  disobey  this  order,  but  did  put  into  execu- 
tion an  abortive  movement  towards  Winchester  by 
way  of  Harper's  Ferry.  The  movement  failed  be- 
cause at  the  last  moment  it  was  discovered  that  the 
canal  boats  which  had  been  collected,  and  with 
which  a  permanent  bridge  was  to  have  been  con- 
structed at  Harper's  Ferry,  were  too  large  to  pass 
through  the  lift-lock  into  the  river.  It  was  when 
an  officer  reported  to  him  this  fiasco  and  told  him 
that  the  movement  had  been  arrested  because  the 
pontoons  were  not  ready,  that  the  sorely  tried 
Lincoln  for  once  lost  his  patience  and,  relapsing 
into  the  provincialism  of  the  frontier,  said  in  a 
voice  of  thunder  to  the  astonished  officer,  "Why 
in  h — 1  ain't  they  ready?" 

<  This  was  in  substance  the  question  which  was 
everywhere  being  asked  in  the  North.  At  the  early 
hour  of  seven  o'clock  on  the  8th  of  March,  Lincoln 
summoned  McClellan  to  his  office  and  said  that 
he  wished  to  speak  to  him  about  a  "very  ugly 
matter."  Then  followed  one  of  the  most  dramatic 
scenes  of  the  war.  The  "ugly  matter"  was  the 
rumor  that  McClellan's  plan  of  campaign  for  at- 
tacking Richmond  by  way  of  the  Peninsula  was 
conceived  with  the  traitorous  intent  of  removing 
its  defenders  from  Washington  and  thus  giving 
over  to  the  enemy  the  capital  and  the  government. 
Lincoln  concluded  by  saying  that  it  looked  to  him 
very   much   like    treason.      With    that    McClellan 

[79] 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

sprang  to  his  feet  and  demanded  that  Lincoln  with- 
draw the  expression,  that  he  could  not  permit  any- 
one to  couple  the  word  treason  with  his  name. 
Lincoln,  in  great  agitation,  assured  McClellan  that 
he  was  only  repeating  what  he  had  heard  and  what 
he  himself  did  not  believe.  He  finally  succeeded  in 
pacifying  the  outraged  McClellan  and  they  parted 
with  mutual  good  understanding.  It  is  painful  to 
recall  this  interview  between  Lincoln  and  McClel- 
lan. The  President  virtually  charges  the  Com- 
mander-in-Chief with  treasonable  designs  on  the 
eve  of  his  campaign.  There  is  no  question  that 
McClellan's  now  numerous  enemies  were  saying 
that  he  was  not  loyal  to  the  Government,  but  that 
Lincoln,  convinced  or  unconvinced  in  his  own  mind, 
should  have  thus  brought  the  matter  to  McClel- 
lan's attention  is  well-nigh  inconceivable.  In  ex- 
tenuation of  the  President's  action  it  may  be  said 
that  his  heart  was  eaten  with  anxiety  for  the  safety 
of  the  nation,  and  men  high  in  the  Government 
were  hinting  at  the  disloyalty  of  the  Commander- 
in-Chief  of  the  armies. 

When  McClellan  finally  got  under  way  for  the 
Peninsula,  it  was  reported  to  Lincoln  that  he  had 
left  only  nineteen  thousand  troops  for  the  defense 
of  the  capital.  One  of  the  conditions  upon  which 
Lincoln  consented  to  the  Peninsular  plan  of  cam- 
paign was  that  McClellan  should  leave  behind  suf- 
ficient troops  to  defend  Washington.  Lincoln 
therefore  held  back  from  McClellan  the  first  corps 
of  his  army,  McDowell's.  In  this  Lincoln  acted 
with  sincere,  though  unwarranted,  anxiety  for  the 
safety  of  Washington.     But  McClellan  took  it  as 

[80] 


LINCOLN  AND  McCLELLAN 

another  evidence  of  the  plot  of  his  enemies  to  ruin 
him.  From  the  time  that  he  landed  on  the  Penin- 
sula until  he  was  driven  back  to  Harrison's  Land- 
ing, after  the  Seven  Days'  Battle,  McClellan  sent 
to  Washington  unceasing  demands  for  more  men 
and  unceasing  complaints  that  the  Government  was 
not  supporting  him.  These  demands  induced  the 
irritable  Stanton  to  exclaim  one  day,  "If  he  had  a 
million  men  he  would  swear  the  enemy  had  two 
million  men,  and  then  would  sit  down  in  the  mud 
and  yell  for  another  million."  This  hyperbole  of 
Stanton's  reveals  McClellan's  weakness  of  always 
overrating  the  forces  opposed  to  him,  and  shows 
the  contempt  in  which  Stanton  novv  held  him. 

To  McClellan's  complaining  dispatches  Lincoln 
answered  with  kind  and  patient  words,  saying, 
"Your  dispatches  complaining  that  you  are  not 
properly  sustained,  while  they  do  not  offend  me, 
do  pain  me  very  much.  I  beg  to  assure  you  that 
I  have  never  written  you  or  spoken  to  you  in 
greater  kindness  of  feeling  than  now,  nor  with  a 
fuller  purpose  to  sustain  you,  so  far  as  in  my 
anxious  judgment,  I  consistently  can.  But  you 
must  act."  Yet  partly  through  the  fears  of  the 
Government,  and  partly  through  Lincoln's  effort 
to  capture  "Stonewall"  Jackson  through  a  strate- 
gic movement  of  his  own,  the  much  disputed-over 
1st  Corps  was  held  back  from  McClellan's  army. 
When  it  was  too  late  for  it  to  come  to  the  rescue, 
Lee  and  Jackson  had  attacked  McClellan's  right 
flank  and  the  desperate  Seven  Days'  Battle  was  on. 

A  bolder  general  than  McClellan  might  have 
elected  to  advance   towards   Richmond  after  the 

[81] 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

first  repulse  of  the  Confederate  attack.  Instead  of 
this  McClellan  chose  to  change  his  base  from  the 
York  River  to  the  James.  This  retrograde  move- 
ment was  a  masterpiece  of  military  strategy  and 
the  behavior  of  the  army  was  magnificent.  As 
he  fought  his  way  by  day  and  by  night  through  the 
swamps  and  jungles  of  the  Peninsula,  McClellan's 
dispatches  indicated  that  he  felt  more  bitterly 
towards  his  own  Government  than  he  did  toward 
the  foe  hanging  on  his  rear.  This  bitterness  and 
disappointment  reached  its  climax  of  expression  in 
the  amazing  dispatch  which  McClellan  sent  to 
Stanton  from  Savage  Station  on  the  28th  of  June, 
after  the  battle  of  Gaines'  Mill.  In  this  dispatch 
McClellan  said,  "I  have  lost  this  battle  because 
my  force  was  too  small.  If  at  this  instant  I  could 
dispose  of  ten  thousand  fresh  men,  I  could  gain 
a  victory  tomorrow.  I  know  that  a  few  thousand 
more  men  would  have  changed  this  battle  from  a 
defeat  to  a  victory.  I  feel  too  earnestly  tonight; 
I  have  seen  too  many  dead  and  wounded  comrades 
to  feel  otherwise  than  that  the  Government  has  not 
sustained  this  army.  If  you  do  not  do  so  now,  the 
game  is  lost.  If  I  save  this  army  now,  I  tell  you 
plainly  that  I  owe  no  thanks  to  you  or  to  any  other 
persons  in  Washington.  You  have  done  your  best 
to  sacrifice  this  army." 

The  thrust  of  this  message  was  meant  for  Stan- 
ton, but  it  included  the  President  also.  Lincoln's 
distress  during  the  time  of  McClellan's  retreat 
down  the  Peninsula  was  very  great,  for  the  dis- 
patches of  McClellan  indicated  that  the  destruc- 
tion or  the  capitulation  of  the  army  was  not  an 

[82] 


LINCOLN  AND  McCLELLAN 

improbability.  He  sent  encouraging  messages  to 
McClellan  exhorting  him  to  "save  the  army."  This 
McClellan  did  in  masterly  fashion  and  the  retreat 
across  the  Peninsula  to  Harrison's  Landing  was, 
as  he  himself  termed  it,  a  "magnificent  episode," 
though  not  the  kind  of  episode  which  puts  down  a 
rebellion  and  wins  peace. 

When  the  army  was  at  length  safe  under  the 
protection  of  the  gunboats  at  Harrison's  Landing, 
Lincoln  went  down  to  visit  the  troops  and  encour- 
age his  general.  While  he  was  there  McClellan 
delivered  to  him  a  long  letter  which  he  had  ad- 
dressed to  him  on  the  conduct  of  civil  and  military 
matters.  In  this  impudent  and  presumptuous  docu- 
ment McClellan  undertook  to  explain  to  the  Presi- 
dent his  duties,  how  private  property  and  unarmed 
persons  are  to  be  protected,  how  slavery  must  not 
be  forcibly  interferred  with,  and  how  the  army 
needed  a  commander-in-chief  who  should  enjoy  the 
confidence  of  the  President.  Lincoln  read  the  let- 
ter, put  it  in  his  pocket,  and  never  referred  to  it 
again.  It  was  a  letter  well  worthy  of  being  placed 
side  by  side  with  that  which  Seward  wrote  Lincoln 
at  the  beginning  of  the  war.  McClellan  still  as- 
sured Lincoln  that  he  could  take  Richmond  if  given 
more  men.  His  army  had  already  swallowed  up  so 
many  reinforcements  that  Lincoln  remarked  that 
sending  reinforcements  to  McClellan  was  like 
"shoveling  fleas  across  a  barnyard — not  half  of 
them  got  there." 

McClellan's  hint  about  the  necessity  of  a  com- 
mander-in-chief was  soon  to  be  acted  upon  by  the 
President,  but  not  in  the  way  McClellan  had  sup- 

[83] 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

posed.  When  McClellan  was  about  to  take  the 
field  against  Richmond,  Lincoln,  without  warning, 
removed  him  from  the  chief  command,  leaving  him 
commander  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  This  was 
a  military  blunder  of  the  first  order  and  had  an  un- 
happy effect  upon  the  campaign  which  followed. 
Instead  of  one  army  operating  against  the  enemy 
in  Virginia,  and  under  one  supreme  command,  there 
were  several  armies  acting  independently.  A  let- 
ter of  General  Keyes,  commander  of  the  4th  Army 
Corps,  to  Senator  Ira  Harris,  and  given  to  the 
President,  sums  up  the  weakness  of  the  military 
situation.  In  this  letter,  written  at  Warwick  Court- 
house, on  April  7,  1862,  General  Keyes  says,  "The 
plan  of  campaign  on  this  line  was  made  with  the 
distinct  understanding  that  four  army  corps  should 
be  employed.  Today  I  have  learned  that  the  1st 
Army  Corps  and  one  division  of  the  2nd  Army 
Corps  have  been  withdrawn  altogether  from  this 
line  of  operations.  The  greatest  master  of  the  art 
of  war  said  that  'If  you  would  invade  a  country 
successfully,  you  must  have  one  line  of  operations 
and  one  army  under  one  general.'  But  what  is  our 
condition?  The  State  of  Virginia  is  made  to  con- 
stitute the  command,  in  part  or  wholly,  of  some  six 
generals,  viz. :  Fremont,  Banks,  McDowell,  Wool, 
Burnside,  and  McClellan.,, 

This  was  indeed  the  fatal  weakness  of  the  cam- 
paign. Even  before  the  reverse  on  the  Peninsula, 
Lincoln  must  have  realized  that  something  was 
wrong,  for  in  the  latter  part  of  June  he  made  his 
secret  visit  to  General  Scott  at  West  Point  and 
sought    his    advice    on    the    management    of    the 

[84] 


LINCOLN  AND  McCLELLAN 

armies.  Scott  advised  him  to  return  McDowell's 
corps  to  McClellan,  and  it  is  supposed  that  it  was 
he  who  suggested  Halleck  as  commander-in-chief. 
On  July  11th  Halleck  was  made  commander-in- 
chief  and  reported  at  Washington.  After  a  visit  to 
McClellan's  army  at  Harrison's  Landing  he  advo- 
cated its  withdrawal  and  its  union  with  the  Army 
of  Virginia,  now  under  Pope.  In  this  the  Govern- 
ment acquiesced  and,  against  McClellan's  earnest 
protest,  withdrew  his  army  from  the  Peninsula. 
Few  students  of  the  war  will  deny  that  this  was  a 
great  blunder.  Properly  backed  up,  McClellan 
could  have  taken  Richmond  and  ended  the  war. 
His  protest  against  the  withdrawal  of  his  army  was 
prophetic,  for  he  said,  "Here  is  the  true  defense 
of  Washington.  It  is  here  on  the  banks  of  the 
James  that  the  fate  of  the  Union  should  be  de- 
cided." And  so  it  proved  to  be,  for  Grant,  after 
his  fruitless  struggles  through  the  wilderness  to- 
wards Richmond  and  the  bloody  repulse  at  Cold 
Harbor,  abandoned  the  plan  along  which  he  said 
he  would  fight  it  out  if  it  took  all  summer — that 
of  throwing  his  army  against  the  right  flank  of 
Lee  and  trying  to  get  between  him  and  Richmond 
— and  taking  his  army  to  the  James  River,  com- 
menced where  McClellan  had  left  off  two  years 
before. 

During  the  battle  of  Second  Bull  Run  McClel- 
lan, not  removed  from  his  command,  but  with  his 
army  taken  away  from  him  and  given  to  Pope, 
sat  in  his  tent  at  Alexandria  and  heard  the  thunder 
of  the  guns,  in  vain  beseeching  his  Government  to 
let  him  share  in  the  fight,  finally  saying,  "I  can- 

[85] 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

not  express  to  you  the  pain  and  mortification  I 
have  experienced  today  in  listening  to  the  distant 
sound  of  the  firing  of  my  men.  As  I  can  be  of  no 
further  use  here  I  respectfully  ask  that,  if  there  is 
a  probability  of  the  conflict  being  renewed  tomor- 
row, I  may  be  permitted  to  go  to  the  scene  of  the 
battle  with  my  staff,  merely  to  be  with  my  own 
men,  if  nothing  more ;  they  will  fight  none  the 
worse  for  my  being  with  them.  If  it  is  not  deemed 
best  to  entrust  me  with  the  command  even  of  my 
own  army,  I  simply  ask  to  be  permitted  to  share 
their  fate  on  the  field  of  battle/'  The  next  day 
the  battle  was  renewed  but  without  the  help  or 
presence  of  McClellan,  and  the  Union  army  by 
nightfall  was  in  full  retreat  upon  Washington. 

The  next  chapter  in  McClellan's  history  reads 
like  a  romance.  As  the  disastrous  battle  goes 
against  the  Union  army,  he  sits  impatient  and  dis- 
consolate in  his  tent  at  Alexandria,  a  discredited 
and  apparently  forgotten  general,  of  whose  services 
the  army  and  the  Government  have  no  need. 
Within  two  days  after  we  see  him  called  by  his 
Government  into  the  field  again  to  save  the  capital 
and  turn  defeat  into  victory.  Late  at  night,  on  the 
31st  of  August,  the  mentally  paralyzed  Halleck 
telegraphed  McClellan  for  his  aid  in  the  crisis, 
adding  that  he  was  "utterly  played  out."  Mc- 
Clellan went  the  next  day  to  Washington  and  ad- 
vised the  immediate  withdrawal  of  Pope's  beaten 
army  to  the  fortifications.  Halleck  issued  these 
orders  and  gave  McClellan  verbal  command  over 
the  troops  for  the  defense  of  Washington.  At 
seven  o'clock  the  next  morning  Halleck  and  Lin- 

[86] 


LINCOLN  AND  McCLELLAN 

coin  called  at  McClellan's  home.  Lincoln,  betray- 
ing great  emotion,  said  he  regarded  Washington 
as  lost  and  asked  McClellan  if  he  would  "under 
the  circumstances,  as  a  favor  to  him,  resume  com- 
mand and  do  the  best  that  could  be  done."  Mc- 
Clellan accepted  the  grave  responsibility  and  im- 
mediately set  about  the  disposition  of  the  troops 
for  the  defense  of  the  capital.  In  a  few  days  he 
had  accomplished  the  miracle  of  reorganization, 
and  the  army  was  in  pursuit  of  Lee,  who  had 
crossed  the  Potomac  in  his  invasion  of  Maryland. 
Lincoln  never  fronted  such  a  storm  of  criticism 
and  opposition  as  when  he  restored  McClellan  to 
the  command  of  the  army.  In  Congress  and  in  the 
Cabinet  the  feeling  against  McClellan  was  most 
intense.  General  Pope  attributed  his  ill  success  to 
the  non-support  of  McClellan  and  his  generals,  and 
this  impression  prevailed  throughout  the  country. 
On  August  29th,  Chase,  the  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury,  presented  to  Gideon  Welles,  the  Secre- 
tary of  the  Navy,  a  petition  to  the  President  ask- 
ing for  the  removal  of  McClellan  and  citing  grave 
charges  against  him.  Welles  himself  was  unfavor- 
able to  McClellan,  but  declined  to  sign  the  paper. 
Three  days  later  Chase  presented  to  him  a  second 
paper,  but  more  moderate  than  the  former,  stating 
that  the  Cabinet  did  not  believe  McClellan  should 
be  intrusted  with  the  command  of  the  army.  Since 
the  former  paper  had  been  presented  the  Union 
army  had  been  worsted  at  Second  Bull  Run,  and 
the  enemies  of  McClellan,  knowing  that  the  army 
must  have  a  new  commander,  were  apprehensive 
lest   McClellan    should    be   recalled.      Welles    too 

[87]  ..     . 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

hoped  that  McClellan  would  not  be  put  in  com- 
mand, but  refused  to  sign  the  paper,  saying  that  it 
was  a  wrong  way  of  seeking  to  influence  the  choice 
of  the  President.  "It  was  evident,"  writes  Welles, 
"there  was  a  fixed  determination  to  remove,  and 
if  possible,  to  disgrace  McClellan.  Chase  frankly 
stated  he  deserved  it,  that  he  deliberately  believed 
McClellan  ought  to  be  shot,  and  should,  were  he 
President,  be  brought  to  summary  punishment." 

Postmaster-General  Blair,  writing  in  1879  of  the 
intrigue  against  McClellan,  says,  "The  folly  and 
disregard  of  public  interests  thus  exhibited  would 
be  incredible,  but  that  the  authors  of  this  intrigue, 
Messrs.  Stanton  and  Chase,  when  the  result  of  it 
came,  and  I  proposed  the  restoration  of  McClellan 
to  command,  to  prevent  the  completion  of  ruin  by 
the  fall  of  this  capital,  actually  declared  that  they 
would  prefer  the  loss  of  the  capital  to  the  restora- 
tion of  McClellan  to  command." 

There  was  a  stormy  scene  at  the  meeting  of  the 
Cabinet  on  September  2nd,  when  Lincoln  an- 
nounced that  McClellan  had  been  restored  to  com- 
mand. In  answer  to  the  reproaches  of  Stanton 
and  Chase  and  the  protests  of  most  of  the  other 
members  of  the  Cabinet,  Lincoln  declared  that  he 
had  acted  for  the  best  interests  of  the  country, 
that  while  McClellan  had  the  "slows,"  and  was 
good  for  nothing  for  a  forward  movement,  none 
could  surpass  him  in  the  defensive  and  as  an  or- 
ganizer, and  that  he  was  thoroughly  familiar  with 
the  whole  ground  to  be  occupied  by  the  army. 
When  Chase  declared  that  giving  McClellan  com- 
mand was  equivalent  to  giving  Washington  to  the 

[88] 


LINCOLN  AND  McCLELLAN 

rebels,  Lincoln  answered  that  he  was  distressed  to 
find  himself  in  disagreement  with  the  Secretary  of 
War  and  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  and  that 
he  would  gladly  resign  his  place.  So  ended  what 
Welles  describes  as  the  most  agitated  and  despond- 
ent meeting  the  Cabinet  ever  held. 

Why  was  it  that  Lincoln,  who  above  all  others 
had  reason  to  be  displeased  with  McClellan,  re- 
stored him  to  the  command  in  face  of  the  opposi- 
tion of  the  Cabinet  and  Congress  and  the  hostile 
sentiment  of  the  country?  The  first  reason  was 
the  military  ability  of  McClellan  to  cope  with  the 
critical  situation  which  had  arisen  in  the  fortunes 
of  the  army  and  the  nation.  Whatever  the  Cabinet 
and  Congress  thought  of  McClellan,  there  could 
be  no  doubt  as  to  what  the  army  thought  of  him. 
Lincoln  knew  that  the  officers  and  the  men  loved 
him  and  would  follow  him.  He  knew,  too,  of 
McClellan's  great  gift  for  organizing  an  army  and 
putting  a  fighting  spirit  into  it,  and  the  retreat 
through  the  Peninsula  had  established  the  fame  of 
McClellan  as  a  great  defensive  general.  Lincoln 
counted  over  his  generals  and  asked  himself  which 
one  of  them  could  meet  the  emergency — Halleck, 
rubbing  his  elbows  and  smoking  his  cigar,  and  call- 
ing for  McClellan  to  aid  him?  Pope,  beaten  and 
discredited?  McDowell,  twice  beaten  at  Bull  Run, 
and  so  disliked  by  the  troops  that  after  Second 
Bull  Run  it  was  not  safe  for  him  to  visit  the  camps 
of  his  men,  who  declared  that  they  would  kill  him? 
There  were  indeed  officers  like  Meade,  who  had 
the  engineering  ability  to  defend  the  capital,  but 
none  of  them  had  the  personal  magnetism  which 

[89] 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

was  now  required  for  bringing  together  the  de- 
feated and  dispirited  army.  The  finger  of  destiny- 
pointed  to  McClellan.  Lincoln  swallowed  his  own 
pride  and  mortification,  and  for  the  sake  of  the 
cause,  which  was  ever  uppermost  in  his  mind, 
asked  the  man  whom  but  a  few  days  before  he  had 
permitted  to  be  stripped  of  his  army,  to  resume 
the  command.  It  was  one  of  the  most  important 
and  patriotic  acts  of  Lincoln's  administration  of 
the  war.  To  Gideon  Welles,  the  Secretary  of  the 
Navy,  Lincoln  said,  "I  must  have  McClellan  to 
reorganize  the  army  and  bring  it  out  of  chaos. 
But  there  has  been  a  design,  a  purpose  in  breaking 
down  Pope,  without  regard  of  consequences  to  the 
country.  It  is  shocking  to  see  and  know  this;  but 
there  is  no  remedy  at  present,  McClellan  has  the 
army  with  him."  To  another  Lincoln  said,  "There 
is  no  one  in  the  army  who  can  man  these  fortifica- 
tions and  lick  these  troops  of  ours  into  shape  half 
as  well  as  he  can.  We  must  use  the  tools  we  have ; 
if  he  cannot  fight  himself,  he  excels  in  making 
others  ready  to  fight." 

The  second  reason  for  the  restoration  of  Mc- 
Clellan was  political;  that  is,  it  was  done  with 
regard  to  the  feeling  of  the  people  of  the  North. 
The  progress  of  the  war  was  bringing  McClellan 
out  as  the  foremost  figure  in  the  Democratic  party. 
Lincoln  felt  the  necessity  of  having  the  support  of 
all  elements  of  the  people  in  the  crisis  confronting 
him,  and  knew  that  while  the  restoration  of  Mc- 
Clellan would  offend  radical  Republicans  it  would 
please  all  the  Democrats. 

The   splendid   reception   which   the   army  gave 

[90] 


LINCOLN  AND  McCLELLAN 

McClellan  when  he  returned  to  take  command 
proved  that  Lincoln  was  right  and  his  Cabinet 
wrong.  An  officer  of  the  Union  army,  Captain 
John  D.  Wilkins,  tells  how,  on  the  evening  of 
September  2,  1862,  he  was  marching  along  with 
the  dispirited  host  which  was  streaming  towards 
Washington.  The  troops  had  halted  and  were 
lying  on  the  ground  resting,  when,  in  the  gather- 
ing gloom,  Wilkins  saw  two  horsemen  approaching 
from  the  opposite  direction.  A  second  glance  at 
the  trim  military  figure  on  one  of  the  horses  told 
him  who  it  was  and  he  shouted  to  his  colonel, 
"McClellan  is  here!"  At  the  sound  of  that  name 
the  weary  soldiers  leaped  to  their  feet  and  a  roar 
of  cheering  passed  like  a  wave  over  companies, 
regiments,  brigades,  divisions,  corps,  until  the  re- 
motest units  of  this  great  host  caught  up  the 
tumultuous  refrain.  Unstrung  by  the  terrible  ex- 
periences of  the  past  two  days,  many  of  the  soldiers 
broke  from  the  ranks  and  crowded  about  McClel- 
lan's  horse,  crying  like  children,  praising  God  for 
his  return,  and  calling  upon  him  to  lead  them  once 
more  against  the  foe. 

In  the  short  and  brilliant  campaign  which  ended 
in  the  battle  of  Antietam,  McClellan  more  than  ful- 
filled the  hopes  which  were  reposed  in  him.  The 
capital  was  saved,  and  Lee,  with  a  beaten  and 
sadly  depleted  army,  had  retreated  into  Virginia. 
Lincoln  celebrated  the  victory  by  the  first  procla- 
mation of  emancipation.  In  the  presumptuous  let- 
ter which  he  had  addressed  to  Lincoln  earlier  in 
the  summer  McClellan  had  expressed  his  opposi- 
tion to  the  measure  and  his  dread  of  its  results. 

[91] 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

When  he  heard  of  the  proclamation  McClellan 
wrote  to  his  wife,  "The  President's  late  proclama- 
tion, and  the  continuance  in  office  of  Stanton  and 
Halleck,  render  it  almost  impossible  for  me  to  re- 
tain my  commission  and  self-respect  at  the  same 
time.,,  General  W.  F.  Smith  is  authority  for  the 
statement  that  McClellan  prepared  a  protest 
against  the  proclamation  and  read  it  to  some  of  his 
friends  in  the  army,  who  dissuaded  him  from  pub- 
lishing it.  Instead,  with  due  respect  to  the  Presi- 
dent and  the  civil  authorities,  McClellan  issued  an 
address  to  the  army  in  which  he  asked  their  sup- 
port of  the  Government  and  advised  them  to  re- 
strain from  intemperate  discussion  of  public  meas- 
ures determined  upon  by  those  in  authority. 

On  the  first  of  October  Lincoln  paid  a  visit  to 
the  army  at  Antietam  and  remained  with  McClel- 
lan for  seven  days.  During  this  visit  McClellan 
received  the  impression  that  Lincoln  was  quite 
satisfied  with  his  conduct  of  the  campaign,  and 
would  stand  by  him  to  the  last.  He  said  to  Mc- 
Clellan that  the  only  fault  he  had  to  find  with  him 
was  that  he  was  "too  prone  to  be  sure  that  every- 
thing was  ready  before  starting."  To  this  Mc- 
Clellan rejoined  that  the  experiments  Lincoln  had 
had  with  those  who  acted  before  they  were  ready 
ought  to  convince  him  that  he  consumed  less  time 
than  they  did.  "He  repeated  that  he  was  entirely 
satisfied  with  me/'  wrote  McClellan,  "that  I  should 
be  let  alone;  that  he  would  stand  by  me.  I  have 
no  doubt  that  he  meant  exactly  what  he  said.  He 
parted  from  me  with  the  utmost  cordiality.  We 
never  met  again  on  this  earth."     But  as  soon  as 

[92] 


LINCOLN  AND  McCLELLAN 

Lincoln  reached  Washington  McClellan  began  to 
be  pressed  with  orders  for  an  immediate  advance 
into  Virginia.  It  was  after  this  visit  to  McClel- 
lan's headquarters  at  Antietam  that  some  one 
spoke  to  Lincoln  about  McClellan's  great  capacity 
as  a  military  engineer.  "Yes,"  answered  Lincoln, 
"McClellan  is  a  great  engineer,  but  his  specialty 
seems  to  be  a  stationary  engine."  Now  that  the 
crisis  was  safely  over,  Chase  and  Stanton  and  the 
other  enemies  of  McClellan  resumed  their  warfare 
in  his  rear.  On  September  22nd  McClellan  wrote 
in  prophetic  words  to  his  wife,  "It  may  be,  now 
that  the  Government  is  pretty  well  over  their  scare, 
they  will  begin  again  with  their  persecutions  and 
throw  me  overboard  again."    So  it  proved  to  be. 

If  the  restoration  of  McClellan  to  the  command 
of  the  army  was  one  of  the  most  fearless  and 
patriotic  acts  of  Abraham  Lincoln,  his  removal  of 
McClellan  from  that  post  after  the  victorious  cam- 
paign of  Antietam  was  one  of  the  most  unfortunate 
acts  of  his  administration  and  one  for  which  there 
was  the  least  excuse.  McClellan  attributed  his  re- 
moval to  the  cabal  against  him  on  the  part  of  Chase 
and  Stanton;  but  in  the  end  Lincoln  must  be  held 
responsible,  for  he  had  once  before  defied  the 
wishes  of  these  enemies  of  McClellan  and  could 
have  done  so  again.  When  he  restored  McClellan 
to  the  command  of  the  army  Lincoln  had  made 
reference  to  the  employment  of  McClellan's  abili- 
ties in  the  crisis  at  that  time  facing  the  Govern- 
ment. In  view  of  what  followed,  it  is  probable 
that  Lincoln  did  not  propose  that  McClellan  should 
be  the  leader  of  the  next  great  offensive  of  the 

[93] 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

army.  Antietam  changed  the  national  situation; 
the  administration  saw  itself  strong  and  secure, 
and  the  Proclamation  of  Emancipation  had  added 
immensely  to  the  prestige  and  power  of  Lincoln. 
At  all  events,  Lincoln  felt  that  he  was  strong 
enough  to  dispense  with  the  services  of  McClellan, 
if  he  thought  it  wise  to  do  so.  This  he  did  on 
November  7,  1862,  just  after  McClellan  had  crossed 
the  Potomac  and  was  advancing  against  Lee's 
army.  General  Burnside  was  placed  in  command 
of  the  army  and  McClellan  ordered  to  repair  to 
Trenton,  N.  J.,  to  "await  further  orders"  which 
never  came.  The  removal  was  a  hard  blow  to  Mc- 
Clellan and  created  intense  resentment  in  the  army, 
so  that  not  a  few  advised  McClellan  to  ignore  the 
order,  march  upon  Washington,  and  take  posses- 
sion of  the  Government.  There  is  no  doubt  that 
he  could  have  done  so,  so  deep  was  the  attachment 
of  the  army  to  him.  But  like  a  true  patriot  Mc- 
Clellan turned  over  the  command  to  Burnside  and 
assisted  him  in  every  way  possible  to  get  the  situa- 
tion in  hand. 

McClellan  was  as  happy  in  his  dispatches  and 
orders  as  he  was  in  personal  contact.  His  farewell 
message  to  the  army  shows  him  at  his  best  in  this 
respect:  "In  parting  from  you  I  cannot  express 
the  love  and  gratitude  I  bear  to  you.  As  an  army 
you  have  grown  up  under  my  care.  In  you  I  have 
never  found  doubt  or  coldness.  The  battles  you 
have  fought  under  my  command  will  proudly  live 
in  our  nation's  history.  The  glory  you  have 
achieved,  our  mutual  perils  and  fatigues,  the  graves 
of  our  comrades  fallen  in  battle  and  by  disease,  the 

[94] 


LINCOLN  AND  McCLELLAN 

broken  forms  of  those  whom  wounds  and  sick- 
ness have  disabled — the  strongest  associations 
which  can  exist  among  men — unite  us  still  by  an 
indissoluble  tie." 

During  the  remaining  years  of  the  war  McClel- 
lan  occupied  the  place  of  prominence  and  influ- 
ence to  which  his  great  services  entitled  him, 
although  never  again  having  any  part  in  the  mili- 
tary operations.  The  summer  of  1863  was  a  very 
anxious  one  for  the  administration  of  Lincoln,  and 
in  June  of  that  year  Thurlow  Weed  planned  a 
great  meeting  in  New  York  in  support  of  the  war 
and  the  Union.  He  knew  that  it  would  add  im- 
mensely to  the  meeting  if  McClellan  were  present, 
and  he  went  to  the  General  and  invited  him  to 
preside.  McClellan  at  first  consented,  but  at  the 
last  moment  declined.  In  the  summer  of  1864  he 
was  nominated  for  the  Presidency  by  the  Demo- 
cratic convention  at  Chicago  with  its  infamous  plat- 
form which  declared  the  war  to  be  a  failure  and 
hinted  at  compromise  with  the  South.  McClel- 
land speech  of  acceptance  repudiated  the  shame- 
ful platform,  and  he  came  out  strongly  for  the  Union, 
but  this  could  not  save  him  from  overwhelming 
defeat  at  the  polls  in  November.  Atlanta,  Mobile 
Bay,  and  Winchester  were  victories  which  knocked 
the  props  from  under  the  Democratic  platform  and 
its  celebrated  candidate.  Before  the  nomination 
of  McClellan  by  the  Democrats,  his  old  and  firm 
friend,  Postmaster-General  Blair,  went  to  McClel- 
lan and  sought  to  secure  his  support  of  the  ad- 
ministration. He  urged  him  to  have  nothing  to 
do  with  the  Chicago  convention,  telling  him  that 

[95] 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

defeat  was  certain.  Instead  of  the  miserable  por- 
tion of  a  defeated  candidate  for  the  Presidency, 
Blair  held  out  before  McClellan  the  nobler  lot  of 
rallying  to  the  support  of  the  Union  party  the 
loyal  Democrats  of  the  North.  His  suggestion 
was  that  McClellan  write  a  letter  to  Lincoln  ask- 
ing to  be  restored  to  a  command  in  the  army.  One 
could  wish  that  McClellan  had  accepted  Blair's 
advice.  But  McClellan  knew  that  his  military  fame 
was  secure,  he  had  had  experience  with  the  oppo- 
sition of  the  Government  to  him  as  a  commander, 
and,  no  doubt,  had  hopes  of  success  as  the  Demo- 
cratic candidate  in  the  forthcoming  election. 

Before  the  victories  of  Atlanta,  Mobile  Bay,  and 
Winchester,  Lincoln  expected  defeat.  On  the  23rd 
of  August,  several  days  before  the  meeting  of  the 
convention  which  nominated  McClellan,  Lincoln 
wrote  the  following  vow:  "This  morning,  as  for 
some  days  past,  it  seems  exceedingly  probable  that 
this  administration  will  not  be  re-elected.  Then  it 
will  be  my  duty  to  so  co-operate  with  the  Presi- 
dent-elect as  to  save  the  Union  between  the  elec- 
tion and  the  inauguration;  as  he  will  have  secured 
his  election  on  such  ground  that  he  cannot  possibly 
save  it  afterwards."  He  had  the  members  of  the 
Cabinet  endorse  this  statement  by  writing  their 
names  across  the  back  of  the  paper,  though  they 
knew  not  what  it  contained.  His  purpose  was  to 
pledge  the  administration  to  accept  the  verdict  of 
the  people  at  the  polls  and  do  all  they  could  to 
save  the  Union  before  they  went  out  of  office. 
After  his  victory  at  the  polls  Lincoln  read  the 
contents  of  the  paper  to  the  Cabinet  and  said  that 

[96] 


LINCOLN  AND  McCLELLAN 

if  McClellan  had  been  elected  he  would  have  sent 
for  him  and  said  to  him,  "General,  the  election  has 
demonstrated  that  you  are  stronger,  have  more 
influence  with  the  American  people  than  I.  Now 
let  us  together,  you  with  your  influence,  and  I  with 
all  the  executive  power  of  the  Government,  try  to 
save  the  country.  You  raise  as  many  troops  as  you 
possibly  can  for  this  final  trial,  and  I  will  devote 
all  energies  to  assist  and  finish  the  war."  When 
he  was  through,  Seward  said  to  him,  "And  the 
General  would  have  answered  you,  'Yes,  yes/  and 
the  next  day  when  you  saw  him  again  and  pressed 
these  views  upon  him  he  would  have  said,  'Yes, 
yes/  and  so  on  forever  and  would  have  done  noth- 
ing at  all." 

So,  with  this  final  fling  against  him  for  his  habit 
of  procrastination  and  delay,  the  great  soldier 
passed  forever  out  of  the  counsels  of  Lincoln  and 
his  Cabinet. 


I~97, 


LINCOLN  AND  SHERMAN 

Like  most  of  the  officers  who  rose  to  prominence 
during  the  war,  Sherman  had  resigned  his  com- 
mission in  the  regular  army  and  had  been  in  civil 
life  for  a  number  of  years  when  hostilities  broke 
out.  After  leaving  the  army  in  1853  he  engaged 
for  a  time  in  banking  in  San  Francisco,  conducted 
a  business  in  New  York,  tried  his  hand  at  law  in 
Kansas,  and  in  1860  became  the  head  of  the  State 
Military  College  of  Louisiana.  When  it  became 
evident  that  Louisiana  would  secede  from  the 
Union,  Sherman  resigned  his  post  and  went  north. 
Early  in  March,  1861,  he  went  to  Washington  to 
visit  his  brother  John,  the  Senator  from  Ohio.  He 
accompanied  his  brother  to  the  White  House  and 
met  Lincoln  for  the  first  time.  When  Senator 
Sherman  had  finished  his  business  with  the  Presi- 
dent he  said  to  him,  "Mr.  President,  this  is  my 
brother,  Colonel  Sherman,  who  is  just  up  from 
Louisiana;  he  may  give  you  some  information  you 
want."  To  this  Lincoln  responded,  "Ah!  how  are 
they  getting  along  down  there?"  Sherman  an- 
swered, "They  think  they  are  getting  along  swim- 
mingly— they  are  preparing  for  war."  "Oh,  well!" 
said  Lincoln,  "I  guess  we'll  manage  to  keep  house." 
Sherman  felt  that  he  had  been  snubbed,  and  was 
sadly  disappointed  in  the  attitude  of  Lincoln  and 
others  in  authority  at  Washington.  What  particu- 
larly displeased  Sherman  was  Lincoln's  adding,  "I 
guess  we'll  get  along  without  you  fellows,"  mean- 

[98] 


WILLIAM  TECUMSEH  SHERMAN 


LINCOLN  AND  SHERMAN 

ing  that  he  thought  there  would  be  no  war.  As 
they  went  out  from  the  interview  Sherman  said 
to  his  brother,  "You  (meaning  the  politicians) 
have  got  things  in  a  hell  of  a  fix,  and  you  may 
get  them  out  as  best  you  can." 

From  Washington  Sherman  went  to  St.  Louis  to 
take  the  presidency  of  a  street  railway  and  watch 
the  drift  of  events.  Although  he  was  disgusted 
with  the  administration,  and  had  told  his  brother 
he  would  have  nothing  to  do  with  the  Govern- 
ment's efforts  to  save  the  country,  he  thought  bet- 
ter of  it  and  wrote  to  the  Secretary  of  War  offer- 
ing his  services,  not  as  a  three-months  man  but  as 
a  three-years  man.  To  this  somewhat  haughty 
letter  he  received  no  reply,  but  on  the  14th  of 
May,  1861,  was  appointed  Colonel  of  the  Thir- 
teenth Regular  Infantry.  He  was  put  in  command 
of  a  brigade  in  McDowell's  army  and  shared  in  the 
debacle  of  Bull  Run.  His  next  meeting  with  Lin- 
coln was  shortly  after  that  battle.  He  saw  the 
President  and  Secretary  Seward  riding  in  a  car- 
riage and  asked  them  if  they  were  going  to  his 
camps.  To  this  Lincoln  responded,  "Yes;  we 
heard  that  you  had  got  over  the  big  scare,  and  we 
thought  we  would  come  over  and  see  the  'boys'." 
Sherman  asked  if  he  might  give  the  coachman 
directions  as  to  the  best  road  to  the  camps  and  was 
invited  by  the  President  to  get  in  and  ride  with 
them.  As  they  drew  near  the  camp,  Sherman  saw 
that  the  President  was  full  of  feeling  and  wanted 
to  encourage  the  men.  He  asked  him  if  he  intended 
to  make  a  speech,  and  upon  being  told  that  he 
would  like  to  do  so,  Sherman  requested  him  to 

[99] 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

discourage  all  cheering,  noise  or  any  sort  of  con- 
fusion; the  army  had  had  enough  of  it  before  Bull 
Run  to  ruin  any  set  of  men,  and  what  the  army 
needed  was  cool,  thoughtful  and  fighting  soldiers 
— "no  more  hurrahing,  no  more  humbug.''  Lin- 
coln took  this  somewhat  presumptuous  advice  of 
Sherman's  in  good  part,  and  when  some  of  the  men 
began  to  cheer,  he  checked  them,  saying  as  he  did 
so,  "Don't  cheer,  boys.  I  confess  I  rather  like  it 
myself,  but  Colonel  Sherman  here  says  it  is  not 
military,  and  I  guess  we  had  better  defer  to  his 
opinion." 

On  the  morning  of  the  day  of  this  visit  of  Lin- 
coln, an  officer  of  one  of  the  three-months  regi- 
ments whose  time  was  up  had  said  to  Sherman, 
"Colonel,  I  am  going  to  New  York  today.  What 
can  I  do  for  you?"  Sherman  asked  him  how  he 
could  go,  for  he  did  not  remember  having  signed  a 
leave  for  him.  The  officer  answered  that  he  did 
not  require  a  leave;  he  had  enlisted  for  three 
months  and  his  time  was  up,  and  he  could  no 
longer  neglect  his  business.  Leave  or  no  leave,  he 
was  going  that  day  to  New  York.  A  large  group 
of  soldiers  stood  about  listening  to  this  conversa- 
tion, and  realizing  that  it  was  a  critical  situation, 
Sherman  turned  on  the  man  and  said  with  great 
severity,  at  the  same  time  feeling  in  the  breast  of 
his  overcoat,  "Captain,  this  question  of  your  term 
of  service  has  been  submitted  to  the  rightful 
authority  and  the  decision  has  been  published  in 
orders.  You  are  a  soldier  and  must  submit  to 
orders  till  you  are  properly  discharged.  If  you 
attempt  to  leave  without  orders,  it  will  be  mutiny, 

[100] 


LINCOLN  AND  SHERMAN 

and  I  will  shoot  you  like  a  dog!  Go  back  into  the 
fort  now,  instantly,  and  don't  dare  to  leave  it  with- 
out my  consent."  The  officer  promptly  obeyed  and 
the  men  dispersed. 

After  the  President  had  concluded  his  speech  to 
the  men  at  Fort  Corcoran,  Sherman  observed  this 
same  officer  approaching  the  carriage  where  he 
sat  with  Lincoln  and  Seward.  When  he  was  at  the 
side  of  the  carriage  the  officer  said  to  Lincoln, 
"Mr.  President,  I  have  a  cause  of  grievance  (the 
President  had  ended  his  speech  by  inviting  them 
to  appeal  to  him  in  person  if  they  had  any  cause 
of  complaint).  This  morning  I  went  to  speak  to 
Colonel  Sherman,  and  he  threatened  to  shoot  me." 
Mr.  Lincoln,  who  was  still  standing  in  the  carriage 
from  which  he  had  been  speaking  to  the  men,  said, 
"Threatened  to  shoot  you?"  "Yes,  sir,"  replied 
the  officer,  "he  threatened  to  shoot  me."  Look- 
ing from  the  officer  to  Sherman,  and  from  Sher- 
man back  to  the  officer,  Lincoln  stooped  down 
towards  the  man  and  said  to  him  in  a  whisper  loud 
enough  to  be  heard  for  some  distance  around  the 
carriage,  "Well,  if  I  were  you,  and  he  threatened 
to  shoot,  I  would  not  trust  him,  for  I  believe  he 
would  do  it."  Amid  the  laughter  of  the  men  the 
officer  turned  and  walked  away.  When  the  car- 
riage had  gone  some  distance  Lincoln  said  to  Sher- 
man, "Of  course,  I  didn't  know  anything  about  it, 
but  I  thought  you  knew  your  business  best."  Sher- 
man thanked  him  for  his  confidence  and  told  him 
what  he  had  done  would  be  a  great  help  in  main- 
taining discipline  in  the  somewhat  unruly  army. 

With  General  McClellan  commanding  in  the  East 

[101] 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

and  Fremont  in  the  Mississippi  Valley,  no  adequate 
provision  had  been  made  for  the  middle  territory 
and  the  safety  of  Kentucky  and  Tennessee.  The 
Kentucky  legislature  was  in  session  and  ready  to 
act  for  the  Union  if  backed  up  by  the  Government 
with  troops.  To  meet  this  situation  the  Depart- 
ment of  the  Cumberland  was  created  with 
Brigadier-General  Robert  Anderson  in  command. 
He  chose  Sherman  as  one  of  his  assistants,  Sher- 
man having  served  under  him  at  Fort  Moultrie 
from  1843  to  1846.  Lincoln  himself  came  to  the 
Willard  Hotel  and  had  a  conference  with  Sherman 
and  Anderson,  for  this  territory  of  Kentucky  and 
Tennessee  was  always  close  to  the  heart  of  the 
President. 

It  was  at  this  conference  that  Sherman  per- 
suaded Lincoln  to  appoint  George  H.  Thomas  a 
brigadier  general.  Sherman  and  Thomas  had  been 
classmates  at  West  Point.  When  General  Ander- 
son made  a  request  for  Thomas  to  serve  with  him 
as  a  brigadier-general,  Lincoln,  cautious  by  reason 
of  his  experience  with  other  Southern-born  offi- 
cers who  had  gone  over  to  the  Confederacy,  raised 
the  question  as  to  the  loyalty  of  Thomas  to  the 
Union  cause,  he  being  a  Virginian.  Sherman,  how- 
ever, was  most  emphatic  in  his  endorsement  of 
Thomas,  saying  to  the  President,  "Old  Tom  is  as 
loyal  as  I  am!"  Largely  upon  this  assurance  from 
Sherman,  Lincoln  sent  the  name  of  Thomas  in  to 
the  Senate  for  confirmation  as  brigadier  general. 
After  he  left  the  conference  Sherman  remembered 
that  he  had  seen  hardly  anything  of  Thomas  for 
twenty  years  and,  a  little  anxious  as  to  how  he 

[102] 


LINCOLN  AND  SHERMAN 

stood,  he  mounted  his  horse  and  rode  out  to  the 
post  in  Maryland  where  Thomas  was  stationed. 
He  found  him  in  the  saddle,  and  said  to  him,  "Tom, 
you  are  a  brigadier  general."  Thomas  replied,  "I 
don't  know  of  any  one  that  I  would  rather  hear 
such  news  from  than  you."  "But,"  said  Sherman, 
"there  are  some  stories  about  your  loyalty.  How 
are  you  going?"  "Billy,"  answered  Thomas,  "I  am 
going  south!"  "My  God!"  exclaimed  Sherman, 
"Tom,  you  have  put  me  in  an  awful  position;  I 
have  become  responsible  for  your  loyalty."  "Give 
yourself  no  trouble,  Billy,"  said  Thomas;  "I  am 
going  south,  but  at  the  head  of  my  men!"  How 
Thomas  kept  his  promise,  let  Mill  Spring,  Stone 
River,  Chickamauga,  Missionary  Ridge,  and  Nash- 
ville answer.  It  was  this  loyal  Virginian  whose 
command  saved  the  day  at  Stone  River  when  Mc- 
Cook  and  Sheridan  had  been  swept  from  the  field; 
this  same  Virginian  against  whose  lines  in  the  soli- 
tudes of  Chickamauga  the  whole  Confederate  army 
hurled  itself  only  to  be  flung  back  like  waves  break- 
ing on  a  rocky  headland;  it  was  the  soldiers  of 
Thomas  who  carried  the  rifle  pits  in  their  inspired 
charge  up  Missionary  Ridge,  and  it  was  the  army 
under  his  command  which  annihilated  the  army  of 
Hood  at  Nashville.  Had  Sherman  done  nothing 
else  during  the  war  but  secure  the  appointment  to 
high  rank  of  that  noble  and  heroic  character,  his 
contribution  to  the  success  of  the  war  would  have 
been  most  notable.  The  fame  of  Thomas  has  not 
been  commensurate  with  his  distinguished  service. 
But  as  time  sifts  the  men  and  measures  of  our 
great   struggle    for   national   unity,    the   name    of 

[103] 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

Thomas,  the  Virginian  who  put  his  nation  above 
his  state,  will  grow  in  worthy  fame  and  honorable 
renown. 

At  this  interview  at  the  Willard  Sherman  impressed 
upon  Lincoln  the  fact  that  he  did  not  wish  to  be 
left  in  a  superior  command,  but  was  perfectly  will- 
ing to  serve  in  a  subordinate  capacity.  Lincoln 
assured  him  there  would  be  no  difficulty  about  that, 
as  his  chief  trouble  was  to  find  places  for  the 
generals  who  wished  to  command  armies  and  be 
at  the  head  of  affairs.  The  worries  and  harassments 
incident  to  the  setting  up  of  a  new  department 
proved  too  trying  for  General  Anderson,  and  early 
in  October  he  was  relieved  of  the  command  of  the 
Department  of  the  Cumberland  and  Sherman  suc- 
ceeded him.  This  introduced  Sherman  to  the  most 
painful  chapter  in  his  career.  Most  of  the  recruits 
which  the  loyal  states  had  raised  were  streaming 
either  into  Washington,  to  McClellan's  army,  or  in 
the  direction  of  Fremont^at  St.  Louis.  Sherman's 
command  received  few  troops,  and  as  with  keen 
military  mind  he  realized  his  difficult  position  and 
the  disproportion  of  the  means  at  hand  to  the  im- 
mensity of  the  task,  he  began  to  fret  and  complain, 
feeling  that  he  was  neglected  by  the  Government. 
At  his  urgent  request  the  Secretary  of  War,  Simon 
Cameron,  who  had  been  to  St.  Louis  to  investi- 
gate Fremont's  administration  of  affairs,  on  his 
way  back  to  Washington  stopped  off  for  a  day 
to  visit  Sherman  at  Louisville.  He  was  accom- 
panied by  the  adjutant-general  of  the  army, 
Lorenzo  Thomas.  The  conference  was  held  in  a 
room  in  the  Gait  House. 

[104] 


LINCOLN  AND  SHERMAN 

Before  taking  up  the  discussions  of  his  problems, 
Sherman  asked  for  greater  privacy,  stating  that 
many  of  those  present  were  strangers  to  him.  With 
some  testiness  of  manner  Cameron  replied,  "They 
are  all  friends,  all  members  of  my  family,  and  you 
may  speak  your  mind  freely  and  without  restraint/' 
But  among  those  present  was  a  correspondent  of 
the  New  York  Tribune,  and  what  Sherman  sup- 
posed was  a  confidential  and  secret  conversation 
was  soon  made  public.  During  the  interview, 
Cameron,  who  was  unwell,  lay  on  the  bed.  Sher- 
man, in  explaining  to  him  the  exigencies  of  the 
situation,  said  that  he  required  60,000  men  for 
purposes  of  defense  and  200,000  for  offense.  At 
this  Cameron  raised  himself  in  the  bed  and  ex- 
claimed, "Great  God!  where  are  they  to  come 
from?"  Convinced  that  he  had  at  last  aroused  the 
Government  to  the  seriousness  of  the  situation  in 
Kentucky  and  Tennessee,  Sherman  the  next  morn- 
ing saw  Cameron  off  for  Washington. 

When  he  reached  Washington  Cameron  asked 
Adjutant-General  Thomas  to  submit  to  him  a 
memorandum  of  the  events  during  his  absence  in 
the  West.  In  this  memorandum  Thomas  men- 
tioned Sherman's  "insane"  request  for  200,000  men. 
The  newspapers  at  once  took  up  the  cry,  and  for 
several  months  Sherman  was  declared  to  be  insane. 
Not  long  after  he  was  relieved  of  his  command 
and  General  Buell  appointed  to  succeed  him.  This 
was  in  accordance  with  his  understanding  with  the 
Government,  but  to  the  people  at  large  it  looked 
like  a  confirmation  of  the  rumors  of  his  insanity. 
He  was  transferred  to  Halleck's  department  at  St. 

[105] 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

Louis  and  did  not  see  active  duty  in  the  field  until 
the  Shiloh  campaign.  Lincoln  was  in  no  way  in- 
fluenced by  these  newspaper  slanders,  and  ex- 
pressed his  willingness  to  make  Buell  a  major- 
general  so  that  Sherman  could  serve  under  him 
and  thus  be  retained  in  Kentucky.  When  Halleck 
sent  Sherman  home  for  a  month's  rest,  he  said  in 
his  explanation  to  General  McClellan,  "I  am  satis- 
fied that  General  Sherman's  physical  and  mental 
system  is  so  completely  broken  by  labor  and  care 
as  to  render  him,  for  the  present,  unfit  for  duty; 
perhaps  a  few  weeks'  rest  may  restore  him."  The 
fact  of  the  matter  was  that  Sherman  was  in  a  ner- 
vous and  irritable  state  of  mind;  but  to  say  that  he 
was  insane,  or  in  the  least  unbalanced,  was  a 
malicious  slander. 

Sherman's  part  in  Shiloh,  Vicksburg  and  Chat- 
tanooga made  him  one  of  the  great  personalities  of 
the  war.  Yet  during  these  years  he  had  little  con- 
tact or  correspondence  with  Lincoln.  When  he 
was  getting  ready  for  his  march  from  Chattanooga 
to  Atlanta,  Sherman  commandeered  all  the  rolling 
stock  and  foodstuffs  in  his  neighborhood.  This,  of 
course,  worked  hardship  upon  the  civilian  popula- 
tion, and  when  complaint  was  made  to  Lincoln, 
who  was  always  ready  to  listen  to  the  voice  of 
Union  men  in  these  Kentucky  and  Tennessee 
Mountains,  he  wrote  to  Sherman  asking  him  if  he 
could  in  some  way  modify  his  orders.  Sherman 
refused  to  do  so,  telling  the  President  that  the 
railroad  could  not  supply  both  the  army  and  the 
people.  "One  or  the  other  must  quit,  and  the  army 
don't  intend  to,  unless  Joe  Johnston  makes  us." 

[106] 


LINCOLN  AND  SHERMAN 

Lincoln  made  no  further  remonstrance  and  Sher- 
man was  left  a  free  hand  in  his  preparation  for  the 
great  thrust  into  the  heart  of  the  Confederacy. 

Sherman,  like  all  men,  had  his  peculiarities,  and 
sometimes  these  peculiarities  bordered  on  insub- 
ordination. In  the  midst  of  the  Atlanta  campaign 
he  received  notification  from  General  James  A. 
Hardie,  the  Inspector-General  of  the  army,  that 
Generals  Osterhaus  and  Hovey,  then  serving  under 
Sherman,  had  been  made  major-generals.  Both  of 
these  men  had  gone  to  the  rear,  Osterhaus  because 
of  sickness  and  Hovey  because  of  disagreement 
with  General  Schofield.  Sherman  was  angry  that 
these  men  had  been  elevated  and  other  officers 
with  him  passed  over,  and  telegraphed  Hardie  a 
message  which  concluded  with  these  words:  "If 
the  rear  be  the  post  of  honor,  then  we  had  better 
all  change  front  on  Washington."  This  dispatch 
was  shown  to  the  President,  who,  instead  of  resent- 
ing its  unjust  slur,  wrote  Sherman  a  kindly  letter, 
expressing  willingness  to  promote  any  officers 
whom  Sherman  might  name  and  reminding  him 
that  in  the  cases  of  Osterhaus  and  Hovey  the 
President  had  been  chiefly  influenced  by  the  recom- 
mendations of  Generals  Grant  and  Sherman!  The 
impetuous  Sherman  was,  as  he  himself  puts  it, 
"fairly  caught"  for  once,  and  telegraphed  the  Presi- 
dent his  apology,  saying  that  he  did  not  suppose 
such  messages  reached  him  personally,  and  that 
he  had  recommended  Osterhaus  and  Hovey  when 
the  events  of  the  Vicksburg  campaign  were  fresh 
in  his  mind. 

After  the  fall  of  Atlanta  Sherman  and  Lincoln 

[107] 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

attempted  to  supplement  the  military  campaign 
by  what  in  the  World  War  would  have  been  called 
"propaganda".  There  was  perhaps  no  Southern 
state  in  which  the  feeling  against  Jefferson  Davis 
was  so  strong  as  it  was  in  Georgia,  and  Sherman 
and  Lincoln  tried  to  capitalize  that  feeling  and 
thus  withdraw  Georgia  from  the  war.  Prominent 
Georgia  citizens  in  conversation  with  Sherman  had 
given  expression  to  the  futility  of  further  resistance 
and  expressed  the  wish  that  Governor  Brown 
would  withdraw  the  people  of  Georgia  from  the 
Confederacy.  One  of  these  men  was  commis- 
sioned to  tell  Governor  Brown  that  if  he  would 
come  and  talk  with  Sherman  he  should  have  safe 
conduct  and  a  respectful  hearing.  About  this  time 
Governor  Brown  had  disbanded  the  Georgia  militia 
and  sent  the  members  home  to  harvest  the  corn 
and  sorghum  of  the  state.  For  this  action  Brown 
was  denounced  as  a  traitor  by  Jefferson  Davis. 
Lincoln  evinced  the  keenest  interest  in  these 
maneuvers  of  Sherman,  and  telegraphed  him  on 
September  17,  1864,  "I  feel  great  interest  in  the 
subject  of  your  dispatch,  mentioning  corn  and 
sorghum,  and  the  contemplated  visit  to  you."  The 
same  day  Sherman  telegraphed  to  Lincoln  telling 
of  his  exchanges  with  Governor  Brown  and  how 
he  had  said  to  the  Governor's  emissaries,  "that 
some  of  the  people  of  Georgia  are  engaged  in  re- 
bellion, begun  in  error  and  perpetuated  in  pride, 
but  that  Georgia  can  now  save  herself  from  the 
devastations  of  war  preparing  for  her,  only  by 
withdrawing  her  quota  out  of  the  Confederate 
army  and  aiding  to  expel  Hood  from  the  borders 

[108] 


LINCOLN  AND  SHERMAN 

of  the  state;  in  which  event,  instead  of  desolating 
the  land  as  we  progress,  I  will  keep  our  men  to 
the  high  roads  and  commons,  and  pay  for  the  corn 
and  meat  we  need  and  take.  I  am  fully  conscious 
of  the  delicate  nature  of  such  assertions,  but  it 
would  be  a  magnificent  stroke  of  policy  if  we  could, 
without  surrendering  principle  or  a  foot  of  ground, 
arouse  the  latent  enmity  of  Georgia  against  Davis." 
But  the  times  proved  not  to  be  ripe  for  this  stroke 
of  policy,  and  Georgia  was  to  feel  once  more  the 
iron  tread  of  Sherman's  legions. 

On  the  12th  of  November,  1864,  Sherman 
severed  connections  with  his  rear  and  set  out  on 
his  famous  march  to  the  sea  at  Savannah.  For  a 
whole  month  there  were  no  tidings  from  him, 
except  the  vague  and  alarming  reports  which  came 
in  by  way  of  the  Southern  newspapers.  During 
this  period  Lincoln  was  anxious,  but  confident. 
One  day  Colonel  McClure  of  Pennsylvania  called 
at  the  White  House.  As  he  was  leaving  Lincoln 
said,  with  a  twinkle  in  his  eye,  "McClure,  wouldn't 
you  like  to  hear  something  from  Sherman?" 
Everybody  in  the  North  just  at  that  time  was 
hoping  to  hear  some  word  of  Sherman  and  his 
army,  and  McClure  responded,  "Yes,  most  of  all 
I  should  like  to  hear  from  Sherman."  To  this  Lin- 
coln answered,  with  a  laugh,  "Well,  I'll  be  hanged 
if  I  wouldn't  myself!" 

When  Sherman's  brother  John,  calling  at  the 
White  House,  expressed  anxiety  about  him  and  his 
army  and  asked  Lincoln  if  he  had  heard  any  of  the 
reports  about  Sherman  having  been  outflanked  and 
driven  back,  Lincoln  said,  "Oh,  no.     I  know  what 

[109] 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

hole  he  went  in  at,  but  I  can't  tell  what  hole  he 
will  come  out  of." 

At  length,  on  the  22nd  of  December,  the  message 
came  to  Lincoln  telling  of  the  capture  of  Savannah. 
In  this  message  Sherman  said,  "I  beg  to  present 
you  as  a  Christmas  gift  the  city  of  Savannah." 
In  his  acknowledgment  of  this  splendid  gift  to  the 
nation  Lincoln  wrote  to  Sherman: 

My  dear  General  Sherman: 

Many,  many  thanks  for  your  Christmas  gift,  the 
capture  of  Savannah.  When  you  were  about  leaving 
Atlanta  for  the  Atlantic  coast  I  was  anxious  if  not 
fearful;  but  feeling  that  you  were  the  better  judge, 
and  remembering  that  "nothing  risked,  nothing 
gained,"  I  did  not  interfere.  Now,  the  undertaking 
being  a  success,  the  honor  is  all  yours,  for  I  believe 
none  of  us  went  farther  than  to  acquiesce.  And  tak- 
ing the  work  of  General  Thomas  into  the  count,  as  it 
should  be  taken,  it  is,  indeed,  a  great  success.  Not 
only  does  it  afford  the  obvious  and  immediate  military 
advantages,  but  in  showing  to  the  world  that  your 
army  could  be  divided,  putting  the  stronger  part  to 
an  important  new  service,  and  yet  leaving  enough  to 
vanquish  the  old  opposing  force  of  the  whole — 
Hood's  army — it  brings  those  who  sat  in  darkness  to 
see  a  great  light.  But  what  next  ?  I  suppose  it  will 
be  safe  if  I  leave  General  Grant  and  yourself  to  de- 
cide. Please  make  my  grateful  acknowledgments  to 
your  whole  army,  officers  and  men. 

The  great  career  of  Sherman  as  a  commander 
in  the  Civil  War  came  to  an  end  in  a  bitter  and 
unfortunate  dispute  with  his  Government.  This 
was  due  to  the  repudiation  of  the  terms  of  sur- 
render of  the  Confederate  army  under  General 
Joseph  E.  Johnston.    Sherman  maintained  that  in 

[110] 


LINCOLN  AND  SHERMAN 

giving  Johnston  these  terms  he  was  following  the 
wishes  of  Lincoln  as  indicated  to  him  at  a  confer- 
ence held  at  City  Point.  When  his  army  was  at 
Goldsboro,  North  Carolina,  Sherman  went  to 
Grant's  headquarters,  City  Point,  on  the  James 
River,  to  confer  with  his  commander-in-chief.  At 
the  same  time  Lincoln  was  there;  also  Admiral 
Porter.  Sherman  says  that  when  he  went  on  board 
the  steamer  River  Queen,  on  which  the  President 
was  living,  Lincoln  remembered  him  perfectly;  but 
Admiral  Porter,  in  his  account  of  the  interview, 
says  that  Lincoln  did  not  remember  having  met 
Sherman  before,  until  Sherman  reminded  him  of 
the  circumstances  of  their  former  meeting  at 
Washington.  Lincoln  was  much  entertained  by 
Sherman's  stories  of  the  exploits  of  his  "bummers" 
and  told  other  stories  in  return.  The  next  day, 
March  28,  1865,  Sherman  again  called  on  Lincoln 
on  the  River  Queen.  Grant  and  Porter  were  also 
present.  Lincoln  expressed  great  distress  when 
Grant  and  Sherman  told  him  that  they  thought 
another  great  battle  would  have  to  be  fought  be- 
fore the  war  would  come  to  an  end.  Sherman  told 
him  that  the  only  ones  who  could  prevent  another 
great  battle  were  the  enemy.  Sherman  then  asked 
Lincoln  if  all  was  ready  for  the  end  of  the  war. 
What  was  to  be  done  with  rebel  armies  when  de- 
feated; and  with  the  political  leaders?  Lincoln 
said  that  all  was  ready;  that  all  he  wanted  was  to 
get  the  Confederate  soldiers  back  on  the  farms  and 
into  the  shops.  As  for  Jefferson  Davis,  he  illus- 
trated his  wish  by  telling  one  of  his  characteristic 
anecdotes  about  a  total  abstinence  man  who  was 

[in] 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

invited  by  a  friend  to  have  a  drink,  but  declined 
on  the  ground  of  his  pledge.  His  friends  suggested 
lemonade  as  an  agreeable  substitute.  As  he  was 
preparing  the  lemonade  the  friend  pointed  to  a 
bottle  of  brandy  and  said  a  few  drops  of  the  brandy 
would  add  greatly  to  the  lemonade.  His  guest  said 
that  if  the  brandy  were  added  "unbeknownst"  to 
him,  he  would  not  object.  It  was  thus  plain  that 
Lincoln  hoped  that  Jefferson  Davis  would  be  per- 
mitted to  flee  the  country.  Lincoln  also  authorized 
Sherman  to  assure  Governor  Vance  and  the  people 
of  North  Carolina  that  as  soon  as  the  rebel  armies 
laid  down  their  arms  and  resumed  their  civil  pur- 
suits, they  would  be  guaranteed  all  their  rights  as 
citizens  of  a  common  country;  and  that  to  avoid 
anarchy  the  State  governments  then  in  existence, 
with  their  civil  functionaries,  would  be  recognized 
by  him  as  the  government  de  facto  till  Congress 
could  provide  others.  Admiral  Porter,  who  took 
notes  during  this  interview,  confirms  the  account 
given  by  Sherman. 

When,  therefore,  on  the  7th  of  April,  Sherman 
met  General  Johnston  at  the  Bennet  house,  near 
Durham,  North  Carolina,  to  arrange  for  the  sur- 
render of  his  army,  there  was  no  doubt  in  his  mind 
as  to  what  Lincoln  desired  and  what  he  was  auth- 
orized to  arrange.  On  the  way  to  the  meeting  he 
was  handed  the  telegram  telling  of  the  assassina- 
tion of  the  President.  Sherman  kept  the  news  from 
his  army,  but  showed  the  dispatch  to  Johnston 
when  they  met.  The  latter  manifested  the  deepest 
distress,  and  the  perspiration  came  out  in  large 
drops  on  his  forehead.     After  the  truce  had  been 

[112] 


LINCOLN  AND  SHERMAN 

arranged  for,  Sherman  and  Johnston  again  met 
the  next  day.  At  this  meeting  Johnston  was  ac- 
companied by  General  Breckenridge,  the  Secretary 
of  War  in  Davis'  cabinet.  Johnston  requested  that 
he  be  permitted  to  sit,  not  as  representative  of  the 
Confederate  Government,  but  as  a  general  in  the 
army.  To  this  Sherman  assented.  After  proposed 
terms  written  by  Postmaster-General  Reagan  of 
the  Confederate  cabinet  had  been  read  and  re- 
jected, Sherman,  recalling  what  Lincoln  had  said 
to  him  at  City  Point,  took  up  his  pen  and  with  an 
extraordinary  facility  which  amazed  Johnston, 
wrote  off  the  draught  of  the  terms  which  were 
finally  adopted. 

The  terms  concerning  the  officers  and  soldiers  of 
Johnston's  army  were  the  same  as  those  given  by 
Grant  to  Lee  the  week  before  at  Appomattox. 
The  paragraphs  which  raised  a  storm  at  Washing- 
ton and  led  to  the  repudiation  of  the  whole  agree- 
ment were  those  which  provided  for  the  storing 
of  the  arms  of  the  Confederate  soldiers  in  the  State 
arsenals,  the  recognition  of  the  State  governments 
and  a  proclamation  that  the  war  was  to  cease  fol- 
lowed by  a  general  amnesty.  The  moment  Grant 
read  these  terms  he  saw  that  they  were  impossible, 
and  when  he  submitted  them  to  the  new  President 
and  the  Secretary  of  War,  a  meeting  of  the  Cabinet 
was  immediately  called  and  there  was  the  greatest 
consternation  lest  Sherman  should  commit  the 
Government  to  terms  which  it  was  not  willing 
to  grant.  A  foolish  order  was  sent  to  the  troops 
in  the  South  not  to  obey  Sherman,  and  Grant 
himself  was  sent  to  take  charge  of  matters  in  South 

[113] 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

Carolina.  He  discharged  his  difficult  and  delicate 
mission  with  the  greatest  tact,  and  Sherman, 
although  deeply  hurt  and  chagrined,  notified  John- 
ston that  his  terms  had  not  been  accepted  by  the 
Government  of  the  United  States  and  that,  in 
forty-eight  hours,  according  to  the  agreement  of 
the  truce,  he  would  attack  him.  A  new  arrange- 
ment was  then  made  with  Johnston  whereby  he 
surrendered  his  army  as  Lee  had  done  at  Appo- 
mattox. The  Government's  rejection  of  Sher- 
man's pact  with  Johnston  was  published,  with  the 
implied  censure  on  Sherman,  and  worst  of  all  the 
order  of  Halleck  to  Meade,  commander  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac,  to  march  against  Johnston 
and  attack  him  regardless  of  Sherman's  orders. 
This  raised  a  great  storm  in  the  North,  and  Sher- 
man, but  yesterday  the  idolized  hero  of  the  war, 
became  the  most  execrated  man  in  the  army.  But 
this  storm  of  national  passion  soon  blew  over,  and 
the  great  soldier  was  restored  to  popular  favor  and 
to  the  admiration  of  the  ages. 

The  mistake  that  Sherman  made  was  to  include 
political  as  well  as  military  considerations  in  his 
terms  with  Johnston.  Any  one  reading  over  the 
paragraphs  of  the  agreement  will  be  impressed 
with  the  fact  that  it  was  a  treaty  of  peace  rather 
than  the  surrender  of  a  hostile  army.  The  biog- 
raphers of  Lincoln  asseverate  that  Sherman's  pre- 
sumption was  due  to  the  fact  that  he  had  a  low 
opinion  of  all  civilians  and  thought  the  generals  in 
the  field  more  competent  to  make  war  or  peace 
than  the  politicians  at  Washington.  This  probably 
was   true;   but    even   with   such   views,    Sherman 

[114] 


LINCOLN  AND  SHERMAN 

would  not  have  ventured  to  propose  such  an  in- 
strument to  Johnston  unless  he  had  felt  that  he 
was  only  putting  into  effect  the  desires  of  Lincoln 
as  expressed  to  him  at  City  Point.  Some  days 
before  that  meeting  the  Secretary  of  War  had  sent 
Grant  a  telegram  telling  him  that  it  was  the  Presi- 
dent's wish  that  he  have  no  conferences  with 
General  Lee  "unless  it  be  for  the  capitulation  of 
Lee's  army  or  on  solely  minor  or  purely  military 
matters.  He  instructs  me  to  say  that  you  are  not 
to  decide,  discuss  or  confer  upon  any  political  ques- 
tion. Such  questions  the  President  holds  in  his 
own  hands,  and  will  submit  them  to  no  military 
conferences  or  conventions."  If  a  copy  of  these 
orders  of  March  3rd  had  been  sent  to  Sherman  the 
whole  difficulty  might  have  been  obviated;  but  this 
was  not  done,  and  even  if  it  had  been  done,  at  the 
City  Point  conference,  held  ten  days  after  these 
orders  were  sent  to  Grant,  Lincoln  seemed  to  give 
Sherman  authority  to  do  just  what  he  did  in  the 
first  agreement  with  Johnston. 

There  are  many  conjectures  as  to  what  might 
have  happened  had  Lincoln  been  spared  and  per- 
mitted to  carry  out  his  own  policy  of  reconstruc- 
tion, for  it  was  contrary  to  the  temper  of  the 
nation.  The  explosion  of  indignation  which  fol- 
lowed the  publication  of  Sherman's  terms  with 
Johnston,  which  were  a  resume  of  Lincoln's  own 
policy  of  reconstruction,  revealed  all  too  plainly 
that  the  nation  did  not  approve  of  Lincoln's  clem- 
ency, and  that  even  Lincoln  himself,  had  he  been 
spared,  could  never  have  secured  for  such  a  policy 
the  ratification  of  the  will  of  the  people.  Four  years 

[115] 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

of  suffering  and  distress  had  bred  a  different  tem- 
per in  the  nation,  and  such  a  thing  as  the  imme- 
diate recognition  of  the  State  governments,  and 
the  general  amnesty,  would  have  been  impossible. 
Complete  proof  of  this  is  shown  by  the  fact  that 
Lincoln  himself  had  to  withdraw  the  permission 
for  the  assembling  of  the  Legislature  of  Virginia, 
and  when  he  had  formulated  a  message  to  Con- 
gress in  February,  1865,  proposing  that  $400,000,- 
000  be  paid  to  the  South  as  compensation  for  the 
emancipation  of  the  slaves,  it  met  with  the  unani- 
mous disapproval  of  the  Cabinet.  We  can  only 
imagine  what  the  nation  would  have  thought  had 
it  known  that  such  a  thing  had  been  proposed. 

The  half-century  and  more  which  has  passed 
since  the  close  of  the  Civil  War  has  raised  Abraham 
Lincoln  to  the  rank  of  martyr,  saint  and  prophet. 
But  we  must  not  read  the  thought  and  sentiments 
of  the  nation  today  into  the  mind  of  the  nation  of 
1865.  A  general  amnesty  and  the  quick  recogni- 
tion of  the  States  which  had  been  in  revolt  against 
the  Government  appear  at  this  day  the  natural  and 
easy  course  to  have  been  followed,  all  the  more 
because  we  know  it  was  the  policy  of  Abraham 
Lincoln,  the  nation's  great  hero.  But  a  nation  is 
greater  than  its  greatest  man,  and  the  accumu- 
lated indignation  of  the  people  would  have  swept 
Lincoln's  overmild  policy  of  reconstruction  aside 
as  surely  as  the  wind  drives  the  leaves  before  it. 


[116] 


LINCOLN  AND  BURNSIDE 

General  Ambrose  E.  Burnside  was  an  officer 
who,  both  by  his  own  confession  and  by  the  esti- 
mate of  those  associated  with  him,  was  not  fitted 
for  high  command.  Yet  he  had  more  independent 
commands  and  saw  more  fighting  than  almost  any 
other  general  of  the  Civil  War.  Besides  the  com- 
mand of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  Burnside  led 
the  expedition  against  the  North  Carolina  forts 
in  1862,  and,  at  the  head  of  the  Army  of  the  Ohio, 
marched  into  eastern  Tennessee  in  the  campaign 
of  Knoxville.  From  1861  until  July,  1864,  when 
he  was  relieved  by  Grant  after  the  Petersburg  mine 
fiasco,  Burnside  was  continually  in  the  midst  of 
stirring  events,  both  as  a  soldier  and  as  an  admin- 
istrator, for,  as  we  shall  see,  his  administration  of 
the  Department  of  the  Ohio  precipitated  one  of  the 
most  bitter  political  discussions  of  the  war.  Yet  he 
was  a  man  who  had  greatness  thrust  upon  him. 
Thrice  he  was  proffered  by  Lincoln  the  command 
of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  and  twice  he  refused 
the  great  post,  and  when  it  was  offered  to  him  the 
third  time  he  accepted  it  only  with  protests  and 
tears.  He  sought  to  avoid  the  great  honors  and 
the  great  responsibilities  of  the  conflict,  but  they 
gave  him  no  rest. 

In  contrast  with  the  aristocratic  McClellan  and 
Meade,  both  heirs  of  old  Philadelphia  culture  and 
learning,  Burnside  was  a  child  of  the  log  cabin, 
born  at  Liberty,  Indiana,  on  the  23rd  of  May,  1824. 

[117] 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

The  Mexican  War  was  about  over  when  he  was 
graduated  from  West  Point,  and  after  six  years  in 
the  army  he  resigned  his  commission  and  engaged 
in  the  manufacture  of  firearms  in  Rhode  Island. 
When  the  Civil  War  broke  out  he  was  in  the  em- 
ploy of  the  Illinois  Central  Railroad.  It  was  in 
this  service  that  he  became  intimate  with  McClel- 
lan.  He  commanded  a  Rhode  Island  brigade  in  the 
battle  of  Bull  Run  and  early  the  next  year  led  the 
very  successful  expeditionary  force  against  the 
North  Carolina  coast.  His  successes  there  made 
him  a  major-general  and  his  name  well  known  to 
the  public. 

When  McClellan's  retreat  down  the  Peninsula 
had  shaken  the  President's  confidence  in  him,  Lin- 
coln began  to  cast  about  for  a  new  commander  for 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  The  man  he  hit  upon 
was  Burnside,  who  peremptorily  declined  it.  For 
the  time  being  Lincoln  had  to  be  content  with  tak- 
ing McClellan's  army  away  from  him  instead  of 
supplanting  him  with  another  commander.  But 
the  disaster  of  Second  Bull  Run  made  it  necessary 
for  Lincoln  to  recall  McClellan  to  command  the 
forces  about  Washington,  disorganized  by  the  de- 
feat. Before  restoring  McClellan  to  command, 
Lincoln  had  a  second  time  offered  the  post  to 
Burnside,  and  again  Burnside  declined. 

In  the  campaign  which  followed  Burnside  led 
his  corps  and  did  good  service  at  South  Mountain 
and  Antietam,  although  his  action  at  "Burnside" 
Bridge  was  slow  and  poorly  executed.  A  few 
weeks  later  President  Lincoln,  exasperated  by  the 

[118] 


AMBROSE  E.  BURNSIDE 


LINCOLN  AND  BURNSIDE 

lack  of  progress  McClellan  was  making  in  his 
movement  against  Lee,  surprised  the  army  and  the 
entire  country  by  placing  Burnside  in  command. 
When  word  was  brought  to  him  at  his  headquar- 
ters at  Orlean,  Virginia,  Burnside  protested  ear- 
nestly against  taking  the  post,  telling  his  staff  that 
he  did  not  regard  himself  competent  to  command 
so  large  an  army.  Yet  he  was  a  patriot,  ready  to 
serve  where  he  was  called,  and  although  he  did 
not  think  himself  competent  he  knew  of  others 
whom  he  thought  were  even  less  fit,  and  lest  they 
should  be  called  if  he  refused,  he  accepted  his  new 
commission.  It  was  a  sad  day  for  two  men  when, 
on  that  snowy  7th  of  November,  1862,  Burnside 
walked  into  the  tent  of  his  friend  and  commander, 
McClellan,  and  showed  him  the  President's  order. 
With  a  smile  McClellan  accepted  the  inevitable  and 
spent  two  days  with  Burnside  helping  him  get 
hold  of  the  situation.  After  Fitz  John  Porter,  Burn- 
side was  perhaps  McClellan's  most  intimate  friend. 
Fond  as  he  was  of  Burnside,  McClellan  knew  too 
well  that  his  coming  to  the  command  boded  ill 
for  the  army.  In  his  letter  of  that  night  to  his 
wife,  he  said,  "They  have  made  a  great  mistake. 
Alas  for  my  poor  country!" 

There  was  no  question  about  the  mistake  that 
had  been  made.  But  how  terrible  a  mistake  it 
would  prove  to  be,  neither  McClellan  nor  any  other 
man  could  have  foreseen.  The  bloody  slopes  of 
Fredericksburg,  on  the  13th  of  the  following  De- 
cember, revealed  how  sad  and  tragic  a  mistake  it 
was.  The  wonder  is  how  Lincoln  could  ever  have 
made  it.  Many  of  the  generals  whom  Lincoln  chose 

[119] 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

disappointed  him  and  the  whole  country.  But 
Burnside  was  Lincoln's  one  great  military  blunder. 
Fremont,  Butler,  Hooker,  Pope,  McClellan,  Sigel — 
all  made  serious  mistakes,  and  had  characteristics 
which  impaired  their  usefulness,  but  the  blunder 
of  Burnside  was  colossal.  None  of  the  high  offi- 
cials in  the  army  had  advocated  Burnside  as  their 
partisans  had  advocated  McClellan  and  Hooker. 
The  man  himself  confessed  that  he  was  not  equal 
to  the  task  of  leading  the  army  to  victory.  Yet 
to  him  Lincoln  gave  the  commander's  baton.  In 
this  Lincoln  must  have  been  influenced  by  the  per- 
sonal charm  and  frank,  open  ways  of  Burnside.  The 
idea  of  a  dictator  had  been  associated  with  McClel- 
lan, and  when  he  determined  to  remove  McClellan 
after  Antietam  Lincoln  was  evidently  making  sure 
of  a  general  concerning  whose  complete  separation 
from  any  political  entanglement  there  could  be  no 
doubt.  There  was  little  likelihood  of  any  factions  or 
parties  framing  themselves  about  Burnside.  He  was 
too  frank,  too  ingenuous,  for  that.  He  was 
popular  with  his  men  of  the  9th  Corps,  but  beyond 
this  there  was  nothing  in  his  military  career  thus 
far  that  singled  him  out  as  a  leader  of  a  great  army. 
McClellan  had  been  relieved  for  moving  too 
slowly  and  reluctantly.  The  new  commander  was 
expected  to  move  against  the  enemy,  and  to 
move  immediately.  He  did  so.  Burnside  re- 
jected the  President's  plan  of  campaign  which 
had  first  been  submitted  to  McClellan,  and 
chose  to  cross  the  Rappahannock  at  Fredericks- 
burg. But  from  the  very  beginning  of  the  cam- 
paign things  went  wrong.     The  pontoons  did  not 

[120] 


LINCOLN  AND  BURNSIDE 

arrive  as  soon  as  expected,  and  one  delay  after 
another  ensued,  so  that  when  Burnside  finally  got 
ready  to  move  across  the  river,  Lee's  army  was 
strongly  established  on  the  opposite  heights. 
Burnside  might  have  moved  up  or  down  the  river, 
but  he  marched  as  the  Israelites  marched  when 
they  crossed  the  Jordan,  "right  against  Jericho." 
He  was  expected  to  fight.  Why  not  fight  the 
enemy  in  the  first  place  you  find  him?  The  cross- 
ing and  the  attack  at  Fredericksburg  was  com- 
mendable in  its  boldness  and  courage,  but  nothing 
more  can  be  said  of  it.  It  was  magnificent,  but  it 
was  not  war.  Burnside  wrote  to  Lincoln  before 
the  attack  was  made,  "I  think  the  enemy  will  be 
more  surprised  by  a  crossing  immediately  in  our 
front  than  on  any  part  of  the  river."  They  were 
surprised,  but  not  taken  by  surprise.  They  were 
astounded  by  the  frontal  assault,  but  not  dumb- 
founded by  it.  As  one  of  Burnside's  West  Point 
friends  in  the  Confederate  army  said  to  him  dur- 
ing the  truce,  "We  thought  you  had  more  sense 
than  to  batter  your  brains  out  against  our  stone 
walls."  After  the  battle,  Burnside,  standing  at  his 
headquarters  at  Falmouth,  and  pointing  to  the 
thousands  of  dead  and  dying  men  lying  on  the  field 
across  the  river,  groaned  aloud  to  General  W.  F. 
Smith,  "Oh,  those  men!  Oh,  those  men  over 
there !"  And  the  whole  nation,  when  it  heard  the 
story,  echoed  the  cry,  "Oh,  those  men!  Oh,  those 
men  over  there !" 

The  extraordinary  thing  is  that  the  disaster  at 
Fredericksburg  did  nothing  to  change  or  weaken 
the  popular  estimate  of  Burnside.    In  his  own  army 

[121] 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

there  was  lack  of  confidence  and  bitter  criticism, 
but  outside,  no  clamor  and  tumults  were  raised  as 
happened  after  other  reverses. 

This  retention  by  Burnside  of  the  nation's  con- 
fidence, and  Lincoln's  too,  was  due  in  large  part 
to  the  manly  way  in  which  he  assumed  the  entire 
responsibility  for  what  had  taken  place.  In  his 
report  to  General  Halleck,  Burnside  said,  "To  the 
brave  officers  and  men  who  accomplished  the  feat 
of  this  recrossing  in  the  face  of  the  enemy,  I  owe 
everything.  For  the  failure  in  the  attack  I  am 
responsible,  as  the  extreme  gallantry,  courage  and 
endurance  shown  by  them  was  never  excelled,  and 
would  have  carried  the  points,  had  it  been  possible. 
The  fact  that  I  decided  to  move  from  Warrenton 
on  this  line  rather  against  the  opinion  of  the  Presi- 
dent, Secretary,  and  yourself,  and  that  you  have 
left  the  whole  management  in  my  hands,  without 
giving  me  orders,  makes  me  the  more  responsible." 

In  reply  to  this  report  Lincoln,  fearing  that 
the  soldiers  would  be  greatly  depressed  over  the 
recent  defeat,  addressed  a  special  message  to  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac.  In  this  message  Lincoln 
said:  "Although  you  were  not  successful,  the  at- 
tempt was  not  an  error,  nor  the  failure  other  than 
an  accident.  The  courage  with  which  you,  in  an 
open  field,  maintained  the  contest  against  an  in- 
trenched foe,  and  the  consummate  skill  and  success 
with  which  you  crossed  and  recrossed  the  river  in 
the  face  of  the  enemy,  show  that  you  possess  all 
the  qualities  of  a  great  army,  which  will  yet  give 
victory  to  the  cause  of  the  country  and  of  popular 
government.    Condoling  with  the  mourners  for  the 

[122] 


LINCOLN  AND  BURNSIDE 

dead  and  sympathizing  with  the  severely  wounded, 
I  congratulate  you  that  the  number  of  both  is  com- 
paratively small.  I  tender  you,  officers  and  sol- 
diers, the  thanks  of  the  nation." 

Burnside  made  two  more  attempts  to  cross  the 
river.  The  first  was  stopped  by  orders  from  Lin- 
coln and  the  second  by  the  mud.  When  Burnside 
was  preparing  for  his  new  effort  to  cross  the  river 
Lincoln  wrote  a  letter  to  Halleck  asking  him  to 
direct  and  advise  Burnside.  Few  letters  of  Lin- 
coln's show  such  distress  and  reveal  such  a  sense 
of  inability  to  direct  the  military  operations.  In  it 
Lincoln  said,  "If  in  such  a  difficulty  as  this  you 
do  not  help  me,  you  fail  me  precisely  in  the  point 
for  which  I  sought  your  assistance.  Tell  General 
Burnside  that  you  do  approve  or  you  do  not  ap- 
prove his  plan." 

On  the  first  day  of  January,  1863,  Burnside,  who 
was  then  contemplating  a  new  movement  against 
Lee's  army,  wrote  of  his  plan  to  the  President.  In 
the  letter  he  tells  Lincoln  that  both  Stanton  and 
Halleck  have  not  the  confidence  of  the  army  and 
intimates  that  both  of  them  must  be  removed  if 
the  army  is  to  gain  a  victory.  He  then  goes  on  to 
state  how  all  his  division  commanders  are  opposed 
to  his  contemplated  move  and  lack  confidence  in 
his  leadership.  He  states  it  as  his  opinion  that  the 
army  should  be  commanded  by  another  officer 
who  shall  have  the  confidence  of  the  under  offi- 
cers, and  offers  to  make  the  way  easy  for  the  ap- 
pointment of  a  successor  by  resigning  his  post.  On 
the  5th  day  of  January,  Burnside,  in  a  formal  man- 
ner, tendered  his  resignation.    Still  Lincoln  did  not 

[123] 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

accept  it.  Here  is  a  strange  case.  A  general  who 
confesses  that  he  does  not  hold  the  confidence  of 
his  officers  and  asks  to  be  relieved,  yet  is  con- 
tinued in  power.  Lincoln's  dilemma  was  the 
nation's  dilemma — Whom  shall  I  have  for  a  com- 
mander? 

On  the  23rd  day  of  January  Burnside  telegraphed 
to  Lincoln  asking  if  he  could  see  him  after  mid- 
night that  night,  saying  that  he  was  preparing 
some  very  important  orders  which  he  would  like 
to  submit  to  the  President.  These  were  the  famous 
General  Orders,  No.  8,  in  which  Burnside  dismisses 
Hooker  from  the  army  as  a  man  unfit  to  hold 
an  important  commission.  Other  officers  to  be 
dismissed  or  relieved  from  duty  with  the  army 
were  Brooks,  Newton,  Cochrane,  Franklin,  W.  F. 
Smith,  and  Sturgis.  At  the  midnight  interview 
Burnside  submitted  these  preposterous  orders  to 
Lincoln  for  his  approval,  with  the  alternative  of 
accepting  his  resignation.  Lincoln,  of  course, 
chose  the  latter,  and  Hooker  succeeded  the  frank 
and  manly  and  patriotic  Burnside. 

The  next  chapter  in  Lincoln's  relationships  with 
Burnside  contains  one  of  the  most  stirring  political 
incidents  of  the  entire  war.  In  March,  1863,  Lin- 
coln made  Burnside  commander  of  the  Department 
of  the  Ohio,  with  headquarters  at  Cincinnati.  He 
found  that  part  of  Ohio  and  the  adjoining  terri- 
tory infested  with  bitter  hostility  to  the  Govern- 
ment, and  with  a  commendable  zeal  Burnside  de- 
termined to  suppress  its  manifestations.  To  this 
end  he  issued  the  celebrated  Order  No.  38,  in 
which  he  said  that  "all  persons  found  within  our 

[124] 


LINCOLN  AND  BURNSIDE 

lines  who  commit  acts  for  the  benefit  of  the  ene- 
mies of  our  country,  will  be  tried  as  spies  or 
traitors,  and,  if  convicted,  will  suffer  death."  The 
order  concluded  with  this  statement,  "It  must  be 
distinctly  understood  that  treason,  expressed  or 
implied,  will  not  be  tolerated  in  this  department." 
Many  of  the  friends  of  the  administration  thought 
the  order  impolitic,  and  among  the  opposition  it 
aroused  furious  denunciation.  The  most  bitter 
and  most  eloquent  assailant  was  Clement  L.  Val- 
landigham.  Vallandigham  had  been  a  member  of 
Congress  until  his  attacks  on  the  Government  lost 
him  his  seat.  In  a  speech  in  Congress  in  January, 
1863,  he  said,  "I  did  not  support  the  war;  and  to- 
day I  bless  God  that  not  the  smell  of  so  much  as 
one  drop  of  its  blood  is  upon  my  garments.  Our 
Southern  brethren  were  to  be  whipped  back  into 
love  and  fellowship  at  the  point  of  the  bayonet. 
Oh,  monstrous  delusion!  Sir,  History  will  record 
that,  after  nearly  six  thousand  years  of  folly  and 
wickedness  in  every  form  of  government,  theo- 
cratic, democratic,  monarchic,  oligarchic,  despotic, 
and  mixed,  it  was  reserved  to  American  statesman- 
ship, in  the  nineteenth  century  of  the  Christian  era, 
to  try  the  grand  experiment,  on  a  scale  the  most 
costly  and  gigantic  in  its  proportions,  of  creating 
love  by  force,  and  developing  fraternal  affection  by 
war;  and  History  will  record  too,  on  the  same 
page,  the  utter,  disastrous  and  most  bloody  failure 
of  the  experiment."  This  was  a  sample  of  the  pow- 
erful eloquence  of  this  dangerous  demagogue. 

An  army  officer  in  citizen's  clothes  who  attended 
a  mass  meeting  at  Mt.  Vernon,  Ohio,  heard  Val- 

[125] 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

landigham  deliver  a  speech  in  which  he  bitterly- 
denounced  the  Government,  called  Lincoln  a 
tyrant,  and  said  that  Burnside's  Order,  No.  38,  he 
despised,  spat  upon  and  trampled  under  his  feet. 
This  was  too  much  for  the  patriotic  Burnside  who, 
as  an  army  leader,  had  seen  too  many  die  in  battle 
to  be  able  to  tolerate  such  utterances.  A  squad  of 
soldiers  arrested  Vallandigham  in  his  home  at  Day- 
ton and  took  him  to  Cincinnati,  where,  in  due 
course,  he  was  tried  by  a  military  commission  and 
found  guilty  of  violating  General  Order,  No.  38, 
by  declaring  disloyal  sentiments  and  opinions,  with 
the  object  and  purpose  of  weakening  the  powers 
of  the  Government,  in  its  efforts  to  suppress  an  un- 
lawful rebellion.  He  was  sentenced  to  close  con- 
finement in  a  military  fortress  and  General  Burn- 
side  ordered  him  sent  to  Fort  Warren,  Boston. 

Lincoln  was  disturbed  and  embarrassed  by  the 
arrest  of  Vallandigham.  Had  he  been  consulted 
beforehand  it  would  not  have  taken  place.  But 
now  that  Burnside  had  taken  the  stand  and  that 
the  passions  of  the  nation  had  been  aroused  on  one 
side  or  the  other,  Lincoln  could  do  nothing  but 
stand  by  Burnside.  But  he  relieved  the  tension 
somewhat  and  injected  an  element  of  humor  into 
the  whole  matter  by  taking  advantage  of  one  of 
the  clauses  of  Burnside's  order,  in  which  he  said 
that  those  found  guilty  of  expressing  sympathy  for 
the  enemy  would  be  "sent  beyond  our  lines  into 
the  lines  of  their  friends."  The  sentence  of  Val- 
landigham was  commuted  to  expulsion  from  the 
Union  lines,  and  he  was  unceremoniously  dumped 
between  the  lines  of  the  armies  of  Rosecrans  and 

[126] 


LINCOLN  AND  BURNSIDE 

Bragg,  then  confronting  one  another  near  Murfrees- 
boro  in  Tennessee.  After  a  brief  stay  in  the  South, 
Vallandigham  ran  the  blockade  and  went  to  Ber- 
muda and  thence  to  Canada.  From  the  Canadian 
side  he  issued  an  address  to  the  people  of  Ohio, 
where  the  Democrats  had  nominated  him  for  Gov- 
ernor, in  which  he  said,  "Arrested  and  confined  for 
three  weeks  in  the  United  States  a  prisoner  of 
state;  banished  thence  to  the  Confederate  States^ 
I  found  myself  first  a  freeman  when  on  British  soil. 
And  today,  under  the  protection  of  the  British  flag, 
I  am  here  to  enjoy  and,  in  part,  to  exercise  the 
privileges  and  rights  which  usurpers  insolently 
deny  me  at  home.,, 

The  arrest  of  Vallandigham  was  more  bitterly 
criticized  and  disputed  than  any  act  of  the  Gov- 
ernment during  the  war.  All  those  opposed  to  the 
administration  rallied  round  the  incident  and  began 
to  make  use  of  it  for  political  purposes.  On  the 
16th  of  May,  1863,  a  public  meeting  of  protest  was 
held  at  Albany,  New  York.  In  a  message  to  the 
meeting  Governor  Seymour  of  New  York  wrote: 
"It  is  an  act  which  has  brought  dishonor  upon  our 
country.  If  it  is  upheld  our  liberties  are  over- 
thrown. The  action  of  the  administration  will  de- 
termine, in  the  minds  of  more  than  one-half  of  the 
people  of  the  loyal  states,  whether  this  war  is 
waged  to  put  down  rebellion  in  the  South,  or  to 
destroy  free  institutions  at  home."  The  meeting 
adopted  resolutions  of  a  similar  tone  to  reverse 
the  action  of  Burnside's  tribunal  and  set  Vallandig- 
ham free. 

[127] 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

To  these  resolutions  Lincoln  answered  in  one  of 
his  longest  and  most  carefully  considered  papers, 
defending  the  right  of  the  Government  to  act  as  it 
had  in  the  case  of  Vallandigham.  As  for  the  men- 
ace to  civil  liberty  and  constitutional  rights,  he 
said  the  act  was  an  extraordinary  act  for  an 
extraordinary  crisis;  that  even  in  times  of  peace 
"bands  of  horse  thieves  and  robbers  frequently 
grow  too  numerous  and  powerful  for  the  ordinary 
courts  of  justice.  But  what  comparison  in  numbers 
have  such  bands  ever  borne  to  the  insurgent  sym- 
pathizers, even  in  many  of  the  loyal  states?  Again, 
a  jury  too  frequently  has  at  least  one  member  more 
ready  to  hang  the  panel  than  to  hang  the  traitor. 
And,  yet  again,  he  who  dissuades  one  man  from 
volunteering,  or  induces  one  soldier  to  desert, 
weakens  the  Union  cause  as  much  as  he  who  kills 
a  Union  soldier  in  battle. "  Referring  to  the  alleged 
danger  of  civil  procedure  being  supplanted  by  acts 
of  military  courts,  Lincoln  pointedly  and  humor- 
ously said:  "Nor  am  I  able  to  appreciate  the  danger 
apprehended  by  the  meeting  that  the  American 
people  will,  by  means  of  military  arrests  during  the 
rebellion,  lose  the  right  of  public  discussion,  the 
liberty  of  speech  and  the  press,  the  law  of  evidence, 
trial  by  jury,  and  habeas  corpus,  throughout  the  in- 
definite peaceful  future  which  I  trust  lies  before 
them,  any  more  than  I  am  able  to  believe  that  a 
man  could  contract  so  strong  an  appetite  for 
emetics,  during  temporary  illness,  as  to  persist  in 
feeding  upon  them  during  the  remainder  of  his 
healthful  life."  In  a  more  serious  vein  the  Presi- 
dent spoke  of  how  men  like  Vallandigham,  by  their 

[128] 


LINCOLN  AND  BURNSIDE 

speeches,  encouraged  desertion  in  the  army.  "Long 
experience  has  shown  that  armies  cannot  be  main- 
tained unless  desertion  shall  be  punished  by  the 
severe  penalty  of  death.  The  case  requires,  and 
the  law  and  the  constitution  sanction,  this  punish- 
ment. Must  I  shoot  a  simple-minded  soldier  boy 
who  deserts,  while  I  must  not  touch  a  hair  of  a 
wily  agitator  who  induces  him  to  desert?  This  is 
none  the  less  injurious  when  effected  by  getting  a 
father,  or  brother,  or  friend  into  a  public  meeting 
and  there  working  upon  his  feelings  till  he  is  per- 
suaded to  write  the  soldier  boy  that  he  is  fighting 
in  a  bad  cause,  for  a  wicked  administration  of  a 
contemptible  Government,  too  weak  to  arrest  and 
punish  him  if  he  shall  desert.  I  think  that  in  such 
a  case  to  silence  the  agitator  and  save  the  boy  is 
not  only  constitutional,  but,  withal,  a  great  mercy." 
There  was  Lincoln  at  his  best. 

Vallandigham,  overwhelmingly  defeated  in  the 
Ohio  elections,  defied  the  order  of  expulsion  and 
returned  to  the  United  States  in  June,  1864,  where 
he  delivered  speeches  more  violent  and  bitter  than 
those  for  which  he  had  been  deported.  But  Lin- 
coln wisely  refused  to  pay  any  attention  to  him. 
Vallandigham's  last  act  of  political  importance  was 
the  part  he  took  in  the  Chicago  Convention  which 
nominated  McClellan  for  the  presidency  and  de- 
clared the  war  to  be  a  failure.  His  dramatic  career 
was  cut  short  by  an  accident  in  the  year  1871.  He 
was  chief  counsel  for  the  defense  in  a  murder  trial 
at  Lebanon,  Ohio,  and  was  demonstrating  to  some 
of  his  associate  counsel  in  his  room  at  the  hotel, 

[129] 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

the  impossibility  of  the  accused  having  fired  the 
fatal  shot.  There  were  two  pistols  on  the  table, 
and  to  illustrate  his  argument  Vallandigham  took 
up  one  of  the  pistols  and  holding  it  to  his  head  in 
the  place  where  the  bullet  had  entered  the  dead 
man's  head,  pulled  the  trigger.  By  mistake  he  had 
taken  up  the  loaded  pistol  and  fell  mortally 
wounded  and  shortly  afterwards  expired.  The  son 
of  a  Presbyterian  minister,  he  was  expelled  from 
Jefferson  College  as  a  lad,  and  his  whole  career 
was  full  of  dramatic  episodes,  not  one  of  the  least 
of  which  was  the  part  he  took  in  interrogating 
John  Brown  when  he  lay  wounded  on  the  floor  of 
the  engine  house  at  Harper's  Ferry  in  1859. 

During  the  campaign  of  Rosecrans  against 
Bragg  in  eastern  Tennessee,  Burnside  conducted  an 
army  to  Knoxville.  After  the  disaster  which  befell 
the  Union  army  at  Chickamauga,  when  it  was  com- 
pelled to  fall  back  into  Chattanooga,  Longstreet 
was  detached  from  Bragg's  army  and  moved 
against  Burnside,  besieging  him  at  Knoxville.  The 
greatest  apprehension  was  felt  by  the  Government 
for  the  safety  of  Burnside  and  his  army,  and  the 
first  thing  Grant  did  after  crushing  Bragg  in  the 
battle  of  Chattanooga,  was  to  send  Sherman  to  the 
relief  of  Burnside.  But  Burnside  had  conducted 
affairs  with  great  courage  and  skill,  and  had  suc- 
cessfully withstood  Longstreet  long  before  Sher- 
man appeared.  General  Foster  had  been  sent  to 
relieve  Burnside  at  his  own  request,  and  when  as 
far  as  Cumberland  Gap,  reported  that  he  could  get 
little  news  of  Burnside  and  the  siege  of  Knoxville, 
except  that  his  scouts  reported  heavy  firing  in  that 

[130] 


LINCOLN  AND  BURNSIDE 

direction.  It  was  when  he  had  received  one  of 
these  messages  after  a  day  of  anxiety,  that  Lincoln 
expressed  his  confidence  and  satisfaction  as  to 
Burnside's  position  by  the  following  bit  of  anec- 
dotage :  "A  neighbor  of  mine  in  Menard  County, 
named  Sally  Ward,  had  a  large  family  of  children 
that  she  took  very  little  care  of.  Whenever  she 
heard  one  of  them  yelling  in  some  out-of-the-way 
place  she  would  say,  'Thank  the  Lord!  there's  one 
of  my  young  ones  not  dead  yet!'  "  The  reports  of 
heavy  firing  in  the  direction  of  Knoxville  let  Lin- 
coln know  that  one  of  his  generals  was  not  yet 
captured. 

Upon  being  relieved  from  the  command  of  the 
Department  of  the  Ohio,  Burnside  went  back  to  his 
old  Corps,  the  9th,  and  led  it  gallantly  through  the 
heavy  fighting  of  the  Wilderness  under  Grant.  His 
long  career  in  the  army  came  to  an  abrupt  and 
unfortunate  conclusion  after  the  failure  of  the 
Petersburg  Mine  attack. 

When  the  army  was  before  Petersburg  Burn- 
side's  Ninth  Corps  had  fought  its  way  to  within 
one  hundred  and  thirty  yards  of  the  Confederate 
position.  An  officer  in  one  of  Burnside's  divisions, 
who  had  been  a  mine  expert  in  the  anthracite  re- 
gions of  Pennsylvania,  suggested  to  Burnside  that 
a  mine  be  dug  under  the  Confederate  lines.  The 
men,  many  of  whom  had  been  miners,  entered  into 
the  project  with  the  greatest  industry  and  enthu- 
siasm. The  main  gallery  was  510  feet  in  length, 
with  two  lateral  galleries  thrust  under  the  fort. 
Three  hundred  and  twenty  kegs  of  powder  were 
stowed  away  in  the  eight  magazines.     The  explo- 

[131] 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

sion  was  set  for  the  30th  of  July.  Wild  rumors 
were  abroad  in  the  Confederate  lines  as  to  the 
mine,  and  their  troops  were  filled  with  apprehen- 
sion and  unrest.  Finally,  at  five  o'clock  in  the 
morning,  after  the  first  fuse  had  burned  out,  the 
mine  exploded,  tearing  a  great  chasm  in  the  earth 
and  carrying  terror  to  the  heart  of  the  enemy. 
Burnside  had  carefully  drilled  a  division  of  colored 
troops  for  the  assault,  but  at  the  last  moment  a 
white  division  was  substituted.  There  was  bad 
behavior  on  the  part  of  some  of  the  officers,  and 
the  troops,  poorly  led,  pressed  down  into  the  crater 
and  were  soon  in  seething  and  hopeless  disorder. 
To  add  to  the  confusion  and  debacle  the  division  of 
colored  troops  was  ordered  up.  The  negroes 
fought  with  the  greatest  gallantry,  but  they  had 
come  too  late  and  were  soon  thrust  back  by  the 
reorganized  Confederates  into  the  inferno  at  the 
bottom  of  the  crater.  The  vast  pit  was  now  filled 
with  a  struggling  mass  of  white  and  colored  troops, 
cowering  against  the  steep  sides  and  vainly  seek- 
ing shelter  from  the  fire  of  the  Confederate  artil- 
lery. The  blood  of  men  wounded  near  the  top  of 
the  crater  flowed  in  streams  down  the  yellow  sides 
of  the  crater,  and  gathered  into  pools  at  the  bot- 
tom. Men  who  had  been  shot  at  the  top  came  roll- 
ing down  the  steep  sides,  or  ran  screaming  and 
cursing  through  the  mob.  The  sun,  now  high  in 
heaven,  aggravated  the  sufferings  of  the  victims  in 
the  crater,  and  a  wave  of  moisture  produced  by  the 
breathing  of  the  bloody,  struggling,  perspiring 
mass,  rose  like  a  cloud  over  the  scene  of  horror. 
Thrown  into  this  terrible  pit  by  the  blunders  of 

[132] 


LINCOLN  AND  BURNSIDE 

their  officers,  the  men  were  left  in  the  crater  for 
hour  after  hour,  without  orders,  and  it  was  not 
until  two  in  the  afternoon  that  two  of  the  briga- 
diers with  the  troops,  gave,  on  their  own  respon- 
sibility, the  order  to  retire.  The  Petersburg  crater 
was  one  of  the  ghastliest  tragedies  of  the  war,  and 
once  again  it  was  Burnside  who  was  immediately 
responsible  for  the  blunder.  The  two  division  com- 
manders, it  was  discovered,  had  been  crouching 
like  cowards  in  their  bomb-proof  shelters  while 
their  men,  waiting  in  vain  for  orders,  were  left 
struggling  in  the  shambles  at  the  bottom  of  the 
crater.  The  only  redeeming  feature  of  the  whole 
ghastly  action  was  the  magnificent  conduct  of  the 
black  troops. 

Both  Grant  and  Meade  blamed  Burnside  for 
the  disaster.  The  Court  of  Inquiry,  ordered  by 
the  President  at  the  request  of  Meade,  censured 
Burnside  for  neglecting  the  preparations  necessary 
to  insure  success,  but  the  Committee  on  the  Con- 
duct of  the  War  justified  Burnside  in  every  par- 
ticular and  laid  the  responsibility  for  the  failure 
at  the  door  of  Meade  and  Grant.  From  the  evi- 
dence at  hand  it  seems  clear  that  if  Burnside's  care- 
fully trained  negro  troops  had  been  permitted  to 
take  the  part  which  Burnside  had  intended  them 
to  take,  the  chances  of  success  would  have  been 
much  greater. 

Burnsides'  resignation  never  would  have  been 
accepted  by  Lincoln  until  the  war  was  over.  But 
it  arrived  on  the  day  of  his  assassination,  and  one 
of  the  first  official  acts  of  President  Johnson  was 
its  acceptance.     Thus,  with  the  fall  of  his  great 

[133] 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

chief,  the  noble-minded,  magnanimous  patriot, 
Burnside,  passed  into  civil  life.  He  left  behind  him 
a  record  of  unblemished  character  and  high  fear- 
lessness. His  service  was  long  and  many  of  his 
achievements  notable.  But  he  will  be  remembered 
for  the  great  and  tragic  mistake  of  Fredericksburg. 
When  we  think  of  Burnside,  we  see  a  haggard  gen- 
eral pointing  across  the  Rappahannock  to  where 
thousands  of  his  soldiers  lay  dead  and  dying  on  the 
bloody  slopes  of  Marye  Heights,  and  groaning 
aloud  to  the  members  of  his  staff  who  stood  near 
him,  "Oh,  those  men!    Oh,  those  men  over  there!" 


[134] 


LINCOLN  AND  HOOKER 

"General  Joseph  Hooker,  having  been  guilty  of 
unjust  and  unnecessary  criticism  of  the  actions  of 
his  superior  officers,  and  of  the  authorities,  and 
having  by  the  general  tone  of  his  conversation  en- 
deavored to  create  distrust  in  the  minds  of  officers 
who  have  associated  with  him,  and  for  habitually 
speaking  in  disparaging  terms  of  other  officers,  is 
hereby  dismissed  the  service  of  the  United  States 
as  a  man  unfit  to  hold  an  important  commission 
during  a  crisis  like  the  present,  when  so  much 
patience,  charity,  confidence,  consideration,  and 
patriotism  are  due  from  every  soldier  in  the  field. 
This  order  is  issued  subject  to  the  approval  of  the 
President  of  the  United  States." 

So  ran  the  extraordinary  order  which  General 
A.  E.  Burnside,  Commander  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac,  submitted  to  President  Lincoln  a  few 
weeks  after  the  disastrous  repulse  of  the  army  be- 
fore the  heights  of  Fredericksburg.  Lincoln  did 
not  approve  the  order,  and  the  next  day,  January 
25,  1863,  appointed  to  the  command  of  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac,  General  Joseph  Hooker,  described 
by  Burnside  as  "a  man  unfit  to  hold  an  important 
commission  during  a  crisis  like  the  present."  In 
making  this  appointment  Lincoln  consulted  none 
of  his  colleagues.  He  had,  indeed,  in  the  previous 
summer,  about  the  time  of  the  battle  of  Second 
Bull  Run,  said  to  his  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  Gideon 
Welles,  "Who  can  take  command  of  this  army? 

[135] 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

Who  is  there  among  all  the  generals?"  Without 
much  consideration  Welles  named  Hooker.  Lin- 
coln replied,  "I  think  as  much  as  you  or  any  other 
man  of  Hooker,  but  I  fear  he  gets  excited."  Post- 
master-General Blair,  who  was  present,  said  he 
thought  Hooker  was  too  great  a  friend  of  John 
Barleycorn,  whereupon  Welles  answered,  "If  his 
habits  are  bad,  if  he  ever  permits  himself  to  get 
intoxicated,  he  ought  not  to  be  trusted  with  such  a 
command."  This  lets  us  know  that  long  before  he 
was  made  commander  of  the  army  Hooker  was 
highly  thought  of  by  those  in  authority  at  Wash- 
ington. But  when  he  appointed  him  to  that  post 
Lincoln  acted  by  himself  and  for  himself. 

Joseph  Hooker  was  born  on  the  13th  of  Novem- 
ber, 1813,  at  Hadley,  Massachusetts.  He  was  grad- 
uated from  West  Point  in  1837,  and  served  with 
distinction  in  the  Mexican  War.  After  a  few  years' 
service  as  assistant  adjutant-general  in  California, 
where  he  was  intimate  with  Grant,  Sherman,  and 
Halleck,  Hooker  purchased  a  tract  of  land  in  Son- 
oma County,  California,  and  tried  his  hand,  but 
with  indifferent  success,  at  ranching.  In  anticipa- 
tion of  the  war  between  the  States,  Hooker  had 
become  the  colonel  of  a  California  regiment  of 
infantry.  When  the  war  broke  out  he  had  not 
sufficient  funds  to  get  to  the  scene  of  hostilities, 
and  generous  and  admiring  friends  raised  a  sum 
of  one  thousand  dollars  to  defray  his  traveling  ex- 
penses. No  attention  was  paid  to  his  application 
for  a  commission  in  the  army  by  the  authorities  at 
Washington,  probably  due  to  the  fact  that  testy  old 
General  Scott,  then  in  command,  had  not  forgot- 

[136] 


i 

1 

W  % 

- .    *        1 

'ill 

4 

* 

i 

1  \                      \1 

1                    f'iH1*           LI 

JOSEPH   HOOKER 


LINCOLN  AND  HOOKER 

ten  how  the  impudent  young  artillery  officer  had 
criticized  him  during  the  Mexican  War.  Shortly 
after  the  Battle  of  Bull  Run,  which  he  had  wit- 
nessed as  a  mere  spectator,  Hooker,  about  to  go 
back  in  chagrin  to  California,  was  presented  to 
Lincoln  at  the  White  House.  The  friend  who  in- 
troduced him  named  him  as  "Captain"  Hooker. 
Hooker  then  said  to  the  President,  "Mr.  President, 
I  am  not  'Captain'  Hooker,  but  was  once  Lieu- 
tenant-colonel Hooker,  of  the  regular  army.  I  was 
lately  a  farmer  in  California,  but  since  the  Rebel- 
lion broke  out  I  have  been  here  trying  to  get  into 
the  service,  and  I  find  that  I  am  not  wanted.  I 
am  about  to  return  home,  but  before  going  I  was 
anxious  to  pay  my  respects  to  you,  and  to  express 
my  wishes  for  your  personal  welfare  and  success  in 
quelling  this  Rebellion.  And  I  want  to  say  one 
word  more.  I  was  at  Bull  Run  the  other  day,  Mr. 
President,  and  it  is  no  vanity  in  me  to  say  that  I 
am  a  d —  sight  better  general  than  any  you  had 
on  that  field." 

Such  was  the  first  meeting  between  Lincoln  and 
the  general  who  was  in  the  next  few  years  to 
arouse  in  Lincoln  such  high  hopes,  only  to  be 
dashed  in  dark  disappointment.  Shortly  after  this 
meeting  Lincoln  made  Hooker  a  brigadier-general 
of  volunteers.  There  must  have  been  something 
in  common  between  these  two  men,  recognized  by 
the  acute  Lincoln  at  the  very  first  encounter,  for 
Lincoln  was  more  intimate  with  Hooker,  talked 
with  him  more,  than  with  any  other  commander 
of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  His  messages  to  him 
were  couched  in  a  familiar  and  fatherly  style,  and 

[137] 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

the  President,  in  his  conversations  and  communica- 
tions with  Hooker,  fell  back  easily  and  naturally 
into  the  vernacularities  and  jocosities  of  the  West. 

Hooker  was  regarded  as  the  best-looking  man 
in  the  Federal  army.  He  was  tall  and  well  pro- 
portioned, his  complexion  as  ruddy  as  a  school- 
girl's, his  hair  a  light  brown.  Some  of  his  critics 
claim  to  have  noted  a  weak  chin  in  his  make-up, 
but  that  probably  was  after  Chancellorsville,  and 
not  before  it.  His  best  portraits  show  not  only  a 
good-looking  man,  but  a  face  of  high  intelligence. 
His  reputation  for  good  looks  was  of  long  stand- 
ing, for  the  ladies  of  Mexico  City  called  him  "El 
Capitan  Hermoso,"  the  handsome  captain,  and  also 
applied  to  him  an  expression  which  meant  "the  only 
man  as  handsome  as  a  woman."  When  mounted 
on  his  white  charger  Hooker  presented  a  magnifi- 
cent appearance,  and  his  presence  among  his 
troops,  in  the  midst  of  battle,  never  failed  to  evoke 
wild  cheering. 

In  the  Peninsular  campaign  Hooker  led  his  corps 
with  courage  and  skill,  and  he  was  soon  one  of  the 
outstanding  officers  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac. 
The  sobriquet  by  which  he  was  known,  "Fighting 
Joe,"  was  not  bestowed  upon  him  by  the  troops, 
but  by  some  nameless  clerk  of  the  Associated 
Press,  who,  when  the  reports  of  the  Battle  of 
Malvern  Hill  were  coming  in,  put  as  a  running  head 
for  one  of  the  copy  sheets  the  words  "Fighting 
Joe  Hooker."  The  newspapers  ran  the  words  at  the 
head  of  their  columns  the  next  day  and  the  sobri- 
quet became  inexorably  linked  with  Hooker's 
career.     It  did  not  do  him  justice,   for  Hooker, 

[138] 


LINCOLN  AND  HOOKER 

although  full  of  dash  and  fight  when  going  into 
action,  did  not  assault  in  mad  frenzy  nor  without 
careful  consideration  of  the  end  in  view.  It  was 
this  "Fighting  Joe"  Hooker,  who,  as  commander 
of  one  of  the  Grand  Divisions  at  Fredericksburg, 
rode  to  Burnside's  headquarters  and  earnestly  pro- 
tested against  the  order  to  move  his  troops  against 
the  fatal  heights  of  the  Marye  Mansion.  The  title 
was  very  distasteful  to  Hooker.  "It  always  sounds 
to  me,"  said  Hooker,  "as  if  it  meant  'Fighting 
Fool'.  It  has  really  done  me  much  injury  in  mak- 
ing the  public  believe  I  am  a  furious,  headstrong 
fool,  bent  on  making  furious  dashes  at  the  enemy. 
I  have  never  fought  without  good  purpose  and  with 
fair  chances  of  success.  When  I  have  decided  to 
fight,  I  have  done  so  with  all  the  vigor  and  strength 
I  could  command." 

After  Malvern  Hill  it  was  Hooker  who  urged 
McClellan  to  move  on  Richmond,  telling  him  that 
he  might  as  well  be  hung  for  a  lion  as  for  an  old 
sheep,  meaning  probably  that  he  might  as  well  risk 
his  command  of  the  army  in  a  great  forward 
movement  against  the  capital  of  the  Confederacy 
as  lose  it  by  inaction  and  the  wrangling  of  poli- 
ticians. At  South  Mountain  and  Antietam  Hooker 
was  in  the  thick  of  the  fighting  and  was  severely 
wounded  in  the  latter  conflict.  His  chief  fault  was 
unsparing  criticism  of  his  fellow-officers  and  even 
of  his  superiors.  During  the  hearing  of  the  dis- 
pute between  Generals  Pillow  and  Worth,  about 
the  storming  of  Chaupultepec,  Hooker  spoke 
severely  of  some  of  Scott's  plans  of  assault  and 
showed  how  he  could  have  secured  the  same  end 

[139] 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

with  less  cost  of  life.  This,  as  we  have  seen,  the 
vain  old  hero  never  forgot,  and  it  almost  cost 
Hooker  a  commission  in  the  army.  In  his  report 
of  Fredericksburg  he  sarcastically  concluded  by 
saying  that  when  he  had  lost  all  the  men  his  orders 
required  him  to  lose  he  withdrew  his  division  from 
the  fight.  His  criticisms  must  have  been  unusually 
bitter  at  this  time,  for  Burnside's  famous  Order 
No.  8  dismissing  Hooker  from  the  army  and  ex- 
coriating him  for  his  faults,  indicates  extraordinary 
provocation.  Hooker  never  knew  of  this  order  and 
what  Burnside  had  said  of  him  until  the  campaign 
which  culminated  at  Gettysburg  was  about  to  open. 
But  when  he  did  see  it  he  expressed  himself  to 
Stanton  in  these  violent  words:  "I  see  that  Burn- 
side's  stupid  Order  No.  8  has  at  last  found  its 
way  into  the  newspapers.  It  causes  me  no  regret, 
and  would  no  one  else  if  the  character  of  the  author 
was  as  well  understood  by  them  as  myself.  His 
moral  degradation  is  unfathomable.  It  has,  and 
still  grieves  me  to  reflect  that  my  surroundings  at 
this  time  are  such  that  I  cannot  call  him  to  account 
for  his  atrocities  and  make  him  swallow  his  words, 
or  face  the  music,  before  going  into  another  fight. 
He  must  swallow  his  words  as  soon  as  I  am  in  a 
condition  to  address  him,  or  I  will  hunt  him  to  the 
ends  of  the  earth.,,  We  have  no  record  that  Hooker 
and  Burnside  ever  met  again. 

Towards  McClellan,  Hooker  was  equally  unspar- 
ing in  his  censure.  He  testified  before  the  Com- 
mittee of  Congress  to  Investigate  the  War  that  the 
Peninsular  campaign  was  lost  because  of  "want  of 
generalship  on  the  part  of  the  commander-in-chief.,, 

[140] 


LINCOLN  AND  HOOKER 

In  a  message  to  Lincoln,  after  Chancellorsville, 
Hooker  concluded,  saying,  "Jackson  1S  dead,  and 
Lee  beats  McClellan  in  his  untruthful  bulletins." 

These  characteristics  of  Hooker  were  by  this 
time  well  known  to  Lincoln,  for  even  the  President 
had  not  been  spared  Hooker's  energetic  language. 
Lincoln  refers  to  this  in  the  fatherly  letter  which  he 
sent  Hooker  when  he  made  him  commander  of  the 
army.  No  commander  of  an  army  ever  received 
from  the  head  of  the  State  such  a  letter.  The  let- 
ter, which  shows  Lincoln  at  his  best,  ran  as 
follows : 

General :  I  have  placed  you  at  the  head  of  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac.  Of  course  I  have  done  this  upon 
what  appear  to  me  sufficient  reasons,  and  yet  I  think 
it  is  best  for  you  to  know  that  there  are  some  things 
in  regard  to  which  I  am  not  quite  satisfied  with  you. 
I  believe  you  to  be  a  brave  and  skilful  soldier,  which, 
of  course,  I  like.  I  also  believe  you  do  not  mix  poli- 
tics with  your  profession,  in  which  you  are  right. 
You  have  confidence  in  yourself,  which  is  a  valuable 
if  not  an  indispensable  quality.  You  are  ambitious, 
which,  within  reasonable  bounds,  does  good  rather 
than  harm;  but  I  think  that  during  General  Burn- 
side's  command  of  the  Army  you  have  taken  counsel 
of  your  ambition  and  thwarted  him  as  much  as  you 
could,  in  which  you  did  a  great  wrong  to  the  country 
and  to  a  most  meritorious  and  honorable  brother  offi- 
cer. I  have  heard,  in  such  a  way  as  to  believe  it,  of 
your  recently  saying  that  both  the  army  and  the 
government  needed  a  dictator.  Of  course,  it  was  not 
for  this,  but  in  spite  of  this,  that  I  have  given  you  the 
command.  Only  those  generals  who  gain  successes 
can  set  up  as  dictators.  What  I  now  ask  of  you  is 
military  success,  and  I  will  risk  the  dictatorship.  The 
government  will  support  you  to  the  utmost  of  its 

[141] 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

ability,  which  is  neither  more  nor  less  than  it  has  done 
and  will  do  for  all  its  commanders.  I  much  fear  that 
the  spirit  which  you  have  aided  to  infuse  into  the 
army,  of  criticizing  their  commander  and  withholding 
confidence  from  him,  will  now  turn  upon  you.  I 
shall  assist  you  as  far  as  I  can  to  put  it  down. 
Neither  you  nor  Napoleon,  if  he  were  alive  again, 
could  get  any  good  out  of  an  army  while  such  a  spirit 
prevails  in  it.  And  now  beware  of  rashness.  Beware 
of  rashness,  but  with  energy  and  sleepless  vigilance 
go  forward  and  give  us  victories. 

In  this  letter  there  is  a  mingling  of  that  humor, 
pathos,  and  magnificent  faith  in  the  nation  and  its 
cause  which  are  now  forever  associated  with  the 
name  of  Abraham  Lincoln.  When  he  tells  Hooker 
that  only  successful  generals  can  set  up  as  dic- 
tators, the  playful  intimation  is  that  the  past  his- 
tory of  the  army  has  not  led  the  President  to  have 
very  strong  misgivings  as  to  the  danger  of  a  dic- 
tatorship. Together  with  this  is  the  sorrow  of  Lin- 
coln that  Hooker  and  other  of  his  generals  should 
let  their  ambitions  and  personal  prejudices  stand 
in  the  way  of  that  co-operation  which  is  necessary 
to  victory.  Lincoln  believed  that  McClellan  and 
his  generals  had  behaved  badly  at  the  time  of  the 
second  battle  of  Bull  Run  and  that  their  lack  of 
cordial  support  cost  Pope  the  victory  and  almost 
brought  disaster  to  the  nation.  Yet  he  restored 
McClellan  to  the  command.  Here  again  he  be- 
lieved that  Burnside's  indictment  of  Hooker,  as 
contained  in  the  rejected  Order  No.  8,  was  on  the 
whole  true,  and  that  Hooker  had  let  his  own  am- 
bitions stand  in  the  way  of  loyal  and  prompt  obedi- 
ence, and  that  Burnside's  ill  success  was  due  in 

[142] 


LINCOLN  AND  HOOKER 

part  to  Hooker.  With  appalling  frankness  Lin- 
coln says  this  to  Hooker,  yet  he  gave  him  the  com- 
mand of  the  army  beneath  whose  banners  rested 
the  hopes  of  the  republic,  for,  as  in  the  case  of 
McClellan  in  the  Antietam  campaign,  Lincoln 
hoped  that  Hooker,  in  spite  of  his  faults,  would 
give  the  country  what  it  was  praying  for — victory. 

Two  others  of  the  chief  actors  in  the  drama  of  the 
Civil  War  noted  in  Hooker  this  trait  of  ambition. 
Neither  Grant  nor  Sherman  liked  Hooker,  and  their 
judgments  are  to  be  taken  with  that  in  mind.  Yet 
Grant,  at  least,  was  generally  fair  and  just  in  his 
comments  upon  the  officers  with  whom  he  came 
in  contact  during  the  war.  This  is  what  he  had  to 
say  of  Hooker,  who  served  under  him  in  the  No- 
vember campaign  of  1863,  when,  in  the  battle  about 
Chattanooga,  Grant  defeated  Bragg  and  relieved 
the  nation  from  a  great  fear:  "Of  Hooker  I  saw 
but  little  during  the  war.  I  had  known  him  very 
well  before,  however.  Where  I  did  see  him,  at 
Chattanooga,  his  achievement  in  bringing  his  com- 
mand around  the  point  of  Lookout  Mountain  and 
into  Chattanooga  Valley  was  brilliant.  I  never- 
theless regarded  him  as  a  dangerous  man.  He  was 
not  subordinate  to  his  superiors.  He  was  ambitious 
to  the  extent  of  caring  nothing  for  the  rights  of 
others.  His  disposition  was,  when  engaged  in  bat- 
tle, to  get  detached  from  the  main  body  of  the 
army  and  exercise  a  separate  command,  gathering 
to  his  standard  all  he  could  of  his  juniors." 

Sherman  pays  tribute  to  Hooker's  dash  as  a 
fighter  and  complimented  him  for  special  gallantry 
at  Peach  Tree  Creek.    Yet  he,  too,  mentions  "this 

[143] 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

tendency  to  get  detached  from  the  main  body  of 
the  army,"  and  says  that  Thomas,  McPherson  and 
Schofield  had  all  complained  to  him  of  this  ten- 
dency to  "switch  off,  leaving  wide  gaps  in  his  line, 
so  as  to  be  independent,  and  to  make  glory  on  his 
own  account. "  This  habit,  on  one  occasion,  evoked 
a  sharp  reprimand  from  Sherman  and  was  the  chief 
reason  why,  when  McPherson  was  killed  in  battle, 
Howard,  instead  of  Hooker,  was  appointed  to  the 
command  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee. 

The  President's  letter,  as  might  have  been  ex- 
pected from  its  tone,  touched  rather  than  irritated 
Hooker,  who  said  of  it,  "He  talks  to  me  like  a 
father.  I  shall  not  answer  this  letter  until  I  have 
won  him  a  great  victory."  The  letter  was  never 
answered.  With  the  rank  and  the  file  of  the  army 
Hooker's  appointment  to  command  was  well  re- 
ceived. But  the  majority  of  the  superior  officers 
were  far  from  enthusiastic.  Their  attitude  is  re- 
flected in  the  statement  made  long  after  the  war 
by  Major-General  Darius  N.  Couch:  "When 
Hooker,  on  January  25th,  was  placed  in  command 
of  the  army  many  of  us  were  very  much  surprised. 
I  think  the  superior  officers  did  not  regard  him 
competent  for  the  task.  He  had  fine  qualities  as 
an  officer,  but  not  the  weight  of  character  to  take 
charge  of  that  army." 

Hooker  had  often  been  mentioned  as  a  brilliant 
and  hard  fighting  corps  commander.  As  the  com- 
mander of  .an  army  in  battle  his  associates  did  not 
rate  him  highly.  But  his  fitness  for  the  one  thing 
that  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  then  needed  above 
all  else,  reorganization  and  the  restoration  of  fight- 

[144] 


LINCOLN  AND  HOOKER 

ing  spirit,  does  not  seem  to  have  been  discussed 
by  either  the  officials  of  the  government  or  the 
officers  of  the  army.  Yet  it  was  here,  in  this 
work  of  reorganization,  of  putting  a  spirit  of  con- 
fidence and  daring  into  the  army,  that  the  great 
ability  of  Hooker  first  shone  forth.  In  the  very 
passage  where  he  gives  so  unfavorable  an  opinion 
of  Hooker,  Couch  generously  acknowledges  the 
miracle  of  reorganization  accomplished  by  Hooker: 
"Nevertheless,  under  his  administration  the  army 
was  wonderfully  vigorous.  I  have  never  known 
men  to  change  from  a  condition  of  the  lowest  de- 
pression to  that  of  a  healthy  fighting  state  in  so 
short  a  time." 

Never  in  all  its  history  was  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  in  such  bad  shape  as  it  was  in  after  Burn- 
side's  failures  at  Fredericksburg.  The  feat  of 
General  McClellan  in  the  previous  September,  tak- 
ing the  army  in  hand  and  reorganizing  it  as  he 
marched  after  Lee,  was  a  military  achievement  of 
the  highest  order.  But  what  McClellan  had  to 
contend  with  chiefly  was  the  dislocation  of  the 
army,  its  regiments  and  divisions  scattered  about 
here  and  there.  Hooker  succeeded  to  the  command 
of  a  compact  army,  yet  his  work  of  reorganization 
was  a  far  greater  one  than  that  of  McClellan  on 
the  way  to  Antietam,  for  the  army  which  he  took 
over  from  Burnside  was  dispirited  and  sulky.  The 
men  felt  that  they  had  been  mishandled  by  in- 
competent leaders.  Thousands  of  officers  and  men 
were  away  from  the  army  on  one  kind  of  leave  or 
another.  Hundreds  of  men  were  deserting  every 
day,  and  a  spirit  of  cynicism  and  indifference  was 

[145] 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

rife  in  the  camps.  One  of  the  best  New  England 
regiments  openly  hurrahed  for  "Jeff"  Davis  when 
a  Union  officer  of  high  rank  rode  by  with  his  staff. 
This  was  the  host  that  Hooker  took  and  trans- 
formed into  the  army  that  shattered  Lee  at  Gettys- 
burg, for  that  battle,  let  it  not  be  forgotten,  came 
at  the  end  of  a  campaign  which  was  planned  and 
executed  by  Hooker. 

Among  the  features  of  Hooker's  reorganization 
was  the  adoption  of  a  corps  badge,  at  once  very 
popular  with  the  soldiers.  As  for  the  deserters, 
Hooker  secured  greater  liberty  in  dealing  with 
them  from  the  President,  and  a  few  shootings  of 
deserters  in  the  presence  of  the  army  had  a  very 
salutary  effect.  It  was  after  Hooker  took  hold 
of  the  army  that  the  cavalry  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  began  to  count.  Hooker  organized  them 
as  a  separate  unit  and  the  cavalry  division  steadily 
increased  in  spirit  and  fighting  power,  splendidly 
manifested  in  the  Gettysburg  campaign.  The  say- 
ing, "Who  ever  saw  a  dead  cavalryman?"  was  one 
of  the  many  attributed  to  Hooker.  He  did  not  use 
this  expression  as  a  slight  upon  that  branch  of  the 
service,  but  he  did  announce  his  intention  to  make 
greater  use  of  the  cavalry,  saying  to  one  of  his 
officers  that  he  had  not  seen  many  dead  cavalry- 
men lying  about  as  yet,  but  that  ere  long  there 
would  be  such  a  sight.  In  conversation  with  one 
of  his  cavalry  brigadiers  Hooker  spoke  of  the  su- 
periority of  the  Northern  trooper  over  his  Southern 
adversary  in  point  of  food,  mount  and  equipment, 
and  he  added,  "Now,  with  such  soldiers  and  such  a 
cause  as  we  have  behind  them — the  best  cause 

[146] 


LINCOLN  AND  HOOKER 

since  the  world  began — we  ought  to  be  invincible, 
and  by  — ,  sir,  we  shall  be !  You  have  got  to  stop 
these  disgraceful  cavalry  'surprises'.  I'll  have  no 
more  of  them.  I  give  you  full  power  over  your 
officers,  to  arrest,  cashier,  shoot — whatever  you 
will — only  you  must  stop  these  'surprises'.  And, 
by  — ,  sir,  if  you  don't  do  it,  I  give  you  fair  notice, 
I  will  relieve  the  whole  of  you,  and  take  the  com- 
mand of  the  cavalry  myself!" 

By  the  first  of  April  it  was  a  different  host  which 
Hooker  commanded  on  the  heights  opposite  Fred- 
ericksburg, an  army  well  drilled,  thoroughly  dis- 
ciplined and  full  of  fight,  breaking  out  into  wild 
cheering  whenever  their  handsome  general  rode 
down  the  line,  or  singing  as  they  marched  for  the 
fords  of  the  Rappahannock, 

'The  Union  boys  are  moving  on  the  left  and  on  the  right, 
The  bugle  call  is  sounding,  our  shelters  we  must  strike; 
Joe  Hooker  is  our  leader,  he  takes  his  whisky  strong, 
So  our  knapsacks  we  will  sling,  and  go  marching  along." 

In  the  first  week  in  April,  Lincoln,  accompanied 
by  Mrs.  Lincoln  and  "Tad,"  paid  a  visit  to  the 
army.  The  President,  mounted  on  a  black  horse, 
his  long  legs  nearly  touching  the  ground,  received 
a  great  ovation  from  the  troops  as  he  reviewed 
them,  with  the  magnificent  Hooker  seated  on  a 
white  horse  at  his  side.  He  was  greatly  impressed 
with  the  miracle  of  the  army  reorganization  and 
had  every  reason  to  think  that  he  had  not  erred 
in  placing  Hooker  at  its  head.  Yet  he  had  some 
misgivings,  for  Noah  Brooks,  who  was  with  him  on 
this  visit,  recalls  how,  after  hearing  Hooker  talk 

[147] 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

about  the  "finest  army  on  the  planet,"  and  the 
oft-reiterated  "When  I  take  Richmond/'  Lincoln 
said  confidentially  to  him,  "This  is  the  most  de- 
pressing thing  about  Hooker.  It  seems  to  me  that 
he  is  overconfident."  At  the  close  of  a  dinner  party 
at  headquarters  Lincoln  took  Hooker  and  Couch 
aside  and  said  to  them,  in  words  which  were 
strangely  prophetic  of  what  caused  the  defeat  in 
the  coming  battle,  "Gentlemen,  in  your  next  battle, 
put  in  all  your  men."  "Yet,"  as  Couch  significant- 
ly adds,  "that  is  exactly  what  we  did  not  do  at 
Chancellorsville." 

It  was  on  this  visit  to  the  army  that  Lincoln 
talked  with  General  Averell  about  the  recent  fight 
at  Kepp's  Ford  with  the  Confederate  cavalry  under 
General  Fitzhugh  Lee.  An  incident  of  this  fight 
was  a  rather  unusual  exchange  of  letters  between 
Lee  and  Averell,  who  had  been  classmates  at  West 
Point,  Lee  advising  Averell  to  leave  Virginia  and 
go  home,  or,  failing  that,  to  bring  him,  the  next 
time  he  crossed  the  river,  a  sack  of  coffee.  When 
he  withdrew  after  the  fight  at  Kepp's  Ford,  Averell 
left  two  men  too  severely  wounded  to  be  removed. 
To  a  surgeon  remaining  with  the  wounded  men 
he  gave  a  sack  of  coffee,  with  the  following  note 
to  Lee: 

Dear  Fitz :  Here's  your  coffee.    Here's  your  visit. 
How  do  you  like  it?  Averell. 

Lincoln  carried  the  correspondence  with  him  and 
would  frequently  produce  and  show  it.  He  said  to 
Averell : 

"Were  you  and  General  Lee  friends?" 

[148] 


LINCOLN  AND  HOOKER 

"Certainly,"  said  Averell,  "and  always  have 
been." 

"What  would  happen  should  you  meet  on  the 
battlefield?" 

"One  or  both  of  us  would  be  badly  hurt  or 
killed." 

At  this  Lincoln  exclaimed,  more  to  himself  than 
to  the  bystanders : 

"Oh,  my  God,  what  a  dreadful  thing  is  a  war 
like  this,  in  which  personal  friends  must  slay  each 
other  and  die  like  fiends!" 

In  the  last  days  of  April,  1863,  Hooker  com- 
menced the  movement  which  culminated  in  the 
Battle  of  Chancellorsville.  He  had  conceived  what 
all  students  of  war  concede  to  have  been  a  bril- 
liant piece  of  strategy.  The  plan  was  so  clear 
cut,  with  all  its  different  movements  climaxing  in 
the  blow  which  was  to  give  victory  to  the  Federal 
army,  that  it  is  a  delight  even  to  read  an  account 
of  it.  In  brief  it  was  this :  The  two  armies  lay 
facing  one  another  at  Fredericksburg  with  the 
Rappahannock  River  flowing  between  them. 
Hooker's  plan  was  to  have  a  large  division  of  cav- 
alry under  General  Stoneman  cross  the  river  at  a 
point  west  of  the  Confederate  army  and  then  swing 
far  into  the  rear  of  that  army,  cutting  Lee's  com- 
munications with  Richmond  and  threatening  that 
city.  As  soon  as  that  movement  was  well  under 
way  the  main  portion  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
was  to  cross  the  river  to  the  northwest  of  the  Con- 
federate army,  getting  into  its  immediate  rear  and 
advance  towards  it,  while  the  troops  left  at  Fred- 
ericksburg crossed  at  that  point  and  marched  on 

[149] 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

the  foe.  With  his  line  of  communications  endan- 
gered by  the  cavalry  raid  towards  Richmond  and 
with  two  Union  armies  marching  against  him,  one 
on  his  rear  and  another  on  his  front,  Lee's  army 
would  be  crushed  or  compelled  to  make  a  dan- 
gerous retreat  on  Richmond. 

The  raid  of  the  cavalry  did  not  accomplish  what 
Hooker  expected  of  it,  but  the  general  movement 
of  the  army  was  a  great  success.  Without  oppo- 
sition from  the  enemy,  Hooker  succeeded  in  trans- 
porting the  army  over  the  river  and  had  it  well  es- 
tablished in  the  forests  back  of  Lee's  army.  The 
soldiers  were  in  fine  spirits,  and  Hooker's  procla- 
mation to  the  army  at  Chancellorsville  on  the  eve- 
ning of  April  30th,  although  boastful  in  tone,  did 
seem  to  be  in  agreement  with  the  facts  of  the  situa- 
tion: "It  is  with  heartfelt  satisfaction  the  com- 
manding general  announces  to  the  army  that  the 
operations  of  the  last  three  days  have  determined 
that  our  enemy  must  either  ingloriously  fly  or  come 
from  behind  its  defenses  and  give  us  battle  on  our 
own  ground,  where  certain  destruction  awaits 
him."  It  was  also  reported  among  the  soldiers 
that  Hooker  had  said  he  had  Lee  in  such  a  position 
that  God  Almighty  could  not  prevent  him  from 
destroying  the  Confederate  army.  The  Old  Testa- 
ment saying  of  Ahab  to  Benhadad  comes  to  mind, 
when  one  reads  these  boasting  words  of  Hooker, 
"Let  not  him  that  girdeth  on  his  harness  boast 
himself  as  he  that  putteth  it  off." 

When,  a  few  days  later,  Hooker  led  his  baffled 
army  back  across  the  Rappahannock  to  their  old 
encampment,    the   distress   of   Lincoln  was    more 

[150] 


LINCOLN  AND  HOOKER 

poignant  than  at  any  time  during  the  war.  The 
conditions  were  not  as  bad  as  Lincoln  believed 
them  to  be,  and  the  army,  as  the  Gettysburg  cam- 
paign immediately  following  demonstrated,  was 
still  intact  and  in  splendid  military  form.  But  the 
great  expectations  of  the  President  and  those  of 
the  country  had  again  been  dashed.  Noah  Brooks, 
an  inmate  of  the  White  House  at  the  time,  thus 
describes  Lincoln's  anguish  of  mind:  "I  shall  never 
forget  that  picture  of  despair.  He  held  a  telegram 
in  his  hand,  and  as  he  closed  the  door  and  came 
towards  us,  I  mechanically  noticed  that  his  face, 
usually  sallow,  was  ashen  in  hue.  The  paper  on 
the  wall  behind  him  was  of  the  tint  known  as 
Trench  gray',  and  even  in  that  moment  of  sorrow 
and  dread  expectation  I  vaguely  took  in  the 
thought  that  the  complexion  of  the  anguished 
President's  visage  was  almost  exactly  like  that  of 
the  wall.  He  gave  me  the  telegram  and  in  a  voice 
trembling  with  emotion,  said,  'Read  it — news  from 
the  army.'  (The  telegram  was  from  Hooker's  chief- 
of-staff,  Butterfield,  confirming  the  rumor  that  the 
army  had  retreated  across  the  river.)  The  appear- 
ance of  the  President  as  I  read  aloud  these  fateful 
words,  was  piteous.  Never,  as  long  as  I  knew 
him,  did  he  seem  so  broken  up,  so  dispirited  and 
so  ghostlike.  Clasping  his  hands  behind  his  back, 
he  walked  up  and  down  the  room,  saying,  'My  God, 
my  God,  what  will  the  country  say !  What  will  the 
country  say!'  " 

The  next  day  the  careworn  President  and  his 
military  adviser,  Halleck,  went  to  visit  the  army  at 
Fredericksburg,  leaving  behind  them  wild  rumors 

[151] 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

that  Lee  had  cut  Hooker  to  pieces  and  was  advanc- 
ing on  Washington,  that  Hooker  was  under  arrest, 
Stanton  had  resigned,  and  that  McClellan  was  on 
his  way  to  Washington  by  special  train.  This  visit 
contrasted  strangely  with  the  former  visit  when 
Hooker  and  the  President  sat  their  horses  side  by 
side  and  acknowledged  the  cheers  of  the  "finest 
army  on  the  planet." 

On  his  way  back  to  Washington,  Lincoln  wrote 
Hooker  a  letter  asking  for  a  new  and  more  success- 
ful movement.  The  letter  shows  hardly  a  trace  of 
his  anguish  of  spirit:  "The  recent  movement  of 
your  army  is  ended  without  affecting  its  object, 
except,  perhaps  some  important  breakings  of  the 
enemy's  communications.  What  next?  If  possible, 
I  would  like  another  movement  early  enough  to 
give  us  some  benefit  from  the  fact  of  the  enemy's 
communications  being  broken;  but  neither  for  this 
reason  nor  any  other,  do  I  wish  anything  done  in 
desperation  or  rashness.  An  early  movement  would 
help  to  supersede  the  bad  moral  effects  of  the  re- 
cent one,  which  is  said  to  be  considerably  injurious. 
Have  you  already  in  your  mind  a  plan  wholly  or 
partially  formed?  If  you  have,  prosecute  it  with- 
out interference  from  me.  If  you  have  not, 
please  inform  me,  so  that  I,  incompetent  as  I  may  be, 
can  try  and  assist  in  some  plan  for  the  army." 

"Some  plan  for  the  army."  That  was  what  Lin- 
coln was  hoping  and  praying  for,  a  plan  that  would 
accomplish  something  for  the  cause  and  the  coun- 
try. He  urged  Hooker  to  move  soon  again,  yet  in 
his  warning  against  rashness,  betrays  the  fear  that 
Hooker,  baffled  and  mortified  by  his  reverse,  in  an 

[152] 


LINCOLN  AND  HOOKER 

effort  to  retrieve  his  laurels  might  lead  the  army 
into  some  desperate  adventure,  where  a  worse  dis- 
aster would  befall  it.  But  Hooker,  mortified  as 
he  must  have  been,  was  too  much  of  a  soldier  to 
move  a  great  army  without  any  well-defined  plan 
and  objective. 

In  his  telegram  to  Lincoln  when  he  withdrew 
across  the  river  after  the  Battle  of  Chancellorsville, 
and  in  a  subsequent  letter,  Hooker  explained  his 
action  on  the  ground  that  after  the  disaster  which 
befell  the  right  wing  of  his  army,  the  routing  of  the 
11th  Corps,  he  felt  that  his  chances  of  success  along 
the  line  mapped  out  were  so  much  lessened  that  it 
was  advisable  to  withdraw.  Thirteen  years  after 
the  battle  Hooker  paid  a  visit  to  the  field  of  Chan- 
cellorsville, and  on  that  occasion  said  to  Samuel 
Bates,  who  accompanied  him  and  who  asked  him 
why  he  first  halted  and  then  withdrew  his  army: 
"We  were  in  this  impenetrable  thicket.  All  the 
roads  and  openings  leading  through  it  the  enemy 
immediately  fortified  strongly,  and  it  become  ut- 
terly impossible  to  maneuver  my  forces.  My  army 
was  not  beaten.  Only  part  of  it  had  been  engaged. 
The  First  Corps,  led  by  Reynolds,  whom  I  regarded 
as  the  ablest  officer  under  me,  was  fresh  and  eager 
and  ready  to  be  brought  into  action,  as  was  my 
whole  army.  But  I  had  been  fully  convinced  of 
the  futility  of  attacking  fortified  positions,  and  I 
was  determined  not  to  sacrifice  my  men  needlessly, 
though  it  should  be  at  the  expense  of  my  reputa- 
tion as  a  fighting  officer." 

If  Hooker,  as  he  intimates  in  this  conversation, 
and  as  he  said  to  the  President  in  his  telegram  and 

[153] 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

letter,  was  convinced  that  a  further  prosecution  of 
the  battle  had  little  chance  of  success,  then  he 
showed  moral  courage  of  the  highest  order  in  with- 
drawing. But  the  student  will  remember  that  all 
but  one  of  his  corps  commanders,  Sickles,  a  civilian, 
thought  the  army  ought  to  stay  and  fight  it  out 
where  they  were,  and  that  a  year  later  Grant  led 
the  army  through  those  same  "impenetrable  thick- 
ets". The  rumors  that  Hooker  was  drunk  during 
the  battle  are  shown  to  be  false  by  the  direct  testi- 
mony of  Generals  Couch  and  Pleasonton,  the  for- 
mer thinking  that  his  unaccustomed  abstinence 
from  strong  drink  was  perhaps  a  reason  for  the 
sluggish  state  of  his  brain  at  the  critical  moments 
in  the  conflict. 

The  real  psychology  of  Hooker's  actions  during 
the  campaign,  when  he  first  faltered,  and  then 
withdrew,  is  the  interesting  spectacle  of  the  over- 
confident man  suddenly  becoming  underconfident. 
This  is  the  explanation  of  the  battle  and  its  results 
which,  according  to  Major  E.  P.  Halstead,  Hooker 
gave  to  Doubleday  during  the  Gettysburg  cam- 
paign. Doubleday  said  to  him,  "Hooker,  what  was 
the  matter  with  you  at  Chancellorsville?  Some  say 
you  were  injured  by  a  shell,  and  others  that  you 
were  drunk;  now  tell  us  what  it  was."  To  this 
Hooker  answered  good-naturedly,  "Doubleday,  I 
was  not  hurt  by  a  shell,  and  I  was  not  drunk.  For 
once  I  lost  confidence  in  Hooker,  and  that  is  all 
there  is  to  it." 

If  he  lost  confidence  in  himself  at  Chancellors- 
ville, Hooker  quickly  recovered  himself  after  the 
battle  and  kept  his  army  well  in  hand,  the  cavalry 

[154] 


LINCOLN  AND  HOOKER 

especially  growing  bolder  and  bolder.  Some  of  his 
chief  officers,  however,  did  lose  confidence  in  him, 
Couch  being  so  disgusted  with  Hooker's  behavior 
at  Chancellorsville  that  he  asked  to  be  relieved 
from  further  service  in  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
under  Hooker.  In  a  letter  of  May  14,  1863,  Lincoln 
warns  Hooker  against  the  disloyalty  of  his  sub- 
ordinates, saying,  "I  must  tell  you  that  I  have  some 
painful  intimations  that  some  of  your  corps  and 
division  commanders  are  not  giving  you  their  en- 
tire confidence.  This  would  be  ruinous,  if  true, 
and  you  should  therefore,  first  of  all,  ascertain  the 
real  facts  beyond  all  possibility  of  doubt."  But  of 
the  two  most  bitter  critics  of  Hooker,  Couch  and 
Meade,  the  former  sought  service  elsewhere,  and 
the  latter  performed  all  his  duties  like  the  true  sol- 
dier he  was. 

As  soon  as  General  Lee  began  the  maneuvers 
which  culminated  in  the  invasion  of  Pennsylvania, 
Hooker,  with  keen  military  intuition,  predicted  the 
plan  of  Lee,  telegraphing  to  Lincoln  on  June  15th, 
"It  seems  to  me  that  he  (Lee)  will  be  more  likely 
to  go  north,  and  to  incline  to  the  west.  He  can 
have  no  design  to  look  after  his  rear.  It  is  an  act 
of  desperation  on  his  part,  no  matter  in  what  force 
he  moves.  It  is  an  act  of  desperation  which  will 
kill  copperheadism  in  the  North. "  No  better  com- 
ment on  the  military  folly  of  Lee's  invasion  of 
Pennsylvania  has  ever  been  made,  than  this  of 
Hooker,  uttered  almost  a  month  before  the  Battle 
of  Gettysburg.  But  in  this  and  in  other  letters  and 
telegrams  it  is  quite  evident  that  Hooker  does  not 
feel  the   freedom   of  action  which   the   successful 

[155] 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

leader  of  a  great  army  must  have,  for  he  says  to 
the  President,  "I  do  not  know  that  my  opinion  as 
to  the  duty  of  this  army  in  the  case  is  wanted;  if 
it  should  be,  you  know  that  I  shall  be  happy  to  give 
it."  Think  of  it!  A  great  campaign  opening  and 
the  commander  of  the  army  not  sure  that  his  gov- 
ernment cares  anything  about  his  opinions  as  to 
the  movements  of  the  army!  Much  of  this  feeling 
on  the  part  of  Hooker  was  due  to  his  conviction 
that  Halleck  was  not  friendly  to  him.  When  he 
succeeded  Burnside  as  commander  Hooker  made  a 
request  of  Lincoln  that  he  be  permitted  to  act  with- 
out undue  interference  on  the  part  of  Halleck,  say- 
ing that  Halleck  had  opposed  his  being  chosen  as 
commander,  and  that  having  been  identified  with 
the  army  in  the  West  he  had  written  and  spoken 
disparagingly  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  At 
the  time  Lincoln  seems  to  have  reassured  Hooker, 
but  in  the  early  days  of  the  Gettsburg  campaign 
Hooker's  restiveness  under  Halleck's  management 
again  crops  out.  On  June  16th,  he  telegraphed 
Lincoln,  asking  for  a  closer  co-operation,  saying  of 
Halleck,  "You  have  long  been  aware,  Mr.  Presi- 
dent, that  I  have  not  enjoyed  the  confidence  of  the 
major-general  commanding  the  army,  and  I  can 
assure  you  so  long  as  this  continues  we  may  look 
in  vain  for  success,  especially  as  future  operations 
will  require  our  relations  to  be  more  dependent 
upon  each  other  than  heretofore. "  Hooker  felt 
hampered,  as  every  commander  of  the  army  before 
and  after  him  felt  hampered,  by  the  orders  of  a 
commanding  general  who  was  not  himself  on  the 
field  at  the  head  of  the  army.     It  seems  strange 

[156] 


LINCOLN  AND  HOOKER 

now  that  the  sagacity  of  Lincoln  did  not  sooner 
lead  him  to  abandon  the  plan  under  which  the 
war  was  being  prosecuted,  and  the  painful  result 
of  which  was  that  in  the  time  of  crisis  the  com- 
mander of  the  army  in  the  field  did  not  feel  inde- 
pendent in  his  movements,  indeed,  was  not  sure 
that  his  advice  was  wanted. 

In  answer  to  Hooker's  telegram  Lincoln  sent  a 
severe  message,  settling  the  question  of  Hooker's 
relationship  to  Halleck:  "To  remove  all  misunder- 
standing, I  now  place  you  in  the  strict  military  re- 
lation to  General  Halleck  as  the  commander  of  one 
of  the  armies  to  the  general-in-chief  of  all  the 
armies.  I  have  not  intended  differently,  but  as  it 
seems  to  be  differently  understood,  I  shall  direct 
him  to  give  you  orders  and  you  to  obey  them." 

This  was  plain  and  to  the  point.  But  a  harsh 
answer  was  not  in  Lincoln's  make-up,  and  on  the 
same  day  he  sent  Hooker  a  kind  letter  by  the  hand 
of  Colonel  Ulric  Dahlgren,  afterward  to  meet 
death  in  the  raid  on  Richmond,  in  1864.  In  this 
letter  Lincoln  tells  Hooker  that  Halleck  has  no 
special  fault  to  find  with  him  save  that  he  writes 
and  telegraphs  to  the  President  instead  of  to  the 
general-in-chief.  He  pleads  with  them  to  be  as 
frank  and  friendly  in  their  relations  with  each  other 
as  he,  the  President,  is  with  both,  and  tells  Hooker 
in  closing  that  from  the  day  Hooker  took  command 
of  the  army  until  now  he  had  not  believed  he  had 
a  chance  to  effect  anything.  But  now  that  Lee  has 
commenced  his  movement  by  way  of  Harper's 
Ferry,  he  thinks  that  Hooker  has  the  chance  to 


[157] 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

destroy  him  which  McClellan  let  pass  in  the  pre- 
vious year. 

When,  on  June  5th,  Hooker  became  convinced 
that  Lee  was  making  a  move  to  the  north,  he 
telegraphed  the  President  outlining  the  probable 
movement  of  Lee,  his  head  toward  the  Potomac 
and  the  rear  at  Fredericksburg,  exactly  as  it  turned 
out,  and  stated  that  it  was  his  judgmeht  that  he 
should  "pitch  into  Lee's  rear."  At  four  o'clock  that 
same  afternoon  Lincoln  telegraphed  his  famous  re- 
ply in  which  he  advised  against  the  crossing  of  the 
river  to  assail  Lee's  rear:  "If  you  find  Lee  coming 
to  the  North  of  the  Rappahannock,  I  would  by  no 
means  cross  to  the  south  of  it.  If  he  should  leave 
a  rear  force  at  Fredericksburg,  tempting  you  to 
fall  upon  it,  it  would  fight  in  intrenchments  and 
have  you  at  a  disadvantage,  and  so,  man  for  man, 
worst  you  at  that  point,  while  his  main  force  would 
in  some  way  be  getting  an  advantage  of  you  north- 
ward. In  one  word,  I  would  not  take  any  risk  of 
being  entangled  upon  the  river,  like  an  ox  jumped 
half  over  a  fence  and  liable  to  be  torn  by  dogs  front 
and  rear  without  a  fair  chance  to  gore  one  way 
or  kick  the  other.  If  Lee  should  come  to  my  side 
of  the  river,  I  would  keep  on  the  same  side,  and 
fight  him  or  act  on  the  defense,  according  as  might 
be  the  estimate  of  his  strength  relatively  to  my 
own.  But  these  are  mere  suggestions  which  I  de- 
sire to  be  controlled  by  the  judgment  of  yourself 
and  General  Halleck." 

Five  days  later,  on  June  10th,  Lincoln  tele- 
graphed Hooker  repeating  his  advice  against  his 
crossing  the  river  to  the  south,  but  suggesting,  and 

[158] 


LINCOLN  AND  HOOKER 

this  was  the  course  adopted  by  Hooker,  that  if 
Lee  came  towards  the  upper  Potomac  that  he  "fol- 
low on  his  flank  and  on  his  inside  track.  ...  If  he 
stays  where  he  is,  fret  him  and  fret  him." 

The  correspondence  between  Lincoln  and 
Hooker  during  the  critical  days  when  it  was  clear 
that  Lee  was  maneuvering  for  some  great  thrust, 
but  just  where  none  knew,  makes  thrilling  reading. 
This  telegram  of  June  10th,  in  which  Lincoln  ad- 
vised against  Hooker's  going  south  when  Lee  was 
moving  north,  was  in  answer  to  one  received 
earlier  in  the  day  from  Hooker.  It  was  a  message 
which  makes  the  heart  leap  even  after  the  lapse  of 
more  than  half  a  century,  and  which  must  have 
stirred  the  heart  of  the  President,  although  he  at 
once  wired  his  counsel  against  it.  It  was  nothing 
less  than  to  cross  the  Rappahannock  and  march  on 
Richmond.  Hooker,  whose  intuition  and  predic- 
tion as  to  the  movements  of  Lee's  army  were  un- 
failingly correct,  informed  the  President  that  he 
thought  it  was  Lee's  intention  to  send  a  heavy 
column  of  infantry  to  accompany  the  cavalry  on  the 
great  raid  in  Maryland  and  Pennsylvania,  and  then 
added  his  daring  proposal:  "I  am  not  satisfied  of 
his  intention  in  this  respect,  but  from  certain  move- 
ments in  their  corps  I  cannot  regard  it  as  altogether 
improbable.  If  it  should  be  found  to  be  the  case, 
will  it  not  promote  the  true  interest  of  the  cause 
for  me  to  march  to  Richmond  at  once?  From  there 
all  the  disposable  part  of  the  army  can  be  thrown 
to  any  threatened  point  north  of  the  Potomac  at 
short  notice,  and  until  they  can  reach  their  destina- 
tion, a  sufficiency  of  troops  can  be  collected  to 

[159] 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

check,  if  not  to  stop  his  invasion.  If  left  to  operate 
from  my  own  judgment,  with  my  present  informa- 
tion, I  do  not  hesitate  to  say  that  I  should  adopt 
this  course  as  being  the  most  speedy  and  certain 
mode  of  giving  the  rebellion  a  mortal  blow.  I 
desire  that  you  will  give  it  your  reflection."  If 
Lincoln  had  given  his  permission  and  Hooker  had 
marched  on  Richmond  with  the  consummate  skill 
with  which  he  conducted  the  march  up  to  the  open- 
ing of  Gettysburg,  the  capital  of  the  Confederacy 
must  have  fallen  and  the  war  been  finished,  for 
even  if  Lee  had  gone  on  north  with  Hooker  going 
south,  and  had  taken  Harrisburg,  Philadelphia,  or 
even  Washington,  his  stay  would  have  been  of  short 
duration,  and  forsaking  his  prizes  he  would  have 
been  compelled  to  march  back  into  Virginia  with 
a  hostile  army  waiting  for  him  and  a  hostile  coun- 
try behind  him.  But  there  was  in  Hooker's  bold 
proposal,  as  in  every  great  enterprise,  a  chance  of 
mishap  and  failure.  The  anxious  President  was 
fearful  of  any  movement  that  had  a  chance  of  fail- 
ure in  it.  He  was  thinking  what  he  afterwards  told 
Sickles  he  said  on  his  knees  to  God  during  the 
Battle  of  Gettysburg,  that  the  country  could  not 
stand  another  Fredericksburg  or  Chancellorsville. 
On  the  14th  of  June,  when  it  was  well  established 
that  the  head  of  Lee's  infantry  was  about  Win- 
chester and  Martinsburg  in  the  Shenandoah  Val- 
ley, Lincoln  sent  Hooker  another  quaint  telegram, 
saying:  "If  the  head  of  Lee's  army  is  at  Martins- 
burg and  the  tail  of  it  on  the  road  between  Fred- 
ericksburg and  Chancellorsville,  the  animal  must 
be  very  slim  somewhere.     Could  you  not  break 

[160] 


LINCOLN  AND  HOOKER 

him?"  But  Hooker  was  keeping  his  army  well  in 
hand,  marching  west  and  north  on  the  inside  line 
of  Lee's  march  until  the  army  was  concentrated 
in  the  neighborhood  of  Frederick  where  Hooker 
could,  as  he  chose,  pass  over  the  South  Mountain 
and  break  Lee's  long  column,  or  march  to  strike  its 
head  near  Carlisle  or  Harrisburg.  There  was,  of 
course,  great  concern  at  Washington  and  through- 
out the  North,  as  Lee's  advance  guard  came  march- 
ing up  the  Cumberland  Valley  into  Pennsylvania, 
but  Hooker,  Halleck  and  Lincoln  were  all  hopeful 
of  a  great  victory.  They  felt  that  Lee,  as  proved 
to  be  the  case,  was  putting  himself  in  a  bad  posi- 
tion from  which  he  could  extricate  his  army  only 
at  great  loss.  Hooker  termed  it  an  "act  of  des- 
peration." Writing  to  Halleck,  with  whom  he  did 
little  communicating  during  the  campaign,  Hooker 
said,  "I  think  we  may  anticipate  glorious  results 
from  the  recent  movement  of  the  enemy  whether 
he  should  determine  to  advance  or  retreat."  Lin- 
coln said  to  Gideon  Welles,  on  the  26th  of  June, 
"We  can't  help  beating  them  if  we  have  the  man. 
How  much  depends  in  military  matters  upon  one 
master  mind!  Hooker  may  commit  the  same  fault 
as  McClellan  and  lose  his  chance.  We  shall  soon 
see,  but  it  appears  to  me  he  can't  help  but  win." 

This  hopeful  situation  was  due  entirely  to 
Hooker's  masterly  handling  of  the  army.  Lee's 
two  objects  in  going  North  were  to  draw  Hooker 
out  where  he  might  turn  on  him  and  destroy  his 
army  which  had  escaped  him  in  the  tangles  of  the 
forests  about  Chancellorsville,  and  at  the  same 
time    threaten    and    perhaps    capture    Harrisburg, 

[161] 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

Philadelphia  or  Washington.  But  on  the  27th  of 
June,  despite  the  panic  in  Pennsylvania,  there  was 
no  likelihood  of  Lee  succeeding  in  either  project. 
Lee's  army  was  spread  out  through  the  Cumber- 
land and  Shenandoah  Valleys,  and  just  on  the  other 
side  of  the  mountains,  that  is,  to  the  east,  Hooker's 
great  army,  full  of  fighting  spirit  and  confident  of 
victory,  was  concentrated  in  the  vicinity  of  Fred- 
erick. Whether  Lee  chose  to  advance  or  retreat, 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  in  a  position  to  be 
hurled  at  him  with  the  certainty  of  victory,  and 
with  the  probability  of  utter  destruction  of  the 
Confederate  forces.  Nothing  could  have  surpassed 
Hooker's  keenness  in  intuition  and  skilful  handling 
of  the  army  during  those  critical  days.  This  was 
the  situation,  when  on  June  27th,  General  Halleck, 
having  absurdly  refused  to  let  Hooker  attach  to 
his  army  the  garrison  at  Harper's  Ferry,  Hooker, 
justly  aggrieved,  requested  to  be  relieved,  and  was 
succeeded  by  General  Meade. 

There  has  been  a  supposition  that  Lincoln  and 
Halleck  forced  Hooker  to  resign  by  refusing  him 
reasonable  and  important  requests.  This  is  based 
upon  the  testimony  of  Charles  F.  Benjamin,  who 
occupied  a  confidential  post  at  the  War  Depart- 
ment and  at  the  army  headquarters.  He  says  that 
after  Chancellorsville,  Stanton,  Halleck  and  Lin- 
coln determined  that  Hooker  should  not  be  in- 
trusted with  the  leadership  of  the  army  in 
another  battle.  But  in  order  not  to  rouse  the  hos- 
tility of  the  Chase  faction  in  the  Cabinet,  the  re- 
moval was  postponed  until  the  last  hour,  and  made 
all  the  more  difficult  because  of  Hooker's  splendid 

[162] 


LINCOLN  AND  HOOKER 

management  of  the  army  during  the  march  towards 
Pennsylvania.  The  correspondence  between  Lin- 
coln and  Hooker  gives  no  indication  whatever  of 
such  purpose  or  of  a  lack  of  confidence  on  the  part 
of  Lincoln.  Reynolds  had  heard  that  he  was  being 
considered  for  Hooker's  successor  and  went  to  the 
President  saying  that  he  would  not  take  the  com- 
mand. He  spoke  of  Hooker's  defects,  but  Lincoln 
replied,  "I  am  not  disposed  to  throw  away  a  gun 
because  it  missed  fire  once,"  meaning  that  because 
Hooker  had  not  succeeded  in  his  first  campaign, 
Chancellorsville,  Lincoln  did  not  intend  to  abandon 
him. 

Hooker  deported  himself  with  great  dignity  and 
propriety  when  he  received  the  midnight  call  from 
Meade  and  Hardie,  the  purpose  of  which  he  did  not 
need  to  be  told.  He  perhaps  did  not  expect  that 
his  request  to  be  relieved  would  be  granted.  It 
must  have  been  with  bitter  disappointment  that  he 
left  the  army  which  he  had  led  so  successfully, 
and  which  was  about  to  commence  a  battle,  which, 
unless  there  were  terrible  blundering,  could  have 
no  other  result  but  glorious  victory.  So  Hooker 
passes  off  the  stage  of  great  events. 

After  Gettysburg  Lincoln  wrote  to  Meade,  say- 
ing, "I  have  not  thrown  General  Hooker  away," 
and  asking  if  Meade  would  care  to  have  Hooker 
as  a  corps  commander.  Meade  responded  in  a  kind 
spirit,  saying  that  he  would  accept  Hooker,  but 
would  not  ask  for  him.  But  it  was  evidently 
thought  better  to  use  Hooker's  abilities  elsewhere, 
and  he  was  accordingly  dispatched  to  Chattanooga, 
where  in  command  of  the  corps  made  up  of  the  old 

[163] 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

11th  and  12th  Corps  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac, 
he  did  brilliant  fighting  under  Grant,  and  in  the 
march  to  Atlanta  under  Sherman.  But  there  was 
ill  feeling  between  Hooker  and  Sherman,  and  when, 
upon  the  death  of  McPherson,  Sherman  made 
Howard  commander  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee, 
Hooker  asked  to  be  relieved  and  his  request  was 
granted. 

The  student  of  the  war  will  not  fail  of  being  im- 
pressed with  the  superb  management  of  Hooker 
during  the  maneuvering  of  the  army  up  to  the  com- 
mencement of  the  battle  of  Gettysburg.  Meade 
took  over  Hooker's  staff  and  merely  followed  the 
line  of  campaign  as  laid  down,  for  Hooker's  posi- 
tioning of  the  army  made  Lee's  drawing  in  of  his 
troops  and  the  subsequent  battle  inevitable.  As 
the  passion  and  bitterness  of  the  Civil  War  subside 
and  the  historian  sees  more  clearly  the  men  and  the 
measures  of  the  great  day,  the  figure  of  Joseph 
Hooker  will  loom  larger  than  it  did  in  the  years 
immediately  subsequent  to  the  war.  The  resolution 
of  thanks  passed  by  Congress  after  the  battle  of 
Gettysburg  gives  him  his  deserved  share  in  that 
victory  and  his  true  place  in  the  history  of  the  war: 

"Resolved,  That  the  gratitude  of  the  American 
people  and  the  thanks  of  their  representatives  in 
Congress,  are  due,  and  are  hereby  tendered  to 
Major-General  Joseph  Hooker,  and  the  officers  and 
soldiers  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  for  the  skill, 
energy  and  endurance  which  first  covered  Wash- 
ington and  Baltimore  from  the  meditated  blow  of 
the  advancing  and  powerful  army  of  rebels  led  by 
General   Robert    E.    Lee,    and    to    Major-General 

[164] 


LINCOLN  AND  HOOKER 

George  G.  Meade,  Major-General  Oliver  O. 
Howard,  and  the  officers  and  soldiers  of  that  army, 
for  the  skill  and  heroic  valor  which  at  Gettysburg 
repulsed,  defeated  and  drove  back,  broken  and 
dispirited,  beyond  the  Rappahannock,  the  veteran 
army  of  the  rebellion." 


[165] 


LINCOLN  AND  MEADE 

Lincoln  saw  less  of  Meade  and  cared  less  for 
him  than  any  of  the  generals  whom  he  appointed  to 
the  command  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  He 
was  more  irritated,  more  distressed,  more  per- 
plexed by  Meade's  management  of  the  army  than 
he  was  by  that  of  any  other  commander.  Yet  it 
was  when  Meade  was  in  command  that  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac  fought  the  great  battle  of  the  war 
and  won  its  most  important  victory. 

George  Gordon  Meade  was  born  in  1815  at 
Cadiz,  Spain,  where  his  father,  member  of  an  old 
Philadelphia  family,  had  established  himself  in 
business  and  was  also  the  naval  agent  of  the  United 
States.  After  preliminary  schooling  in  Philadel- 
phia and  at  Washington,  where  he  attended  the 
school  kept  by  Salmon  P.  Chase,  afterwards  Sec- 
retary of  the  Treasury  under  Lincoln,  Meade  was 
sent  to  West  Point,  where  he  finished  number  nine- 
teen in  a  class  of  fifty-six.  He  had  little  liking  for 
the  military  life  and  soon  found  himself  engaged 
in  surveys  and  other  engineering  works.  In  the 
Mexican  War  he  served  as  a  topographical  engi- 
neer on  the  staffs  of  Generals  Taylor  and  Scott. 
This  engineering  proclivity  clung  to  him  through- 
out his  career,  so  much  so  that  Grant,  in  the  very 
generous  estimate  he  makes  of  Meade,  says  that 
"he  saw  clearly  and  distinctly  the  position  of  the 
enemy,  and  the  topography  of  the  country  in  front 
of  his  own  position.     His  first  idea  was  to  take 

[166] 


GEORGE  GORDON  MEADE 


LINCOLN  AND  MEADE 

advantage  of  the  lay  of  the  ground,  sometimes 
without  reference  to  the  direction  we  wanted  to 
move  afterwards." 

At  the  outbreak  of  the  Civil  War  Meade  was 
engaged  in  the  geodetic  survey  of  the  Great  Lakes, 
to  which  he  had  been  appointed  by  Jefferson  Davis, 
Secretary  of  War  under  Franklin  Pierce.  He  was 
thus  the  only  officer  in  the  Union  army  who  rose 
to  great  distinction  during  the  war  who  was  not 
resigned  from  the  army  when  the  war  commenced. 
Meade  commanded  a  brigade  in  the  Seven  Days' 
Battle  in  the  Peninsula,  and  as  a  commander  of  a 
division  in  Hooker's  corps  won  distinction  at  South 
Mountain  and  Antietam,  being  made  commander 
of  Hooker's  corps  when  the  latter  was  wounded. 
At  the  head  of  his  division  Meade  took  part  in  the 
futile  attack  on  the  Confederate  lines  at  Fredericks- 
burg, and  led  the  Fifth  Corps  in  the  Chancellors- 
ville  campaign. 

When  the  question  of  a  successor  to  Burnside 
was  being  discussed,  Meade's  name,  together  with 
that  of  Reynolds  and  Hooker,  was  mentioned.  He 
had  done  nothing  that  had  captivated  the  imagina- 
tion of  the  country  as  Hooker  had,  but  all  asso- 
ciated with  him  regarded  him  as  a  thoughtful  and 
thorough  soldier.  After  the  defeat  of  Chancellors- 
ville  a  representative  of  the  President  waited  on 
General  Sedgwick  and  asked  him  if,  in  case  there 
were  a  change  of  commanders,  he  would  accept  the 
appointment.  Sedgwick  refused  to  consider  the 
tentative  offer,  but  in  answer  to  the  question  as  to 
the  best  appointment,  said,  "Why,  Meade  is  the 
proper  one  to  command  this  army." 

[167] 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

It  is  safe  to  say  that  after  the  Battle  of  Freder- 
icksburg, when  it  became  evident  that  there  would 
be  a  change  of  commanders,  Meade's  name  was  be- 
fore the  authorities  in  Washington.  When  Lincoln 
paid  a  visit  to  the  army  at  Antietam,  shortly  after 
the  battle  in  September,  1862,  Meade  accompanied 
him  over  the  battlefield  and  had  the  satisfaction  of 
hearing  McClellan  say  to  the  President,  "that  there 
Meade  did  this  and  that  there  Meade  did  that."  The 
published  letters  of  Meade  reveal  a  singular  com- 
bination of  vanity  and  humility  and  show  him  to  be 
one  of  the  meekest,  proudest  men  that  ever  lived. 
When,  shortly  before  the  battle  of  Antietam,  Gen- 
eral Reynolds  was  detached  from  his  division  for 
duty  in  Pennsylvania,  and  great  outcry  was  made 
by  Hooker  and  others  against  his  removal,  Meade 
was  deeply  offended,  for  since  the  command  of  the 
division  devolved  upon  him,  he  thought  the  pro- 
test against  the  removal  of  Reynolds  was  a  reflec- 
tion upon  his  own  ability.  Again  he  was  jealous  of 
Couch  when  he  was  sent  to  an  independent  cam- 
paign in  Pennsylvania.  The  day  before  Antietam 
he  wrote  to  his  wife,  "I  go  into  the  action  today  as 
the  commander  of  an  army  corps.  If  I  survive, 
my  two  stars  are  secure,  and  if  I  fall,  you  will 
have   my  reputation   to   live   on." 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  at  that  time  Meade  had  very 
little  reputation  in  the  country.  But  coupled  with 
these  frequently  recurring  expressions  of  pride,  and 
that  oversensitiveness  which  goes  with  vain  natures, 
there  are  to  be  found  some  of  the  noblest,  wisest 
and  most  patriotic  of  sentiments.  The  publication 
by  his  family  of  Meade's  letters  to  his  wife  affords 

[168] 


LINCOLN  AND  MEADE 

an  interesting  parallel  to  the  publication  of  Mc- 
Clellan's  letters  to  his  wife.  Both  reveal  a  sincere 
piety,  a  genuine  love  of  country  and  a  keen  dis- 
cernment. They  also  reveal,  on  the  part  of  Mc- 
Clellan,  a  colossal  egoism,  and  on  the  part  of 
Meade  an  even  more  offensive  and  almost  childish 
vanity,  with  bitter  resentment  at  what  he  deemed 
to  be  a  lack  of  appreciation  of  his  soldierly  qualities 
or  his  military  successes.  Meade  was  supposed  to 
be  the  one  man  who  was  not  ambitious  and  not 
striving  for  high  command.  Yet  in  a  letter  written 
at  the  time  of  Lincoln's  visit  to  the  army  shortly 
before  the  Battle  of  Chancellorsville,  we  find  this 
naive  comment,  showing  that  Meade  too  was  of 
like  passion  with  the  rest  of  the  army  officers,  and, 
we  may  add,  the  rest  of  humanity:  "I  have  attended 
the  other  reviews  and  have  been  making  myself 
very  agreeable  to  Mrs.  Lincoln,  who  seems  an  ami- 
able sort  of  personage.  In  view  also  of  the  vacant 
brigadiership  in  the  regular  army,  I  have  ventured 
to  tell  the  President  one  or  two  stories,  and  I  think 
I  have  made  decided  progress  in  his  affections." 

The  ill  success  of  Hooker  in  the  Chancellors- 
ville campaign  created  rather  a  delicate  situation 
between  Meade  and  Hooker.  Meade  had  a  more 
favorable  opinion  of  Hooker  than  most  of  the  army 
officers,  nor  was  he  unmindful  of  the  fact  that  it 
was  at  Hooker's  earnest  representations  that  he 
had  been  chosen  to  lead  his  corps  when  Hooker 
was  wounded  at  Antietam,  and  as  soon  as  he  took 
command  of  the  army  Hooker  made  Meade  the 
leader  of  the  Fifth  Corps.  He  was  close  to  Hooker 
during  the  Chancellorsville  fiasco,  and  it  was  to 

[169] 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

Meade  that  Hooker  in  a  moment  of  despondency- 
said  he  was  almost  ready  to  turn  over  to  him  the 
command  of  the  army,  that  he  had  had  enough  of 
it  and  almost  wished  he  had  never  been  born. 
Three  of  the  generals  in  the  army,  Slocum,  Sedg- 
wick and  Couch,  had  come  to  Meade  and  expressed 
the  opinion  that  he  ought  to  be  placed  in  com- 
mand. Under  these  trying  conditions  Meade  car- 
ried himself  with  dignity  and  propriety,  and  the 
relations  between  the  two  men  promised  well  for 
a  time.  But  Meade  had  a  sharp  tongue,  and  in  a 
confidential  interview  with  Governor  Curtin,  of 
Pennsylvania,  he  severely  criticized  Hooker's  man- 
agement during  the  Chancellorsville  campaign  and 
the  subsequent  loss  of  confidence  in  him  on  the  part 
of  many  of  the  officers  of  the  army.  This  conver- 
sation was  reported  in  Washington  and  reached 
the  ears  of  Hooker,  who  took  Meade  to  task. 
Meade  gave  the  explanation  of  a  confidential  con- 
versation and  the  matter  was  allowed  to  drop.  The 
final  break  between  the  two  came  when  Hooker 
intimated  that  his  withdrawal  across  the  Rappa- 
hannock after  the  Battle  of  Chancellorsville  was 
determined  by  the  advice  of  Meade  and  Reynolds. 
Meade  regarded  this  as  an  effort  to  make  him  and 
Reynolds  the  scapegoats,  and  withstood  Hooker 
to  his  face,  telling  him  that  he  had  made  up  his 
mind  to  withdraw  the  army  before  he  had  con- 
sulted any  of  the  corps  commanders. 

The  night  of  June  26th  was  a  critical  one  in  the 
history  of  the  Republic.  Upon  the  request  of 
General  Hooker  to  be  relieved  of  the  command 
because  of  the  refusal  of  the  commander-in-chief, 

[170] 


LINCOLN  AND  MEADE 

General  Halleck,  to  give  him  freedom  as  to  the 
troops  at  Harper's  Ferry,  the  Government  decided 
upon  the  very  dangerous  policy  of  removing  a 
popular  and,  so  far  as  the  Gettysburg  campaign 
had  proceeded,  a  very  successful  commander  on  the 
eve  of  battle.  Extraordinary  methods  were  pur- 
sued by  the  Government  to  transfer  immediately 
the  command  to  General  Meade.  Armed  with  du- 
plicate copies  of  the  President's  order  General 
James  A.  Hardie,  a  personal  friend  of  both  officers, 
in  civilian's  dress,  made  his  way  to  Frederick,  going 
first  to  the  tent  of  Meade.  When  Meade  was 
awakened  and  saw  Hardie  standing  over  him  his 
first  thought  was  that  for  some  unknown  offense 
Hooker  had  put  him  under  arrest.  When  he  learned 
the  nature  of  Hardie's  errand  Meade  became 
greatly  agitated  and  protested  against  being  placed 
in  command,  partly  because  he  had  been  kept  in 
total  ignorance  of  the  movements  and  disposition 
of  the  army,  and  partly  because  he  thought  it  an 
injustice  to  his  close  friend,  Reynolds,  to  whom 
the  whole  army  was  looking  as  Hooker's  successor. 
But  the  President's  order  was  peremptory. 
Meade  dressed  himself  and  rode  with  Hardie  to 
Hooker's  headquarters,  and  the  army  had  a  new 
commander.  Hooker,  keenly  disappointed  as  he 
must  have  been,  accepted  the  situation  gracefully, 
and  after  an  affectionate  farewell  to  the  troops 
left  for  Baltimore. 

Just  why  Meade  was  selected  by  the  President 
rather  than  Reynolds  and  others,  no  one  will  ever 
know.  Halleck  suggested  he  had  nothing  whatever 
to  do  with  the  appointment,  and  Stanton  probably 

[171] 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

had  considerable  influence  in  the  selection.  One  of 
the  finest  chapters  in  the  history  of  the  Civil  War 
and  one  of  the  finest  tributes  to  the  reach  and  sway 
of  republican  government  was  the  way  in  which 
commanders  of  the  army  like  McClellan  and 
Hooker,  both  of  whom  were  supposed  to  enter- 
tain the  idea  that  what  the  country  needed  in  its 
crisis  was  a  dictator,  relinquished  their  commands 
when  a  battle  with  the  enemy  was  pending,  with- 
out a  word  of  reproach  or  revolt,  obeying  their 
orders  like  a  private  in  the  ranks.  The  feeling  of 
relief  at  Washington  at  the  way  in  which  the  army 
took  the  removal  of  Hooker  was  hardly  less  than 
it  had  been  when  McClellan  was  removed. 

That  the  Government  realized  to  the  full  the  un- 
usual action  it  had  taken  just  as  the  army  was 
about  to  move  into  battle  is  shown  by  the  order 
addressed  to  Meade  from  Halleck,  but  undoubtedly 
inspired  by  Lincoln.  In  this  letter  Halleck  said, 
"You  will  receive  with  this  the  order  of  the  Presi- 
dent placing  you  in  command  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac.  Considering  the  circumstances,  no  one 
ever  received  a  more  important  command;  and  I 
cannot  doubt  that  you  will  fully  justify  the  con- 
fidence which  the  Government  has  reposed  in  you. 
You  will  not  be  hampered  by  any  minute  instruc- 
tions from  these  headquarters.  Your  army  is  free 
to  act  as  you  may  deem  proper.  All  forces  within 
the  sphere  of  your  operations  will  be  held  subject 
to  your  orders.  Harper's  Ferry  and  its  garrison 
are  under  your  direct  orders.  You  are  authorized 
to  remove  from  command  any  officer  or  other  per- 
son you  may  deem  proper.     In  fine,  General,  you 

[172] 


LINCOLN  AND  MEADE 

are  intrusted  with  all  the  power  and  authority 
which  the  President  and  the  Secretary  of  War,  or 
the  General-in-Chief  can  confer  on  you,  and  you 
may  rely  on  our  full  support." 

Armed  with  these  extraordinary  powers  and 
granted  at  the  very  beginning  what  Hooker  had 
been  refused,  the  authority  to  direct  the  troops  at 
Harper's  Ferry,  Meade  assumed  the  command  of 
the  army.  With  a  twinkle  in  his  eye,  Meade  said 
to  his  aide,  his  son,  George,  when  he  stepped  out 
from  Hooker's  tent,  "Well,  George,  I  command  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac!"  That  was  the  natural 
exultation  of  a  man  whose  ambitions  had  been  ful- 
filled. But  in  a  more  thoughtful  mood  he  wrote 
to  his  wife,  "You  know  how  reluctant  we  both  have 
been  to  see  me  placed  in  this  position,  and  as  it  ap- 
pears to  be  God's  will  for  some  good  purpose — 
at  any  rate,  as  a  soldier,  I  had  nothing  to  do  but 
accept  and  exert  my  utmost  abilities  to  command 
success.  This,  so  help  me  God,  I  will  do,  and, 
trusting  to  Him  Who  in  His  good  pleasure  has 
thought  it  proper  to  place  me  where  I  am,  I  shall 
pray  for  strength  and  power  to  get  through  with 
the  task  assigned  me."  Thus,  humbling  himself 
before  Almighty  God,  the  sober  and  scholarly 
Meade  led  his  hosts  into  battle. 

In  view  of  the  movements  of  Lee,  the  army  could 
not  have  been  better  positioned  than  it  was,  due 
to  the  splendid  handling  of  Hooker,  who  now  must 
see  another  reap  his  laurels.  At  the  east  entrance 
to  the  passes  of  the  South  Mountain  the  army  was 
in  a  position  to  break  through  and  fall  upon  Lee's 
rear  and  line  of  communication  west  of  the  moun- 

[173] 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

tains,  or  move  into  Pennsylvania  on  the  inside  of 
Lee's  flank.  Hooker  had  conceived  the  admirable 
plan  of  joining  the  garrison  under  French  at  Har- 
per's Ferry  with  the  corps  of  Slocum,  and  having 
it  move  up  the  Cumberland  Valley  in  Lee's  rear 
while  the  main  army  moved  on  the  inside  track  and 
struck  at  the  head  of  the  column.  Had  Meade  car- 
ried out  this  plan  of  having  a  strong  body  in  the 
rear  of  Lee,  while  the  main  army  fought  him  far- 
ther to  the  north,  Lee  would  have  been  destroyed. 
If,  after  Gettysburg,  when  Lee  retreated  towards 
Hagerstown  and  the  fords  of  the  Potomac  at  Wil- 
liamsport,  he  had  been  confronted  by  such  a  body 
of  troops  as  Hooker  proposed  should  meet  him, 
the  Confederate  army  would  have  been  annihilated. 
As  it  was,  Meade  followed  out  Hooker's  general 
plan,  moving  north  on  the  inside  track  of  Lee  as 
his  legions  marched  up  the  Cumberland  Valley,  and 
the  advance  guard  towards  the  Susquehanna  River 
at  York  and  Christiana.  Meade  had  prepared  a 
line  of  battle  at  Pipe  Creek  in  Maryland,  but  the 
natural  course  of  the  march  of  the  army  under 
Hooker's  direction  made  a  collision  with  Lee  in- 
evitable, and  Lee's  westward  movement  resulted  in 
the  conflict  on  the  hills  and  meadows  about  the 
peaceful  hamlet  of  Gettysburg.  As  Meade  had 
little  or  nothing  to  do  with  the  tactics  and  strategy 
of  the  campaign,  for  Hooker's  admirable  move- 
ments had  already  determined  in  a  general  way 
the  impending  conflict,  so  he  had  nothing  to  do 
with  selecting  the  actual  field  where  took  place  the 
clash  of  arms  which  shook  the  world.  His  ad- 
vance  guard,   under   Reynolds   and    Howard,    en- 

[174] 


LINCOLN  AND  MEADE 

countered  the  Confederate  advance  just  to  the  west 
and  north  of  Gettysburg.  These  forces  sent  back 
for  reinforcements  and  the  great  battle  was  on. 
Meade  did  not  reach  the  field  until  early  morning 
on  the  2nd  of  July,  and  when  he  arrived  he  found 
the  army  strongly  posted  on  the  hills  south  of 
Gettysburg.  This  line  of  battle  had  been  chosen  by 
Howard  and  then  strengthened  by  Hancock,  whom 
Meade  had  sent  ahead  to  take  whatever  action  he 
deemed  proper.  At  once  Meade  saw  the  strength 
of  the  Union  position,  and  chose  to  stay  and  fight 
it  out.  For  that  he  deserves  no  particular  credit, 
for  even  the  most  unmilitary  eye  would  have  taken 
in  the  great  natural  advantage  of  the  position  for 
a  defensive  battle. 

The  story  of  Gettysburg  does  not  fall  within  the 
scope  of  this  book.  Suffice  it  to  say  that  Meade 
fought  a  careful  and  courageous  battle,  though  be- 
cause of  his  numbers  and  his  position  little  handling 
of  the  army  was  required.  All  he  had  to  do 
was  stand  against  the  brave  but  ill-considered 
assaults  of  Lee's  infantry.  If  Meade  had  fallen 
on  the  field  of  battle  on  the  evening  of  the  third 
day's  fight,  when  Pickett's  men  were  reeling  back 
towards  Seminary  Ridge,  his  fame  might  have 
been  greater  than  that  of  any  commander  of  the 
Union  armies.  But  fate  ruled  otherwise.  When 
Hancock  was  being  borne  on  a  litter  from  the  field 
he  sent  a  penciled  note  to  Meade  urging  him  to 
make  immediately  a  counter-attack  and  break  the 
Confederate  lines.  His  chief  of  cavalry,  Pleason- 
ton,  begged  him  to  make  an  assault  with  the  entire 
army.     If  he  had  done  so,  Lee  would  have  been 

[175] 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

crushed  and  the  war  ended.  But  Meade  waited 
for  an  hour,  a  night,  a  day,  another  night,  and  the 
next  morning  Lee  was  gone.  In  January  of  the 
same  year  Meade,  commenting  on  the  hesitating 
movements  of  the  army  under  Burnside,  had  writ- 
ten, "You  see,  I  am  among  the  fire-eaters  and  may 
perhaps  jeopardize  my  reputation  by  being  too  de- 
cided. But  the  fact  is,  I  am  tired  of  the  playing 
war  without  risks.  We  must  encounter  risks  if 
we  fight  and  we  cannot  carry  on  war  without 
fighting." 

If  Meade  had  only  remembered  that  declaration 
and  acted  upon  it  when  Lee  was  reforming  his 
beaten  army  on  Seminary  Ridge !  There  was  little 
risk  involved  in  a  general  assault  upon  a  half- 
shattered  army  of  invaders,  far  from  their  base  of 
supplies,  with  a  range  of  mountains  and  a  great 
river  between  them  and  Virginia.  But  Meade  was 
not  equal  to  the  occasion.  Lee  was  permitted 
almost  unmolested  to  withdraw  his  army,  his  trains, 
his  wounded,  and  his  long  column  of  prisoners, 
through  the  passes  of  the  mountains  and  on  to  the 
Potomac  at  Williamsport.  The  very  stars  in  their 
courses  were  fighting  against  him,  for  when  he 
reached  the  river  he  found  that  his  pontoon  bridge 
had  been  destroyed  and  the  river  was  so  swollen 
by  the  heavy  rains  that  it  would  be  several  days 
before  he  could  cross. 

Meanwhile  Halleck  and  Lincoln  were  imploring 
Meade  to  strike  the  final  and  fatal  blow.  On  July 
7\h  Halleck  telegraphed,  "You  have  given  the 
enemy  a  stunning  blow  at  Gettysburg.  Follow  it 
up,  and  give  him  another  before  he  can  reach  the 

[176] 


LINCOLN  AND  MEADE 

Potomac.  "  Under  the  same  date  Halleck  for- 
warded to  Meade  a  message  which  he  had  just 
received  from  Lincoln,  and  which  read,  "We  have 
certain  information  that  Vicksburg  surrendered 
to  General  Grant  on  the  4th  of  July.  Now,  if 
General  Meade  can  complete  his  work,  so  glori- 
ously prosecuted  thus  far,  by  the  literal  or  sub- 
stantial destruction  of  Lee's  army,  the  rebellion 
will  be  over."  On  the  8th  Halleck  telegraphed  to 
Meade,  "There  is  reliable  information  that  the 
enemy  is  crossing  at  Williamsport.  The  oppor- 
tunity to  attack  his  divided  forces  should  not  be 
lost.  The  President  is  urgent  and  anxious  that 
our  army  should  move  against  him  by  forced 
marches."  On  the  12th  Meade  telegraphed  to  Hal- 
leck that  he  was  getting  ready  to  attack  and  fight 
the  decisive  battle  of  the  war.  Yet  the  precious 
days  went  by  and  the  attack  was  not  made. 

On  the  13th  Meade,  instead  of  fighting,  held  a 
council  of  war  and  reported  to  Halleck  that  five 
out  of  six  of  his  corps  commanders  were  unquali- 
fiedly opposed  to  the  attack.  Therefore  he  would 
delay  and  make  more  careful  examination  of  Lee's 
position.  To  this  Halleck  responded  in  a  message 
which  must  have  been  inspired,  if  not  dictated,  by 
Lincoln:  "You  are  strong  enough  to  attack  and 
defeat  the  enemy  before  he  can  effect  a  crossing. 
Act  upon  your  own  judgment,  and  make  your  gen- 
erals execute  your  orders.  Call  no  council  of  war. 
It  is  proverbial  that  councils  of  war  never  fight. 
Do  not  let  the  enemy  escape." 

On  the  14th  Meade  telegraphed  that  that  morn- 
ing he  had  moved  up  to  attack  Lee  but  found  his 

[177] 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

lines  evacuated.  What  Lincoln  and  Halleck  and 
the  whole  nation  feared  had  happened.  Lee  had 
recrossed  the  Potomac  and  was  safe  in  Virginia. 
That  same  day  Halleck  sent  Meade  a  message  still 
urging  him  to  follow  Lee's  retreat,  but  telling  him 
that  the  escape  of  Lee's  army  had  "created  great 
dissatisfaction  in  the  mind  of  the  President." 
Within  an  hour  Meade  sent  Halleck  his  request  to 
be  relieved,  saying,  "Having  performed  my  duty 
conscientiously  and  to  the  best  of  my  ability,  the 
censure  of  the  President  conveyed  in  your  dispatch 
of  1  P.  M.  this  day,  is,  in  my  judgment,  so  unde- 
served that  I  feel  compelled  most  respectfully  to 
ask  to  be  immediately  relieved  from  the  command 
of  this  army."  Halleck  responded  that  his  tele- 
gram was  not  meant  for  censure  but  as  a  stimulus, 
and  refused  the  application  to  be  relieved.  In  a 
private  communication  of  July  28th  Halleck  speaks 
kindly  and  appreciatively  of  Meade  and  his  leader- 
ship of  the  army,  telling  him  among  other  things 
that  he  had  done  at  Gettysburg  that  which  no 
other  commander  of  the  army  had  been  able  to 
do,  brought  all  his  forces  into  action  at  the  right 
time  and  the  right  place.  The  President's  great 
disappointment  is  again  referred  to  with  the  state- 
ment that  the  President  had  himself  examined  all 
the  details  of  sending  every  possible  reinforcement 
to  the  army  and  that  he  thought  Lee's  defeat  and 
destruction  were  certain.  At  the  close  of  the  let- 
ter Halleck  reveals  the  fact  that  he  had  recom- 
mended Meade  to  the  President  for  the  command 
of  the  army  at  the  time  of  Hooker's  removal.  In 
response  to  this  Meade  wrote  that  he  did  not  won- 

[178] 


LINCOLN  AND  MEADE 

der  at  the  President's  disappointment,  for  he  him- 
self was  disappointed  at  Lee's  escape,  but  there  was 
a  difference  between  disappointment  and  dissatis- 
faction. Referring  to  the  implied  feeling  of  the 
President  that  he  had  not  done  all  that  might  have 
been  done,  or  that  another  might  have  done, 
Meade  says:  "Perhaps  the  President  was  right;  if 
such  was  the  case,  it  was  my  duty  to  give  him  an 
opportunity  to  replace  me  by  one  better  fitted  for 
the  command  of  the  army.  It  was,  I  assure  you, 
with  such  feelings  that  I  applied  to  be  relieved.  It 
was  not  from  any  personal  considerations,  and  I 
have  tried  in  this  whole  war  to  forget  all  personal 
considerations  and  have  always  maintained  they 
should  not  for  an  instant  influence  anyone's  actions. 
Of  course,  you  will  understand  that  I  do  not  agree 
that  the  President  was  right.  Had  I  attacked  Lee 
the  day  I  proposed  to  do  so,  and  in  the  ignorance 
that  then  existed  of  his  position,  I  have  every 
reason  to  believe  the  attack  would  have  been  un- 
successful and  would  have  resulted  disastrously." 
The  distress  of  Lincoln  upon  the  receipt  of  the 
news  of  the  escape  of  Lee  was  terrible,  greater 
than  at  any  other  crisis  in  the  war.  After  the  ad- 
journment of  the  Cabinet  meeting  on  the  day  the 
news  came  Lincoln  overtook  Gideon  Welles,  Secre- 
tary of  the  Navy,  on  the  lawn  and  walked  with  him 
towards  the  Army  and  Navy  buildings,  telling  him 
that  what  he  had  so  much  dreaded  had  come  to 
pass  and  that  Lee  had  crossed  the  Potomac,  and 
more,  that  there  seemed  to  him  a  determination 
that  "Lee,  though  we  had  him  in  our  hands,  should 
escape  with  his  force  and  plunder.     And  that,  my 

[179] 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

God,  is  the  last  of  this  Army  of  the  Potomac! 
There  is  bad  faith  somewhere.  Meade  has  been 
pressed  and  urged,  but  only  one  of  his  generals 
was  for  an  immediate  attack,  was  ready  to  pounce 
on  Lee;  the  rest  held  back.  What  does  it  mean, 
Mr.  Welles?    Great  God!  what  does  it  mean?" 

On  the  14th  of  July,  the  day  that  Lee's  army 
crossed  the  Potomac,  Lincoln  wrote  to  Meade  the 
famous  unsent  letter  in  which  he  tells  why  and  how 
deeply  he  was  disappointed  in  the  escape  of  Lee, 
and  what  it  meant  to  the  cause  and  the  nation: 

I  have  just  seen  your  despatch  to  General  Halleck, 
asking  to  be  relieved  of  your  command  because  of  a 
supposed  censure  of  mine.  I  am  very,  very  grateful 
to  you  for  the  magnificent  success  you  gave  the  cause 
of  the  country  at  Gettysburg ;  and  I  am  sorry  now  to 
be  the  author  of  the  slightest  pain  to  you.  But  I  was 
in  such  deep  distress  myself  that  I  could  not  restrain 
some  expression  of  it.  I  have  been  oppressed  nearly 
ever  since  the  battles  at  Gettysburg  by  what  appeared 
to  be  evidences  that  yourself  and  General  Couch  and 
General  Smith  were  not  seeking  a  collision  with  the 
enemy,  but  were  trying  to  get  him  across  the  river 
without  another  battle.  What  those  evidences  were, 
if  you  please,  I  hope  to  tell  you  at  some  time  when  we 
shall  both  feel  better.  The  case,  summarily  stated, 
is  this :  You  fought  and  beat  the  enemy  at  Gettysburg, 
and  of  course,  to  say  the  least,  his  loss  was  as  great 
as  yours.  He  retreated,  and  you  did  not,  as  it  seemed 
to  me,  pressingly  pursue  him ;  but  a  flood  in  the  river 
detained  him  till,  by  slow  degrees,  you  were  again 
upon  him.  You  had  at  least  twenty  thousand  veteran 
troops  directly  with  you,  and  as  many  more  raw  ones 
within  supporting  distance,  all  in  addition  to  those 
who  fought  with  you  at  Gettysburg,  while  it  was  not 
possible  that  he  had  received  a  single  recruit,  and 

[180] 


LINCOLN  AND  MEADE 

yet  you  stood  and  let  the  flood  run  down,  bridges  be 
built,  and  the  enemy  move  away  at  his  leisure  without 
attacking  him.  And  Couch  and  Smith!  The  latter 
left  Carlisle  in  time,  upon  all  ordinary  calculation,  to 
have  aided  you  in  the  last  battle  at  Gettysburg,  but  he 
did  not  arrive.  At  the  end  of  more  than  ten  days,  I 
believe  twelve,  under  constant  urging,  he  reached 
Hagerstown  from  Carlisle,  which  is  not  an  inch  over 
fifty-five  miles,  if  so  much,  and  Couch's  movement 
was  very  little  different. 

Again,  my  dear  General,  I  do  not  believe  you  ap- 
preciate the  magnitude  of  the  misfortune  involved  in 
Lee's  escape.  He  was  within  your  easy  grasp,  and  to 
have  closed  upon  him  would,  in  connection  with  our 
other  late  successes,  have  ended  the  war.  As  it  is,  the 
war  will  be  prolonged  indefinitely.  If  you  could  not 
safely  attack  Lee  last  Monday,  how  can  you  possibly 
do  so  south  of  the  river,  when  you  can  take  with  you 
very  few  more  than  two-thirds  of  the  force  you  then 
had  in  hand  ?  It  would  be  unreasonable  to  expect,  and 
I  do  not  expect  (that)  you  can  now  effect  much. 
Your  golden  opportunity  is  gone,  and  I  am  distressed 
immeasurably  because  of  it. 

I  beg  you  will  not  consider  this  a  prosecution  or 
persecution  of  yourself.  As  you  had  learned  that  I 
was  dissatisfied,  I  have  thought  it  best  to  kindly  tell 
you  why. 

A  week  later,  in  answer  to  a  letter  from  General 
Howard,  who  had  written  defending  the  course  of 
Meade,  Lincoln  wrote  as  follows: 

Your  letter  of  the  18th  is  received.  I  was  deeply 
mortified  by  the  escape  of  Lee  across  the  Potomac, 
because  the  substantial  destruction  of  his  army  would 
have  ended  the  war,  and  because  I  believed  such  de- 
struction was  perfectly  easy — believed  that  General 
Meade  and  his  noble  army  had  expended  all  the  skill, 

[181] 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

and  toil,  and  blood,  up  to  the  ripe  harvest,  and  then 
let  the  crop  go  to  waste. 

Perhaps  my  mortification  was  heightened  because 
I  had  always  believed — making  my  belief  a  hobby, 
possibly — that  the  main  rebel  army  going  north  of  the 
Potomac  could  never  return,  if  well  attended  to;  and 
because  I  was  so  greatly  flattered  in  this  belief  by  the 
operations  at  Gettysburg.  A  few  days  having  passed, 
I  am  now  profoundly  grateful  for  what  was  done, 
without  criticism  for  what  was  not  done. 

General  Meade  has  my  confidence,  as  a  brave  and 
skilful  officer  and  a  true  man. 

Colonel  Alexander  McClure  saw  Lincoln  within 
a  week  after  the  retreat  of  Lee  from  Gettysburg 
and  gave  him  first-hand  information  about  the 
roads  and  passes  leading  from  Gettysburg  to  the 
Potomac.  McClure  asked  Lincoln  if  he  was  not 
satisfied  with  what  Meade  had  accomplished.  Lin- 
coln answered  with  his  characteristic  caution  when 
speaking  of  the  defenders  of  the  Republic,  "Now, 
don't  misunderstand  me  about  General  Meade.  I 
am  profoundly  grateful  down  to  the  bottom  of  my 
boots  for  what  he  did  at  Gettysburg,  but  I  think 
that  if  I  had  been  General  Meade  I  would  have 
fought  another  battle."  History  confirms  the  ver- 
dict of  Lincoln.  It  is  an  old  military  maxim  that  a 
retreating  army  must  be  given  a  wall  of  steel  or  a 
bridge  of  gold.  Meade  presented  Lee  with  a 
bridge  of  gold.  Meade  was  retained  in  independent 
command  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  until  Grant 
arrived  on  the  scene,  and  under  Grant  commanded 
the  army  to  the  end  of  the  war.  But  there  is  no 
evidence  that  Lincoln  greatly  admired  him  or  ex- 
pected much  of  him.    When,  in  March,  1864,  Meade 

[182] 


LINCOLN  AND  MEADE 

asked  for  a  court  of  inquiry  to  settle  disputes  that 
had  arisen  about  his  conduct  of  the  battle  at 
Gettysburg,  Lincoln  refused  in  a  somewhat  curt 
message  in  which  he  told  Meade  that  there  was 
better  employment  for  him  and  his  officers  than 
attending  the  sessions  of  a  court  of  inquiry.  In 
his  diary  for  September  21,  1863,  Gideon  Welles 
tells  of  a  conversation  he  had  with  the  President, 
who  at  the  time  was  much  depressed  because  of  the 
bad  news  from  Chickamauga.  Welles  asked  him 
what  the  immense  army  of  Meade  was  doing. 
Lincoln  answered  that  he  could  not  learn  that 
Meade  was  doing  anything  or  wanted  to  do  any- 
thing. "It  is,"  he  said,  "the  same  old  story  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac.  Imbecility,  inefficiency — 
don't  want  to  do — is  defending  the  capital.  Oh,  it 
is  terrible,  terrible,  this  weakness,  this  indifference 
of  our  Potomac  generals,  with  such  armies  of  good 
and  brave  men."  When  Welles  asked  him  why 
he  did  not  remove  Meade  and  choose  a  better  gen- 
eral, the  President  answered,  "What  can  I  do  with 
such  generals  as  we  have?  Who  among  them  is 
any  better  than  Meade?  To  sweep  away  the  whole 
of  them  from  the  chief  command  and  substitute  a 
new  man  would  cause  a  shock,  and  be  likely  to  lead 
to  combinations  and  troubles  greater  than  we  now 
have.  I  see  all  the  difficulties  as  you  do.  They 
oppress  me." 

When  Grant  came  east  and  pitched  his  tent  with 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  Meade  knew  that  his 
day  was  over.  Henceforth  Grant  must  increase  and 
Meade  must  decrease.  It  was  a  trying  situation 
for  Meade,  but  he  performed  his  duties  with  sol- 

[183] 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

dierly  promptness  and  obedience.  There  was 
nothing  in  common  between  Grant  and  Meade,  but 
Grant  entertained  a  high  opinion  of  Meade's  ability. 
Meade's  position  with  the  army  was  now  more  like 
a  chief-of-staff  than  a  commander.  It  was  inevi- 
table that  he  should  have  dropped  out  of  public 
notice.  When  Sherman  was  made  a  major-general 
in  August,  1864,  Meade  felt  keenly  the  omission 
of  his  name  from  the  list  of  promotions.  Still  more 
did  he  resent  Grant's  giving  the  independent  com- 
mand in  the  Shenandoah  Valley  to  Sheridan,  who 
had  been  very  offensive  in  his  conduct  to  Meade 
when  with  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  After  his 
victory  over  Early  at  Cedar  Creek,  Sheridan  was 
made  a  major-general  in  the  regular  army.  The 
victor  of  Gettysburg  was  still  unhonored,  and  Lin- 
coln must  have  known  of  the  omission  and  acqui- 
esced in  it.  But  when  Meade  was  at  length  ap- 
pointed to  the  grade  of  major-general  in  the  regu- 
lar army  in  November,  1864,  Grant  saw  to  it  that 
the  commission  was  pre-dated  for  August,  so  that 
Meade  ranked  Sheridan.  In  1866  the  rank  of  gen- 
eral was  created  for  Grant,  and  Sherman  succeeded 
to  the  rank  of  lieutenant-general,  thus  leaving 
Meade  first  in  rank  among  the  major-generals. 
When  Grant  became  President,  in  1869,  it  was  gen- 
erally supposed  that  Sherman  would  succeed  him 
as  general,  and  that  Meade  would  become  the 
lieutenant-general.  But  almost  the  first  official 
act  of  Grant  as  President  was  to  make  Sheridan 
lieutenant-general.  This  was  a  terrible  blow  for 
Meade,  and  he  stigmatized  it  as  the  "crudest  and 
meanest  act  of  injustice"  and  expressed  the  hope 

[184] 


LINCOLN  AND  MEADE 

that  the  "man  who  perpetrated  it  will  some  day 
be  made  to  feel  so."  Henceforth  Meade  is  as  a  man 
whose  head  is  bowed  by  a  great  sorrow  and  who 
nurses  an  incurable  wound.  His  contemporaries 
did  not  give  him  the  highest  rank;  nor  has  history 
reversed  their  verdict.  He  will  be  remembered  as 
Lincoln  wrote  to  him  after  Gettysburg — the  man 
who  let  his  "golden  opportunity"  escape. 


[185] 


LINCOLN  AND  HALLECK 

In  Gideon  Welles'  diary  for  September  29,  1863, 
we  find  this  entry:  "Halleck,  Chase  said,  was  good 
for  nothing,  and  everybody  knew  it  but  the  Presi- 
dent." That  blunt  opinion  of  Chase  about  Halleck 
is  the  one  held  by  nearly  every  student  of  the 
Civil  War.  He  stands  out  as  a  man  "good  for 
nothing,"  and  that  good-for-nothingness  recognized 
by  all  except  the  man  who  called  him  to  his  high 
office  and  retained  him  in  power  to  the  end  of  the 
war.  Why  did  Lincoln  not  see  what  all  his  con- 
temporaries saw?  This  is  one  of  the  puzzles  of 
the  war. 

No  high  officer  was  held  in  such  little  esteem 
by  his  contemporaries  as  Halleck.  An  extraor- 
dinary chorus  of  contempt  rises  at  the  mention  of 
his  name.  To  Chase  he  is  "good  for  nothing"; 
McClellan,  who  was  quick  to  recognize  ability,  says 
of  him,  "Of  all  men  whom  I  have  encountered  in 
high  position  Halleck  was  the  most  hopelessly 
stupid.  It  was  more  difficult  to  get  an  idea  through 
his  head  than  can  be  conceived  by  anyone  who 
never  made  the  attempt.  I  do  not  think  he  ever 
had  a  correct  military  idea  from  beginning  to  end." 
As  for  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  Gideon  Welles, 
Halleck  is  his  bete  noir,  and  every  mention  of  his 
name  and  every  sight  he  has  of  him  calls  forth  an 
expression  of  indignation  and  disgust.  Here  are 
some  of  his  thoughts  about  Halleck:  "Halleck  is 
heavy  headed,  wants  sagacity,  courage,  and  heart." 

[186] 


HENRY  WAGER  HALLECK 


LINCOLN  AND  HALLECK 

"Halleck  originates  nothing,  anticipates  nothing; 
takes  no  responsibility,  plans  nothing,  suggests 
nothing,  is  good  for  nothing.  His  being  at  head- 
quarters is  a  national  misfortune."  "In  this  whole 
summer's  campaign  I  have  been  unable  to  see,  hear, 
or  obtain  evidence  of  power,  or  will,  or  talent,  or 
originality  on  the  part  of  General  Halleck.  He  has 
suggested  nothing,  decided  nothing,  done  nothing 
but  scold  and  smoke  and  scratch  his  elbows.  Is  it 
possible  the  energies  of  the  nation  should  be  wasted 
by  the  incapacity  of  such  a  man?" 

Reading  such  opinions  as  these  on  the  part  of 
men  who  saw  Halleck  in  action,  or  rather  saw  him 
failing  to  act,  the  mystery  is  that  Lincoln  kept  such 
a  man  in  high  office,  consulted  constantly  with  him, 
and  deferred  to  his  judgment  in  military  matters. 
Was  there  something  of  worth  in  the  man  which 
Lincoln  saw  and  appreciated,  but  which  escaped 
the  notice  of  others?  However  this  may  have  been, 
no  history  of  Lincoln's  relationship  to  the  army 
leaders  would  be  complete  without  a  chapter  tell- 
ing of  his  association  with  Halleck. 

Henry  Wager  Halleck  was  born  in  New  York,  in 
1815,  graduated  from  West  Point  in  1839  and  im- 
mediately became  assistant  professor  of  engineer- 
ing in  the  academy.  In  1841  he  was  sent  to  Europe 
to  study  military  science  and  upon  his  return  pub- 
lished a  volume  under  the  title  Elements  of  Military 
Art  and  Science.  When  the  Civil  War  broke  out 
this  book  was  much  used  in  the  training  of  volun- 
teer officers.  In  the  Mexican  War  Halleck  served 
with  distinction  in  California.  In  1849  he  helped 
frame  the  constitution  of  California  when  it  was  ad- 

[187] 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

mitted  to  the  Union.  After  some  years  of  service 
in  lighthouse  and  fortification  works  on  the  Pacific 
coast,  Halleck  resigned  his  commission  and  took  up 
the  practice  of  law.  In  this  he  was  eminently  suc- 
cessful. He  was  also  the  director  of  a  silver  mine 
and  the  president  of  a  railway.  He  was  a  prolific 
author,  having  written  besides  the  work  on  military 
science  the  following  books:  Bitumen,  Its  Varieties 
and  Uses;  The  Mining  Laws  of  Spain  and  Mexico; 
International  Law,  and  Treatise  on  International  Law 
and  Laws  of  War;  a  translation  of  Jomini's  Political 
and  Military  View  of  Napoleon,  and  also  a  transla- 
tion of  the  work  of  de  Fooz  on  The  Laws  of  Mines. 
In  contrast  with  Grant,  Sherman,  Hooker,  Sheri- 
dan, and  other  Union  generals,  Halleck,  at  the  out- 
break of  the  war,  was  a  well-to-do,  successful  and 
distinguished  man,  a  scientific  soldier,  a  skilful 
lawyer,  a  prosperous  business  man  and  an  author 
of  note. 

It  was  not  strange,  therefore,  that  the  aged 
General  Scott  began  to  think  of  Halleck  as  his 
successor  at  Washington.  He  was  commissioned 
a  major-general  on  August  19,  1861,  and  summoned 
to  Washington.  But  when  he  arrived  there,  the 
affairs  in  Fremont's  department  at  St.  Louis  were 
in  such  a  chaotic  state  that  he  was  sent  west  to 
succeed  the  "Pathfinder."  In  the  autumn  and  the 
winter  of  1861  Halleck  did  a  great  work  of  organ- 
ization. He  created  and  drilled  the  armies  which 
were  shortly  to  make  such  a  name  for  themselves 
in  the  western  campaigns.  In  a  letter  to  Lincoln 
in  January,  1862,  Halleck  describes  himself  "in  the 
condition  of  a  carpenter  who  is  required  to  build  a 

[188] 


LINCOLN  AND  HALLECK 

bridge  with  a  dull  ax,  a  broken  saw,  and  rotten  tim- 
ber. It  is  true  that  I  have  some  very  good  green 
timber,  which  will  answer  the  purpose  as  soon  as 
I  can  get  it  into  shape  and  season  it  a  little. "  This 
"green  timber"  he  handled  skilfully,  and  ere  long  it 
was  seasoned  well  enough  to  put  into  the  hands  of 
Grant. 

One  of  the  great  mistakes  of  the  early  adminis- 
tration of  the  war  was  the  creation  of  three  inde- 
pendent commands  in  the  west,  under  Hunter, 
Buell  and  Halleck.  Halleck  was  enough  of  a  sol- 
dier to  see  the  danger  of  this,  and  repeatedly  asked 
that  he  be  given  supreme  command.  "Make 
Buell,  Grant  and  Pope  major-generals  of  volun- 
teers, "  he  telegraphed  Lincoln  the  day  after  the 
surrender  of  Fort  Donelson,  "and  give  me  com- 
mand in  the  West.  I  ask  this  in  return  for  Forts 
Henry  and  Donelson."  Lincoln,  who  had  been 
watching  by  the  bedside  of  his  dying  son,  Willie, 
was  so  overwhelmed  with  grief  that  he  was  re- 
luctant to  interfere  in  the  dispute  over  lack  of  co- 
operation between  Buell  and  Halleck.  But  early 
in  March  Halleck  secured  his  desire  and  the  three 
commands  of  Buell,  Grant  and  Hunter  were  put  un- 
der his  direction.  Forts  Henry  and  Donelson  had 
already  been  won;  then  followed  Pea  Ridge,  Shiloh, 
Island  No.  10,  and  Corinth.  It  cannot  be  said  that 
any  one  of  these  victories  was  due  to  the  ability 
of  Halleck;  they  were  due  rather  to  the  initiative 
and  skill  of  the  subordinate  commanders.  Never- 
theless, these  armies  were  under  his  command,  and 
he  authorized  the  movements  and  supplied  the 
troops  and  the  munitions  of  war.     Halleck  himself 

[189] 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

did  not  take  the  field  until  just  after  the  Battle  of 
Shiloh,  when  he  supplanted  Grant  and  advanced 
"with  pick  and  shovel,"  as  Sherman  puts  it,  against 
Corinth.  There  he  let  the  splendid  army  under  him 
lie  idle  and  accomplished  little  or  nothing  until 
Lincoln  summoned  him  to  Washington  in  July, 
1862. 

With  such  a  record  of  victories  in  his  depart- 
ment, while  in  the  east  no  progress  was  being 
made,  it  was  but  natural  that  Lincoln  and  the  pub- 
lic at  large  should  have  had  a  very  high  opinion 
of  the  ability  of  General  Halleck.  When  things 
commenced  to  go  wrong  on  the  Peninsula  under 
McClellan,  Lincoln  began  to  cast  about  for  a*  man 
who  could  devise  new  plans  and  co-ordinate  the 
hitherto  baffled  efforts  of  the  Union  armies  to  put 
down  the  rebellion.  It  was  inevitable  that  he 
should  have  thought  of  the  distinguished  soldier 
who  had  won  such  laurels  in  the  west.  He  was 
supposed,  too,  to  be  a  man  of  superior  military  in- 
telligence, with  the  mind  which  could  plan  and 
undertake  a  great  enterprise. 

Late  in  June,  1862,  when  McClellan  was  on  the 
Peninsula  in  his  campaign  against  Richmond, 
Chase,  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  and  Welles, 
the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  were  with  the  President 
at  the  War  Department.  General  Pope  was  also 
present.  As  they  were  studying  the  maps  which 
lay  on  a  table  Chase  said  the  whole  movement  upon 
Richmond  was  wrong  and  that  nothing  could  be 
accomplished  until  the  army  was  recalled  and 
started  for  Richmond  by  the  land  route,  with 
Washington  as  the  base.     "What  would  you  do?" 

[190] 


LINCOLN  AND  HALLECK 

asked  Lincoln  of  Chase.  "Order  McClellan  to  re- 
turn and  start  right,"  responded  Chase.  Then  Pope, 
looking  up,  said  to  Lincoln,  "If  Halleck  were  here, 
you  would  have,  Mr.  President,  a  competent  ad- 
viser who  would  put  this  matter  right."  How  many 
others  suggested  to  Lincoln  that  Halleck  was  the 
man  for  the  hour  we  do  not  know.  But  we  do 
know  that  about  this  time  Lincoln  made  a  secret 
trip  to  West  Point  and  had  a  conference  with 
General  Scott.  In  the  only  record  we  have  of  this 
conference,  a  memorandum  from  the  hand  of 
Scott,  giving  the  President  advice  as  to  McClel- 
lan's  campaign,  there  is  no  mention  of  Halleck. 
But  it  is  significant  that  shortly  after  this  visit 
Lincoln  summoned  Halleck  to  Washington  to  take 
the  supreme  military  command.  McClellan  says 
that  Scott  had  long  wished  Halleck  to  succeed  him 
as  general-in-chief  and  long  withheld  his  resigna- 
tion so  that  Halleck  might  fall  heir  to  his  place. 

The  first  intimation  we  have  of  Lincoln's  pur- 
pose to  make  Halleck  the  grand  marshal  of  the  war 
is  contained  in  a  telegram  of  July  2,  1862,  in  which 
the  President  says,  "Please  tell  me,  could  you  not 
make  a  flying  visit  for  consultation  without  en- 
dangering the  service  in  your  department?"  On 
the  6th  of  July  Lincoln  writes  that  he  is  sending  a 
messenger  to  Halleck.  "He  wishes,"  says  the 
President,  "to  get  you  and  part  of  your  force,  one 
or  both,  to  come  here.  You  already  know  I  should 
be  exceedingly  glad  of  this  if,  in  your  judgment,  it 
could  be  without  endangering  positions  and  opera- 
tions in  the  southwest."  This  messenger  was 
Governor  Sprague  of  Rhode  Island.    In  answer  to 

[191] 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

the  proposal  which  Sprague  brought  to  Halleck 
from  Lincoln,  Halleck  replied  to  Lincoln,  "Gov- 
ernor Sprague  is  here.  If  I  were  to  go  to  Wash- 
ington I  could  advise  but  one  thing — to  place  all 
the  forces  in  North  Carolina,  Virginia  and  Wash- 
ington under  one  head,  and  hold  that  head  respon- 
sible for  the  result."  This  must  have  satisfied  Lin- 
coln, for  on  the  11th  of  July,  1862,  he  issued  the 
order,  "That  Major-General  Henry  W.  Halleck  be 
assigned  to  command  the  whole  land  forces  of  the 
United  States  as  general-in-chief,  and  that  he  re- 
pair to  this  capital  as  soon  as  he  can  with  safety 
to  the  positions  and  operations  under  his  charge.', 

The  coming  of  Halleck  to  Washington  as  com- 
mander-in-chief was  fraught  with  disaster  for  the 
Union  armies  in  the  east.  But  in  the  west  it  had 
one  very  important  and  fortunate  effect,  for  Grant, 
next  in  rank,  now  succeeded  to  the  command  of 
Halleck's  department.  The  appointment  of  Hal- 
leck was  well  received  by  the  country,  and  it  must 
be  remembered  that  the  adverse  comments  on  his 
ability  are  related  with  his  career  at  Washington 
and  not  with  what  had  gone  before. 

Writing  at  the  time  of  Halleck's  appointment  to 
the  supreme  command,  General  Sherman  says  of 
him,  "General  Halleck  was  a  man  of  great  capacity, 
of  large  acquirements,  and  at  the  time  possessed 
the  confidence  of  the  country,  and  of  most  of  the 
army.  I  held  him  in  high  estimation,  and  gave 
him  credit  for  the  combinations  which  had  resulted 
in  placing  this  magnificent  army  of  a  hundred  thou- 
sand men,  well  equipped  and  provided,  with  a  good 

[192] 


LINCOLN  AND  HALLECK 

base,  at  Corinth,  from  which  he  could  move  in  any 
direction." 

Gideon  Welles  in  his  diary  for  September  3rd, 
lets  us  behind  the  political  scenes  at  Washington, 
when  he  says,  "The  introduction  of  Pope  here,  fol- 
lowed by  Halleck,  is  an  intrigue  of  Stanton's  and 
Chase's  to  get  rid  of  McClellan.  A  part  of  the 
intrigue  has  been  the  withdrawal  of  McClellan  and 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac  from  before  Richmond 
and  turning  it  into  the  Army  of  Washington 
under  Pope."  (Welles  means  the  Army  of  Vir- 
ginia, not  the  Army  of  Washington.)  There  is 
no  doubt  about  an  intrigue  to  get  rid  of  McClellan, 
but  that  Stanton  had  much  to  do  with  bringing 
Halleck  to  Washington  is  not  likely,  for  McClel- 
lan says  that  a  day  or  two  before  Halleck  arrived 
in  Washington  Stanton  came  to  caution  him 
against  Halleck,  saying  that  he  was  "probably  the 
greatest  scoundrel  and  most  barefaced  villain  in 
America,"  that  he  was  totally  destitute  of  principle, 
and  that  in  the  Alameda  Quicksilver  case  he,  Stan- 
ton, had  convicted  Halleck  of  perjury  in  open  court. 
McClellan  adds  that  when  Halleck  arrived  he  came 
to  him  and  warned  him  against  Stanton,  saying  of 
Stanton  almost  precisely  what  Stanton  had  said  of 
Halleck.  Plainly,  there  was  not  much  love  lost 
between  the  two. 

The  day  after  he  arrived  in  Washington  Halleck 
went  to  McClellan's  headquarters  on  the  James 
River  and  consulted  with  him  about  future  plans. 
The  upshot  was  that  Halleck  advised  and  then 
finally  ordered  McClellan  to  withdraw  his  army. 
Just  how  far  Halleck  was  responsible  for  this  great 

[193] 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

military  blunder  is  not  clear.  His  advice  might 
have  led  the  Government  to  maintain  McClellan 
where  he  was,  but  it  is  plain  that  the  Government 
was  fully  determined  in  its  own  mind  to  withdraw 
McClellan  from  the  Peninsula  before  Halleck  ar- 
rived on  the  scene.  Once  he  had  acquiesced  in  the 
plan  to  bring  McClellan  back  and  unite  his  army 
with  that  under  Pope,  Halleck  ought  to  have  seen 
that  the  thing  was  done  with  dispatch.  But  he 
allowed  McClellan  to  discuss  and  delay  until  Lee 
fell  on  Pope  before  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  was 
joined  with  it.  At  the  very  beginning  of  Halleck's 
stay  as  commander-in-chief  Lincoln  was  doomed  to 
disappointment,  for  it  was  plain  that  Halleck  was 
the  last  man  in  the  world  to  assume  the  heavy  re- 
sponsibility of  directing  the  armies  which  were  en- 
gaging in  battle  almost  at  the  gates  of  the  capital. 
What  a  picture  of  incompetence,  of  lack  of  aggres- 
siveness and  fighting  heart  it  is  that  Halleck  pre- 
sents during  the  fateful  days  of  the  Second  Battle 
of  Manassas,  when  at  length,  after  having  ignored 
and  snubbed  McClellan,  he  finally  telegraphs  him, 
"I  beg  of  you  to  assist  me  in  this  crisis  with  your 
ability  and  experience.  I  am  entirely  tired  out!" 
Early  on  the  morning  of  the  2nd  of  September, 
1862,  Halleck  and  Lincoln  went  together  to  the 
home  of  McClellan  in  Washington  and  besought 
him  to  resume  command  of  the  forces  about  Wash- 
ington. In  the  first  crisis  which  had  arisen  Halleck 
had  failed,  failed  dismally  and  completely.  Yet,  as 
we  shall  see,  he  survived  this,  and  many  another, 
failure. 

As  his  relationships  with  McClellan  had  been  un- 

[194] 


LINCOLN  AND  HALLECK 

fortunate  so  also  they  were  with  McClellan's  suc- 
cessor, Burnside.  At  a  meeting  of  the  Cabinet, 
when  the  possible  successor  to  McClellan  was  be- 
ing discussed,  Mr.  Bates  suggested  that  Halleck 
take  command  of  the  army  in  person.  "But  the 
President,"  writes  Welles  in  his  diary,  "said,  and 
all  the  Cabinet  concurred  in  the  opinion,  that  Hal- 
leck would  be  an  indifferent  general  in  the  field, 
that  he  shirked  responsibility  in  his  present  posi- 
tion, that  he,  in  short,  is  a  moral  coward,  worth  but 
little  except  as  a  critic  and  director  of  operations, 
though  intelligent  and  educated. "  After  Burnside 
had  made  his  ghastly  failure  before  Fredericksburg 
he  advised  Lincoln  to  remove  both  Stanton  and 
Halleck,  saying  that  neither  of  them  had  the  con- 
fidence of  the  army.  When  Burnside  was  contem- 
plating another  crossing4  of  the  Rappahannock, 
Lincoln,  fearful  lest  a  new  disaster  should  befall 
the  army,  and  perplexed  as  to  how  he  should  coun- 
sel Burnside,  wrote  the  following  impatient  letter 
to  his  commander-in-chief: 

My  dear  Sir:  General  Burnside  wishes  to  cross 
the  Rappahannock  with  his  army,  but  his  grand  divi- 
sion commanders  all  oppose  the  movement.  If  in 
such  a  difficulty  as  this  you  do  not  help  you  fail  me 
precisely  in  the  point  for  which  I  sought  your  assist- 
ance. You  know  what  General  Burnside's  plan  is, 
and  it  is  my  wish  that  you  go  with  him  to  the 
ground,  examine  it  as  far  as  practicable,  confer  with 
the  officers,  getting  their  judgment  and  ascertaining 
their  temper — in  a  word,  gather  all  the  elements  for 
forming  a  judgment  of  your  own,  and  then  tell  Gen- 
eral Burnside  that  you  do  or  that  you  do  not  approve 
his  plan.  Your  military  skill  is  useless  to  me  if  you 
will  not  do  this. 

[195] 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 


Halleck  responded  to  this  letter  by  sending  in 
his  resignation.  But  Lincoln,  his  exasperation 
now  in  subsidence,  spoke  encouragingly  to  Halleck 
and  refused  to  accept  his  resignation.  The  copy  of 
the  letter  to  Halleck  bears  the  following  endorse- 
ment in  Lincoln's  hand,  "Withdrawn  because  con- 
sidered harsh  by  General  Halleck." 

When  Hooker  succeeded  Burnside  as  com- 
mander of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  the  first  thing 
he  asked  for  was  freedom  of  action  without  being 
hampered  or  hindered  by  Halleck.  By  this  time 
Halleck  was  considered  as  an  obstacle  to  the  suc- 
cess of  the  generals  in  the  field.  The  President 
promised  Hooker  a  free  hand,  and  in  the  subse- 
quent campaigns  of  Chancellorsville  and  on  the 
march  towards  Gettysburg,  Hooker  communicated 
directly  with  Lincoln,  ignoring  the  commander-in- 
chief.  That  he  could  have  done  this  shows  that  Hal- 
leck's  position  was  only  nominal.  In  reality,  he  was 
a  sort  of  chief-of-staff,  or  military  adviser,  to  Lin- 
coln. As  the  campaign  which  culminated  in  Gettys- 
burg progressed,  Hooker  became  more  and  more 
convinced  that  Halleck  was  blocking  him,  and  made 
definite  complaint  to  Lincoln.  To  this  Lincoln 
answered:  "I  believe  Halleck  is  dissatisfied  with 
you  to  this  extent  only,  that  he  knows  that  you 
write  and  telegraph  to  me.  I  think  he  is  wrong  to 
find  fault  with  this;  but  I  do  not  think  he  with- 
holds any  support  from  you  on  account  of  it.  If 
you  and  he  would  use  the  same  frankness  to  one 
another,  and  to  me,  that  I  use  to  both  of  you, 
there  would  be  no  difficulty.     I   need  and  must 

[196] 


LINCOLN  AND  HALLECK 

have  the  professional  skill  of  both,  and  yet  these 
suspicions  tend  to  deprive  me  of  both." 

That  this  critical  situation  had  arisen  in  the  man- 
agement of  the  army  as  it  was  marching  toward  the 
invading  foe  was  due  to  no  one  but  Lincoln  him- 
self, for  it  was  he  who  had  permitted  Hooker  at 
the  beginning  to  take  a  thoroughly  unmilitary  pro- 
cedure in  ignoring  the  commander-in-chief.  Lin- 
coln's perplexity  over  the  relationship  of  Hooker 
and  Halleck  came  to  an  end  with  Halleck's  foolish 
refusal  to  let  Hooker  withdraw  the  garrison  from 
Harper's  Ferry.  This  was  followed  by  Hooker's 
resignation,  and  Meade  was  appointed  to  the  com- 
mand of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac. 

Not  only  was  Halleck  useless  in  the  planning  of 
military  movements,  but  even  as  go-between,  or 
chief  clerk,  acting  for  the  President  and  the  War 
Department,  he  exasperated  the  commanders  of 
the  armies  in  the  field.  This  was  true  in  his  rela- 
tionship with  McClellan,  Burnside,  Hooker,  Sher- 
man, and  Rosecrans,  and  with  Grant,  too,  when 
Halleck  commanded  in  the  west,  although  Grant 
had  no  complaint  to  make  of  Halleck's  support  dur- 
ing the  Vicksburg  campaign.  Halleck  had  an  in- 
teresting clash  with  General  Rosecrans.  In  March, 
1863,  there  was  a  vacancy  in  the  rank  of  major- 
general,  in  the  regular  army,  and  General  Rose- 
crans, along  with  other  officers,  was  being  pressed 
for  the  vacancy.  Thinking  to  get  some  action  out 
of  the  army  commanders,  Halleck  addressed  a  let- 
ter to  the  generals  being  named  in  connection  with 
the  honor,  and  said  the  vacancy  would  be  given 
to  the  general  in  the  field  who  should  first  win  an 

[197] 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

important  and  decisive  victory.  Unquestionably 
this  suggestion  of  Halleck's  has  a  Lincoln  note 
about  it,  nor  is  it  at  all  likely  that  he  would  have 
sent  such  a  letter  unless  the  President  had  at  least 
seen  it  and  given  his  approval.  None  of  the  other 
officers  who  received  the  letter  took  exception  to 
it,  but  the  fiery  Rosecrans  thought  it  an  insult  to 
his  honor,  and  sent  an  angry  reply  saying,  "As  an 
officer  and  a  citizen  I  feel  degraded  to  see  such 
auctioneering  of  honor.  Have  we  a  general  who 
would  fight  for  his  own  personal  benefit,  when  he 
would  not  for  honor  and  country?  He  would  come 
by  his  commission  basely  in  that  case,  and  deserve 
to  be  despised  by  men  of  honor." 

A  month  or  two  later  Halleck  again  roused  Rose- 
crans by  intimating  to  him  that  he  was  using  the 
telegraph  too  freely  for  the  report  of  insignificant 
events.  This  drew  from  Rosecrans  a  fierce  re- 
joinder in  which  he  said  that  he  regarded  the  in- 
sinuation of  Halleck  as  "a  profound,  grievous,  cruel, 
and  ungenerous  official  and  personal  wrong.  If 
there  is  any  one  thing  I  despise  and  scorn,  it  is  an 
officer's  blowing  his  own  trumpet  or  getting  others 
to  do  it  for  him.  I  had  flattered  myself  that  no 
general  officer  in  the  service  had  a  cleaner  record 
on  this  point  than  I  have.  I  shall  here  drop  the 
subject,  leaving  to  time  and  Providence  the  vin- 
dication of  my  conduct,  and  expect  justice,  kind- 
ness, and  consideration  only  from  those  who  are 
willing  to  accord  them."  Rosecrans  was  noted  for 
his  irascibility;  but  making  due  allowance  for  that, 
Halleck's  dealing  with  him  was  irritating  in  the  ex- 
treme.    Thus  did  Halleck,  unable  to  help  his  gen- 

[198] 


LINCOLN  AND  HALLECK 

erals  or  plan  for  them,  splendidly  succeed  in  pro- 
voking them  to  wrath. 

Gideon  Welles  in  his  diary  refers  contemptuously 
to  the  report  that  Halleck  was  engaged  in  some 
literary  work.  Colonel  Lyman  in  his  Meade's  Head- 
quarters, 1863- 1865,  throws  more  light  on  this  literary 
enterprise  of  Halleck,  and  does  so  by  quoting  the 
picturesque  language  of  Benjamin  Butler.  When 
Butler  was  in  command  on  the  James,  Halleck  had 
sent  him  an  aide  without  consulting  him.  When 
the  aide  made  his  appearance  at  Butler's  head- 
quarters Butler  said  to  him,  "Aide-de-camp,  sir! 
Ordered  on  my  Staff,  sir!  I'm  sure  I  do  not  know 
what  you  are  to  do.  I  have  really  nothing  for  you. 
All  the  positions  are  filled.  Now  there  is  General 
Halleck,  what  has  he  to  do?  At  a  moment  when 
every  true  man  is  laboring  to  his  utmost,  when  the 
days  ought  to  be  forty  hours  long,  General  Halleck 
is  translating  French  books  at  nine  cents  a  page; 
and,  sir,  if  you  should  put  those  nine  cents  in  a 
box  and  shake  them  up,  you  would  form  a  clear 
idea  of  General  Halleck's  soul!" 

During  the  period  of  Meade's  command  of  the 
army  Halleck  did  little  more  than  transmit  the  re- 
quests or  orders  of  Lincoln.  Had  he  been  a  real 
commander-in-chief,  he  would  have  issued  peremp- 
tory orders,  or  gone  himself  in  person  to  the  front 
and  seen  that  Meade  attacked  Lee  before  he  with- 
drew across  the  Potomac  after  Gettysburg.  But 
as  it  was  he  sent  only  polite  requests  to  Meade  to 
move  against  Lee.  Grant,  who  had  so  unfortunate 
an  experience  with  Halleck  when  he  was  under  his 
command  in  the  west,  has  nothing  but  praise  for 

[199] 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

Halleck's  loyal  support  of  him  during  the  Vicks- 
burg  campaign.  It  was  Halleck  who  solved  the 
difficult  problem  of  Grant  in  relationship  to  McCler- 
nand  and  the  quasi-independent  command  which 
Lincoln  had  unadvisedly  allowed  him  in  the  cam- 
paign against  Vicksburg,  by  giving  Grant  full  au- 
thority to  take  command  of  the  operations  in  the 
field  and  to  relieve  McClernand  whenever  he 
thought  it  for  the  good  of  the  cause.  When  Grant 
came  to  Washington  as  supreme  commander  Hal- 
leck was  made  chief-of-staff,  the  post  that  he  had 
really  been  filling  all  the  time  he  had  been  at  Wash- 
ington. With  Grant  at  the  head  of  affairs,  Hal- 
leck's  importance  was  now  quite  secondary.  When 
Early  made  his  famous  threat  against  Washington, 
and  property  was  destroyed  near  Baltimore  and 
Washington,  the  Postmaster-General,  Blair,  whose 
place  in  the  suburbs  of  Washington  had  been  de- 
stroyed by  Early's  soldiers,  made  slurring  remarks 
about  the  incapacity  and  cowardice  of  the  defend- 
ers of  the  city.  These  sarcastic  flings  of  Blair  so 
stung  and  outraged  Halleck  that  he  wrote  to  the 
Secretary  of  War  a  letter  in  which  he  wished  to 
know  "whether  such  wholesale  denouncement  and 
accusation  by  a  member  of  the  Cabinet  receives  the 
sanction  and  approbation  of  the  President  of  the 
United  States?  If  so,  the  names  of  the  officers 
accused  should  be  stricken  from  the  rolls  of  the 
army;  if  not,  it  is  due  to  the  honor  of  the  accused 
that  the  slanderer  should  be  dismissed  from  the 
Cabinet. "  Stanton  forwarded  the  letter  to  the 
President  who  at  once  answered  him  as  follows: 

[200] 


LINCOLN  AND  HALLECK 

Sir:  Your  note  of  today  inclosing  General  Hal- 
leck's-  letter  of  yesterday  relative  to  offensive  remarks 
supposed  to  have  made  made  by  the  Postmaster-Gen- 
eral concerning  the  military  officers  on  duty  about 
Washington  is  received.  The  general's  letter  in  sub- 
stance demands  of  me  that  if  I  approve  the  remarks 
I  shall  strike  the  names  of  those  officers  from  the 
rolls ;  and  that  if  I  do  not  approve  them  the  Postmas- 
ter-General shall  be  dismissed  from  the  Cabinet. 
Whether  the  remarks  were  really  made  I  do  not  know, 
nor  do  I  suppose  such  knowledge  necessary  to  a  cor- 
rect response.  If  they  were  made,  I  do  not  approve 
them ;  and  yet,  under  the  circumstances,  I  would  not 
dismiss  a  member  of  the  Cabinet  therefor.  I  do  not 
consider  what  may  have  been  hastily  said  in  a  moment 
of  vexation  at  so  severe  a  loss  is  sufficient  ground  for 
so  grave  a  step.  Besides  this,  the  truth  is  generally  the 
best  vindication  against  slander.  I  propose  con- 
tinuing to  be  myself  the  judge  as  to  when  a  member 
of  the  Cabinet  shall  be  dismissed. 

On  the  same  day  the  President  read  to  the 
Cabinet  when  it  convened  this  bit  of  advice:  "I 
must  myself  be  the  judge  how  long  to  retain  in  and 
when  to  remove  any  of  you  from  this  position.  It 
would  greatly  pain  me  to  discover  any  of  you  en- 
deavoring to  procure  another's  removal,  or  in  any 
way  to  prejudice  him  before  the  public.  Such  en- 
deavor would  be  a  wrong  to  me,  and,  much  worse, 
a  wrong  to  the  country.  My  wish  is  that  on  this 
subject  no  remark  be  made  nor  question  asked  by 
any  of  you,  here  or  elsewhere,  now  or  hereafter." 

This  lecture  to  the  Cabinet  was  anent  the  strong 
opposition  which  had  arisen  in  the  country  against 
the  Postmaster-General,  Montgomery  Blair,  Hal- 
leck's  complaint  being  only  one  of  a  great  number. 

[201] 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

In  September  Lincoln  asked  for  the  resignation  of 
the  troublesome,  but  patriotic  and  loyal,  Post- 
master-General. Blair  resigned  without  a  quarrel, 
and  worked  ardently  for  the  re-election  of  Lincoln. 
When  Lincoln  was  laid  low  by  the  assassin's  bul- 
let Halleck  was  one  of  the  group  who  stood  about 
his  bed  in  the  10th  Street  house  as  the  President 
breathed  his  last,  and  heard  Stanton  exclaim,  "Now 
he  belongs  to  the  ages !"  The  strange  thing  is  not 
that  Lincoln  should  have  chosen  Halleck  for  com- 
mander-in-chief in  the  summer  of  1862,  for  many 
of  the  best  military  minds  and  the  sentiment  of  the 
people  at  large  approved  the  choice.  The  strange 
thing  is  that  after  his  incapacity  had  been  so  strik- 
ingly demonstrated  Lincoln  should  have  kept  him 
in  command  and  constantly  deferred  to  his  judg- 
ment. Originating  nothing,  taking  no  responsibil- 
ity in  times  of  danger  or  crisis,  letting  the  burden 
rest  on  the  shoulders  of  other  men,  afraid  to  majce 
use  of  the  powerful  weapon  that  Lincoln  had  placed 
in  his  hands  when  he  made  him  the  supreme  com- 
mander of  the  armies  of  the  Union,  Halleck  is  a 
contemptible,  almost  ridiculous  figure.  One  would 
laugh  at  him,  were  it  not  for  the  fact  that  his  in- 
competence was  one  of  the  chief  factors  in  the  re- 
peated and  tragic  reverses  which  befell  the  Union 
armies.  Selected  by  Lincoln  and  kept  in  power  by 
Lincoln,  Halleck  did  more  injury  to  the  cause  of 
the  North  than  any  other  man.  "Good  for  noth- 
ing,'' as  Chase  put  it,  "and  everybody  knew  it  but 
Lincoln." 


[202] 


LINCOLN  AND  GRANT 

On  a  warm  June  day  in  1861,  a  modest  looking 
man  of  about  forty  years  of  age  made  his  way  out 
from  Springfield,  Illinois,  to  the  fair  grounds,  where 
a  number  of  volunteer  regiments  from  that  state 
were  being  drilled.  He  had  neither  sword  nor  uni- 
form, the  stick  in  his  hand  and  the  red  bandana 
about  his  coat  being  the  only  signs  of  authority. 
The  regiment  to  which  he  had  been  assigned,  the 
21st  Illinois  volunteers,  was  composed  of  turbulent, 
insubordinate  troops,  who  had  already  driven  their 
colonel  away  from  the  camp.  Before  this  stranger 
took  over  the  command  of  the  regiment,  John  A. 
Logan,  representing  Governor  Yates,  and  a  famous 
political  speaker,  made  the  soldiers  an  oration.  At 
the  close  of  the  speech  the  men  began  to  shout  for 
Grant  to  address  them.  He  did  so,  but  with  char- 
acteristic brevity,  saying,  "Go  to  your  quarters!" 
The  unruly  regiment  had  found  its  master.  But  no 
one  on  that  day  could  have  predicted  that  within 
less  than  a  year  this  unheard-of  and  discredited 
captain  from  the  old  army  would  be  one  of  the  chief 
figures  of  the  war,  the  most  successful  general  of 
the  west,  and  that  in  less  than  three  years  Lincoln 
would  call  him  to  Washington  to  command  all  the 
armies  of  the  nation.  Fremont,  McClellan,  Mc- 
Dowell, and  other  well-known  officers  were  already 
major-generals.  But  the  man  upon  whom  Lincoln 
would  at  length  rely  to  put  down  the  rebellion  was 

[203] 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

this  travel-stained  captain  with  the  red  handker- 
chief about  his  waist,  a  stick  in  his  hand. 

Grant  was  made  a  brigadier-general  soon  after 
he  entered  the  service  of  the  nation,  but  Lincoln 
probably  knew  little  or  nothing  about  him  until 
after  the  capture  of  Forts  Henry  and  Donelson,  in 
February,  1862.  Donelson  gave  Grant  his  chance 
and  he  made  the  most  of  it.  The  victory  which  he 
won  there  was  the  first  ray  of  light  that  Lincoln 
had  seen,  and  the  whole  nation  rejoiced  in  the 
triumph.  Grant's  terms  to  Buckner  had  been  "Un- 
conditional Surrender,"  and  playing  with  Grant's 
initials,  the  country  fondly  referred  to  him  as 
"Unconditional  Surrender"  Grant. 

But  even  as  he  tasted  victory  and  popular, 
esteem  the  cup  of  bitterness  was  not  far  from 
Grant's  lips.  His  first  difficulty  arose  with  the 
irritable  and  fault-finding  Halleck,  then  in  com- 
mand in  the  Mississippi  Valley.  Halleck,  displeased 
at  Grant's  meagre  reports  of  what  he  was  doing, 
and  at  some  independent  moves  he  had  made  in 
following  up  the  Confederate  army,  had  complained 
to  McClellan  at  Washington  that  Grant  would  not 
answer  his  messages.  McClellan  then  wired  that 
Grant  be  relieved  from  duty  and  the  charges 
against  him  investigated.  He  also  authorized  Hal- 
leck to  put  Grant  under  arrest.  Halleck  directed 
him  to  turn  over  the  command  of  the  expedition 
up  the  Tennessee  River  to  General  C.  F.  Smith  and 
remain  himself  at  Fort  Henry.  Grant  did  so,  and 
immediately  asked  to  be  relieved.  Fortunately 
Halleck,  when  all  the  facts  were  known,  saw  that 
he  had  no  cause  to  complain  of  Grant's  course, 

[204] 


ULYSSES  S.  GRANT 


LINCOLN  AND  GRANT 

and  restored  him  to  the  command.  "Thus,"  writes 
Grant,  "in  less  than  two  weeks  after  the  victory 
at  Donelson,  the  two  leading  generals  in  the  army- 
were  in  correspondence  as  to  what  disposition 
should  be  made  of  me,  and  in  less  than  three  weeks 
I  was  virtually  in  arrest  and  without  a  command." 
But  Grant's  difficulties  with  his  superiors  after 
Donelson  were  only  a  prelude  to  the  storm  of 
popular  execration  that  broke  over  his  head  after 
the  Battle  of  Shiloh. 

Shiloh  was  the  first  great  battle  of  the  war,  and 
it  was  not  until  then  that  the  country  began  to 
realize  what  a  grim  and  bloody  business  war  is. 
But  the  people  were  not  prepared  for  the  casualties 
that  began  to  come  in  after  the  battle.  The  sober 
verdict  of  history  is  that  although  at  Shiloh  Grant 
displayed  in  a  magnificent  manner  those  qualities 
of  calmness  and  doggedness  and  holding  on  with 
full  confidence  of  victory,  which  were  to  serve  the 
nation  so  well  in  many  a  future  campaign,  his  posi- 
tioning of  his  army  was  faulty  in  the  extreme,  and 
it  was  the  fine  fighting  spirit  of  the  soldiers  which 
saved  the  army  on  the  first  day's  battle  rather  than 
anything  done  or  ordered  by  Grant  or  the  other 
generals  on  the  field.  The  battle  ended  with  a 
most  important  victory  for  the  North.  But  the 
thunder  of  the  cannon  in  the  great  fight  in  the 
solitudes  of  Shiloh  had  hardly  died  away  before  reports 
began  to  flow  into  Washington  about  Grant's  mis- 
management and  incapacity.  There  were  ugly 
rumors,  too,  of  his  drinking  to  excess.  An  echo 
of  those  rumors  is  heard  in  the  telegram  which 
Stanton  sent  to  Halleck  after  the  Battle  of  Shiloh, 

[205] 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

asking  about  the  battle  and  saying  the  President 
was  anxious  to  know  if  the  heavy  losses  were  due 
in  any  v/ay  to  Grant's  mismanagement  or  incapac- 
ity. General  Halleck,  in  command  of  the  depart- 
ment, joined  the  army  on  the  march  towards 
Corinth,  and  Grant  was  made  second  in  command, 
a  position  where  he  had  rank  but  no  authority.  The 
situation  was  intolerable  to  him  and  he  asked  to  be 
relieved  from  duty.  General  Sherman,  who  also  was 
an  object  of  the  popular  anger  about  Shiloh,  relates 
in  his  letters  the  clamor  against  Grant  and  how  it 
nearly  resulted  in  the  country  losing  his  services: 
"He  (Grant)  is  as  brave  as  any  man  should  be,  he 
has  won  several  victories  such  as  Donelson  which 
ought  to  entitle  him  to  universal  praise,  but  his 
rivals  have  almost  succeeded  through  the  instru- 
mentality of  the  press  in  pulling  him  down,  and 
many  thousands  of  families  will  be  taught  to  look 
to  him  as  the  cause  of  the  death  of  their  fathers, 
husbands,  and  brothers.  Grant  had  made  up  his 
mind  to  go  home.  I  tried  to  dissuade  him,  but  so 
fixed  was  he  in  his  purpose  that  I  thought  his  mind 
was  made  up  and  asked  for  his  escort  a  company 
of  the  4th  Illinois.  But  last  night  I  got  a  note  from 
him  saying  he  would  stay.  He  is  not  a  brilliant 
man,  but  he  is  a  good  and  brave  soldier,  tried  for 
years;  is  sober,  very  industrious,  and  as  kind  as  a 
child.  Yet  he  has  been  held  up  as  a  criminal,  a 
drunkard,  tyrant  and  everything  horrible. " 

In  his  memoirs  Sherman  adds  a  little  more  to  the 
interesting  story  of  how  he  helped  to  save  Grant 
for  the  army.  Upon  going  to  visit  him  at  his  head- 
quarters he  found  him  all  packed  and  ready  to  start 

[206] 


LINCOLN  AND  GRANT 

in  the  morning.  Grant  told  him  that  he  felt  he 
was  in  the  way  and  could  stand  it  no  longer. 
Sherman  begged  him  to  stay,  illustrating  his  argu- 
ment by  his  own  experience,  how  he  had  been  de- 
clared crazy  by  the  press  of  the  country  and  was 
ready  to  quit  and  resign,  but  a  single  battle  had 
given  him  new  life.  He  told  Grant  that  if  he  went 
away  events  would  go  right  along  but  he  would 
be  left  out;  whereas  if  he  remained,  some  happy 
accident  might  restore  him  to  favor  and  his  true 
place.  Grant  then  promised  to  wait  for  a  little,  and 
said  he  would  not  leave  without  first  communicat- 
ing with  Sherman.  Grant  remained  with  the  army 
and  in  a  short  time  the  "happy  acident,"  the  ap- 
pointment of  Halleck  as  commander-in-chief  iat 
Washington,  left  Grant  in  command  of  the  army. 
We  know  now  that  a  more  powerful  factor  than 
Sherman's  intercession  or  Grant's  own  patience 
under  abuse  was  at  work,  saving  him  for  the  army 
and  the  cause.  That  factor  was  Lincoln's  sagacity 
and  his  faith  in  Grant.  The  storm  of  popular  denun- 
ciation threatened  for  a  time  to  sweep  Grant  out 
of  his  command,  whether  he  wished  to  stay  with 
the  army  or  not.  He  was  bitterly  assailed  for 
being  absent  from  his  command  when  the  first 
day's  battle  at  Shiloh  started,  and  it  was  openly 
said  that  only  the  gallantry  of  the  troops  and  the 
timely  arrival  of  Buell  with  the  Army  of  the  Ohio 
upon  the  scene  of  conflict  saved  the  day  for  the 
Federal  army.  The  Grant  who  after  Donelson  had 
been  hailed  as  the  Man  of  Destiny,  was  now  de- 
nounced as  an  incompetent  winebibber.  About 
the  only  man  in  Congress  who  espoused  the  cause 

[207] 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

of  Grant  was  his  firm  friend,  Elihu  Washburne, 
from  Illinois.  The  strength  of  the  popular  demand 
for  Grant's  removal  may  be  judged  from  the  fact 
that  Colonel  Alexander  McClure,  who  had  no  per- 
sonal feelings  against  him  and  was  not  sure  that 
he  was  unfit  for  the  command  in  the  west,  was  yet 
convinced  that  the  administration  dare  not  retain 
him  in  face  of  the  strong  adverse  sentiment  in  the 
nation.  In  his  concern  McClure  went  to  Washing- 
ton and  had  a  midnight  conference  with  Lincoln  in 
which  he  urged  the  President  to  remove  Grant  for 
the  good  of  the  cause.  He  pressed  upon  the  care- 
worn President  the  immediate  removal  of  Grant  as 
"an  imperious  necessity  to  sustain  himself."  Lin- 
coln listened  in  silence,  his  feet  resting  on  the  top 
of  the  marble  mantel.  None  understood  better 
than  Lincoln  the  importance  of  the  popular  senti- 
ment in  a  democracy  at  war.  When  McClure  had 
finished  his  appeal,  Lincoln  gathered  himself  up  in 
his  chair  and  said  in  a  tone  of  great  earnestness, 
"I  can't  spare  this  man;  he  fights!"  It  was  Lin- 
coln who  saved  Grant  for  the  army  and  for  the 
great  career  which  now  rapidly  opened  before  him. 
The  most  influential  Democrat  in  Illinois  was 
John  A.  McClernand.  When  war  came  McCler- 
nand,  like  Douglas,  lost  no  time  in  letting  his  loy- 
alty to  the  Union  be  known.  Lincoln  was  ever 
ready  to  recognize  and  honor  Democrats  of  this 
kind  and  McClernand  was  rapidly  advanced  in  rank 
until  he  was  a  major-general.  He  was  patriotic, 
brave,  dashing,  but  without  capacity  as  a  general. 
After  Shiloh  he  had  visited  Washington  and 
secured  from  Lincoln  permission  to  raise  a  corps  of 

[208] 


LINCOLN  AND  GRANT 

troops  in  the  middle  west  for  the  purpose  of  open- 
ing up  the  Mississippi,  with  the  understanding  that 
he  was  to  have  the  command  of  the  expedition. 
Before  he  could  bring  his  troops  to  the  front  Grant 
had  sent  Sherman  against  Vicksburg  in  the  unsuc- 
cessful assault  at  the  bluffs  of  the  Yazoo  River. 
There  McClernand  joined  him  with  his  own 
corps  and  assumed  command  of  the  expedition. 
But  Grant  was  determined  that  McClernand,  in 
whose  ability  as  a  general  neither  he  nor  the  other 
high  officers  had  any  confidence,  should  not  lead 
the  move  against  Vicksburg.  The  matter  was 
solved  by  Grant  himself  going  to  the  front  and 
taking  command  of  the  army  in  the  field.  This 
was  a  mortal  offense  to  McClernand,  who  felt  that 
Grant  was  depriving  him  of  the  post  that  had  been 
specially  created  for  him  by  Lincoln.  From  the 
very  opening  of  the  Vicksburg  campaign  until  near 
its  successful  close  McClernand's  conduct  was  try- 
ing in  the  extreme  to  Grant.  But  he  did  not  dis- 
miss him  from  the  army  until  there  appeared  in  the 
newspapers  a  congratulatory  order  of  McClernand 
to  the  men  of  his  corps  claiming  all  the  credit  for 
the  recent  success  of  the  Federal  army.  This  was 
too  much  for  Grant  and  he  immediately  relieved 
him.  When  General  James  H.  Wilson  read  him 
Grant's  order  relieving  him,  McClernand  looked 
up  and  exclaimed,  "Well,  sir,  I  am  relieved!"  Then 
after  a  pause,  "By  G — ,  sir,  we  are  both  relieved !" 
What  he  probably  meant  was  that  his  passing  from 
the  army  would  mean  the  passing  of  Grant,  too. 
But  if  that  was  his  purpose  he  was  unable  to  make 
good  the  threat.     He  very  soon,  however,  had  his 

[209] 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

influential  friends  at  work  in  his  behalf  and  they 
addressed  a  letter  to  Lincoln  in  August  asking  that 
McClernand  be  restored  to  the  command  of  his 
corps  or  that  he  be  given  an  independent  command. 
Lincoln  was  manifestly  embarrassed,  for  he  un- 
doubtedly had  given  McClernand  to  understand 
that  he  was  to  lead  the  troops  in  the  expedition 
down  the  Mississippi.  At  the  same  time  he  was 
more  than  pleased  with  the  great  achievement  of 
Grant  and  would  do  nothing  to  hamper  or  annoy 
him.  This  feeling  of  embarrassment  comes  out  in 
the  letter  Lincoln  wrote  to  McClernand  in  response 
to  the  appeal  of  his  friends.  In  this  letter  Lincoln 
writes:  "I  doubt  whether  your  present  position  is 
more  painful  to  you  than  to  myself.  Grateful  for 
the  patriotic  stand  so  early  taken  by  you  in  this 
life-and-death  struggle  of  the  nation,  I  have  done 
whatever  has  appeared  practicable  to  advance  you 
and  the  public  interest  together.  No  charges,  with 
a  view  to  a  trial,  have  been  preferred  against  you 
by  anyone ;  nor  do  I  suppose  any  will  be.  All  there 
is,  so  far  as  I  have  heard,  is  General  Grants  state- 
ment of  his  reasons  for  relieving  you.  And  even 
this  I  have  not  seen  or  sought  to  see;  because  it  is 
a  case,  as  appears  to  me,  in  which  I  could  do  noth- 
ing without  doing  harm.  General  Grant  and  your- 
self have  been  conspicuous  in  our  most  important 
successes ;  and  for  me  to  interfere  and  thus  magnify 
a  breach  between  you  could  not  but  be  of  evil  ef- 
fect. For  me  to  force  you  back  upon  General  Grant 
would  be  forcing  him  to  resign.  I  cannot  give  you 
a  new  command  because  we  have  no  forces  except 
such  as  already  have  commanders.    I  am  constantly 

[210] 


LINCOLN  AND  GRANT 

pressed  by  those  who  scold  before  they  think,  or 
without  thinking  at  all,  to  give  commands  respec- 
tively to  Fremont,  McClellan,  Butler,  Sigel,  Curtis, 
Hunter,  Hooker,  and  perhaps  others,  when,  all  else 
out  of  the  way,  I  have  no  commands  to  give  them. 
This  is  now  your  case;  which,  as  I  have  said,  pains 
me  not  less  than  it  does  you.  My  belief  is  that  the 
permanent  estimate  of  what  a  general  does  in  the 
field  is  fixed  by  the  'cloud  of  witnesses'  who  have 
been  with  him  in  the  field  and  that,  relying  on 
these,  he  who  has  the  right  needs  not  to  fear." 

During  the  long  Vicksburg  campaign  the  popular 
discontent  with  Grant  began  to  break  out  once 
more.  The  old  stories  about  his  drinking  were  re- 
vived and  a  clamor  arose  for  his  removal.  Grant 
refers  to  this  in  his  Memoirs  where  he  says:  "Because 
I  would  not  divulge  my  ultimate  plans  to  visitors 
they  pronounced  me  idle,  incompetent,  and  unfit 
to  command  men  in  an  emergency,  and  clamored 
for  my  removal.  I  took  no  steps  to  answer  these 
complaints,  but  continued  to  do  my  duty,  as  I  un- 
derstood it,  to  the  best  of  my  ability."  In  order 
to  keep  in  close  touch  with  the  army  about  Vicks- 
burg, Stanton  resorted  to  the  rather  unusual  pro- 
cedure of  sending  down  Charles  A.  Dana  to  stay  at 
headquarters  and  send  frequent  reports  on  the  com- 
mander, his  generals,  and  the  condition  of  the  army. 
Grant  found  in  Dana  a  loyal  friend  and  the  reports 
which  he  sent  back  to  Washington  confirmed  the 
faith  which  the  administration  had  reposed  in  him. 

When  the  great  news  came  of  the  fall  of  Vicks- 
burg, Lincoln  sent  Grant  a  fine  congratulatory  let- 
ter in  which  he  said: 

[211] 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

My  dear  General:  I  do  not  remember  that  you 
and  I  ever  met  personally.  I  write  this  now  as  a 
grateful  acknowledgment  for  the  almost  inestimable 
service  you  have  done  your  country.  I  wish  to  say  a 
word  further.  When  you  first  reached  the  vicinity  of 
Vicksburg,  I  thought  you  should  do  what  you  finally 
did — march  the  troops  across  the  neck,  run  the  bat- 
teries with  the  transports,  and  thus  go  below;  and  I 
never  had  any  faith  except  a  general  hope  that  you 
knew  better  than  I  that  the  Yazoo  Pass  expedition  and 
the  like  could  succeed.  When  you  got  below  and  took 
Port  Gibson,  Grand  Gulf  and  vicinity,  I  thought  you 
should  go  down  the  river  and  join  General  Banks, 
and  when  you  turned  northward,  east  of  the  Big 
Black,  I  feared  it  was  a  mistake.  I  now  wish  to  make 
the  personal  acknowledgment  that  you  were  right  and 
I  was  wrong. 

Almost  a  month  later,  August  9th,  at  the  end  of 
a  letter  to  Grant,  Lincoln  says,  "Did  you  receive  a 
short  letter  from  me  dated  the  thirteenth  of  July?" 
This  was  a  reference  to  the  letter  of  congratula- 
tion after  Vicksburg,  and  reveals  the  fact  that  for 
a  month  at  least  Lincoln's  fine  letter  had  gone  un- 
answered. But  this  did  not  provoke  Lincoln  so 
long  as  Grant  turned  in  victories.  In  a  letter  to 
Burnside  written  about  the  same  time,  and  in  ref- 
erence to  Grant  having  promised  to  send  Burnside 
at  Cincinnati  the  9th  Corps,  Lincoln  alludes  to 
Grant's  slowness  as  a  correspondent  and  says, 
"General  Grant  is  a  copious  worker  and  fighter, 
but  a  very  meagre  writer  or  telegrapher."  In 
Lincoln's  letters  to  Grant  after  Vicksburg,  and  they 
had  almost  no  correspondence  before  that,  there  is 
always  the  recognition  of  Grant  as  a  successful 
commander,  and  a  tone  of  deference  to  his  wishes 

[  212  ] 


LINCOLN  AND  GRANT 

and  plans.  The  fatherly,  guardianlike  way  in  which 
Lincoln  had  been  accustomed  to  write  to  his  gen- 
erals, urging  them  to  do  this  or  that,  or  to  avoid 
this  or  that  peril,  is  abandoned,  and  Lincoln  writes 
to  Grant  as  the  man  who  knows  how  to  organize 
victory.  From  Vicksburg  clear  down  to  the  fall  of 
the  curtain  at  Appomattox,  "God  bless  you!"  is  the 
frequent  expression  of  Lincoln's  communications 
to  Grant. 

There  was  considerable  criticism  of  Grant's 
course  in  paroling  the  prisoners  taken  at  Vicks- 
burg, it  being  feared  that  many  of  them  would  find 
their  way  back  into  the  ranks  of  the  Confederate 
armies.  This  undoubtedly  happened.  But  as  an 
effective  force  Pemberton's  army  was  destroyed. 
In  defending  the  course  of  Grant  Lincoln  reverted 
to  one  of  his  favorite  anecdotes,  that  of  Sykes  and 
his  yellow  dog.  "Sykes  had  a  yellow  dog  he  set 
great  store  by,  but  there  were  a  lot  of  small  boys 
around  the  village,  and  that's  always  a  bad  thing 
for  dogs,  you  know.  These  boys  didn't  share 
Sykes'  views.  Even  Sykes  had  to  admit  that  the 
dog  was  getting  unpopular;  in  fact,  it  was  soon 
seen  that  a  prejudice  was  growing  up  against  that 
dog  that  threatened  to  wreck  all  his  future  pros- 
pects in  life.  The  boys  after  meditating  how  they 
could  get  the  best  of  him,  finally  fixed  up  a  cart- 
ridge with  a  long  fuse,  put  the  cartridge  in  a  piece 
of  meat,  dropped  the  meat  in  the  road  in  front  of 
Sykes'  door  and  then  whistled  for  the  dog.  When 
the  dog  came  out  he  scented  the  bait,  and  bolted 
the  meat,  cartridge  and  all.  The  boys  touched  off 
the  fuse  with  a  cigar,  and  in  about  a  second  a  re- 

[213] 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

port  came  from  that  dog  that  sounded  like  a  clap 
of  thunder.  Sykes  came  bouncing  out  of  the  house 
and  yelled,  'What's  up?  Anything  busted?'  There 
was  no  reply  except  a  snicker  from  the  small  boys 
roosting  on  the  fence ;  but  as  Sykes  looked  up  he 
saw  the  whole  air  filled  with  pieces  of  yellow  dog. 
He  picked  up  the  biggest  piece  he  could  find,  a 
portion  of  the  back  with  a  part  of  the  tail  still 
hanging  to  it,  and  after  turning  it  round  and  look- 
ing it  all  over,  he  said,  'Well,  I  guess  he'll  never 
be  much  account  again — as  a  dog.'  And  I  guess 
Pemberton's  forces  will  never  be  much  account 
again — as  an  army."  Lincoln  related  this  story  to 
Grant  in  their  first  private  interview  at  Wash- 
ington. 

So  far  as  their  correspondence  shows,  the  only 
time  Lincoln  and  Grant  came  into  collision  with 
one  another  was  in  January,  1863,  when  Grant,  an- 
noyed by  Jewish  peddlers  in  the  army,  issued  an 
order  expelling  from  his  department  all  Jews. 
This  order  was  immediately  revoked  by  Lincoln. 

Grant's  success  at  Vicksburg,  followed  by  the 
brilliant  victories  about  Chattanooga,  in  November, 
1863,  made  him  the  pre-eminent  military  figure  of 
the  war.  Congress  recognized  this  leadership  by 
restoring  the  grade  of  lieutenant-general.  Lincoln 
then  sent  in  Grant's  name  to  the  Senate  and  he  was 
confirmed  the  second  day  of  March,  1864.  On  the 
8th  day  of  March,  1864,  a  brown-bearded  man  of 
forty-two,  accompanied  by  a  lad  of  fifteen,  stepped 
up  to  the  desk  at  the  Willard  Hotel  in  Washington 
and  wrote  on  the  register,  "U.  S.  Grant  and  son, 
Galena,  111."     That  same  night  Grant  went  to  the 

[214] 


LINCOLN  AND  GRANT 

reception  at  the  White  House,  where  he  was  im- 
mediately the  center  of  all  eyes.  In  order  that  he 
might  be  seen  by  the  guests  and  acknowledge  their 
cheers,  Grant  somewhat  awkwardly  mounted  a 
sofa,  In  the  private  interview  which  followed  Lin- 
coln related  to  him  the  Sykes  "dog  story,"  and  with 
this  characteristic  introduction  began  to  talk  about 
the  plans  for  the  future.  The  President,  knowing 
his  diffidence  as  a  speaker,  gave  him  a  copy  of  the 
remarks  he  would  make  when  he  handed  him  his 
commission  on  the  following  day,  and  suggested 
to  Grant  that  in  his  speech  of  acceptance  he  might 
say  something  which  would  tend  to  obviate  any 
jealousy  towards  him  on  the  part  of  the  other 
generals  of  the*  army  and  also  a  word  or  two  which 
would  put  him  on  as  good  terms  as  possible  with 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac. 

The  next  day  the  commission  was  formally  pre- 
sented to  Grant  by  Lincoln,  who  said,  "General 
Grant,  the  nation's  appreciation  of  what  you  have 
done,  and  its  reliance  upon  you  for  what  remains 
to  be  done  in  the  existing  great  struggle,  are  now 
presented,  with  this  commission  constituting  you 
lieutenant-general  in  the  Army  of  the  United 
States.  With  this  high  honor  devolves  upon  you, 
also,  a  corresponding  responsibility.  As  the  coun- 
try herein  trusts  you,  so,  under  God,  it  will  sustain 
you.  I  scarcely  need  to  add  that,  with  what  I  here 
speak  for  the  nation,  goes  my  own  hearty  personal 
concurrence." 

To  this  Grant  responded  as  follows:  "Mr.  Presi- 
dent, I  accept  the  commission,  with  gratitude  for 
the  high  honor  conferred.     With  the  aid  of  the 

[215] 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

noble  armies  that  have  fought  in  so  many  fields 
for  our  common  country,  it  will  be  my  earnest 
endeavor  not  to  disappoint  your  expectations.  I 
feel  the  full  weight  of  the  responsibilities  now  de- 
volving on  me ;  and  I  know  that  if  they  are  met,  it 
will  be  due  to  these  armies,  and  above  all,  to  the 
favor  of  that  Providence  which  leads  both  nations 
and  men."  The  reader  will  note  that  Grant  in  his 
speech  of  acceptance  made  no  reference  to  the  two 
matters  the  President  had  asked  him  to  introduce. 
At  a  subsequent  interview  Lincoln  told  Grant 
that  he  had  "never  professed  to  be  a  military  man, 
or  to  know  how  campaigns  should  be  conducted, 
and  never  wanted  to  interfere  in  them:  but  pro- 
crastination on  the  part  of  the  commanders,  and 
the  pressure  from  the  people  of  the  North  and 
Congress,  which  was  always  with  him,  forced  him 
into  issuing  his  series  of  military  orders,  one,  two, 
three,  etc.  He  did  not  know  but  that  they  were 
all  wrong,  and  he  did  know  that  some  of  them 
were.  All  he  wanted  or  had  ever  wanted  was  some- 
one who  would  take  the  responsibility  and  act,  and 
call  on  him  for  all  the  assistance  needed,  pledging 
himself  to  use  all  the  power  of  the  government  in 
rendering  such  assistance."  But  Lincoln  always 
had  some  plan  in  mind  for  his  armies  and  pro- 
ceeded to  tell  Grant  what  it  was.  He  produced  a 
map  of  Virginia  and  pointed  out  two  streams  which 
empty  into  the  Potomac,  and  suggested  that  the 
army  might  be  moved  by  boats  and  landed  be- 
tween the  mouths  of  these  streams.  Supplies  could 
be  brought  up  by  the  Potomac  and  the  two  tribu- 
tary  streams   would   serve   to   protect   the   Union 

[216] 


LINCOLN  AND  GRANT 

flanks  when  the  army  moved  out.  Grant  says  that 
he  listened  respectfully,  "but  did  not  suggest  that 
the  same  streams  would  protect  Lee's  flanks  while 
he  was  shutting  us  up." 

Lincoln's  rejected  plan  for  the  new  campaign 
was  probably  the  last  effort  of  the  President  along 
that  line.  Henceforth  the  burden  of  the  military 
responsibility  rested  upon  the  shoulders  of  Grant. 
Lincoln  had  at  length  found  a  man  after  his  own 
heart,  one  who  would  "take  the  responsibility  and 
act."  Both  Halleck  and  Stanton  gratuitously  and 
impertinently  warned  Grant  not  to  divulge  his 
plans  to  Lincoln,  for  he  was  so  kind-hearted  that 
someone  would  be  sure  to  get  it  out  of  him.  Grant 
said  nothing  to  Lincoln  about  his  plans,  neither 
did  he  communicate  them  to  Stanton  or  Halleck. 
On  April  30,  1864,  just  before  the  great  campaign 
of  the  east  and  the  west  opened,  Lincoln  wrote 
Grant  a  sort  of  farewell  letter  in  which  he  ex- 
pressed his  full  confidence,  and  said  he  would  not 
ask  for  the  particulars  of  his  plans,  but  did  say 
that  he  was  "very  anxious  that  any  great  disaster 
or  capture  of  our  men  in  great  numbers  shall  be 
avoided."  At  their  last  interview  before  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac  crossed  the  Rapidan  into  the 
Wilderness,  Grant  explained  to  Lincoln  how  it  was 
necessary  to  have  a  very  large  number  of  troops 
to  guard  and  hold  the  territory  which  had  already 
been  captured  and  prevent  incursions  into  the 
Northern  States,  and  that  these  troops  could  do 
this  work  as  effectively  by  advancing  as  by  re- 
maining still,  for  by  advancing  they  would  compel 
the  enemy  to  keep  detachments  to  hold  them  back. 

[217] 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

This  was  the  idea  back  of  Grant's  plan  of  a  general 
movement  of  the  troops  on  all  fronts.  Lincoln 
replied,  "Oh,  yes!  I  see  that.  As  we  say  out 
West,  if  a  man  can't  skin,  he  must  hold  a  leg  while 
somebody  else  does." 

Then  followed  the  plunge  into  the  Wilderness 
and  the  fearful  fighting  by  day  and  the  weary 
marches  by  night  until  Grant  reached  the  James 
River  and  commenced  where  McClellan  had  left 
off  three  years  before.  During  these  anxious  days 
Lincoln  and  Grant  had  little  communication.  Grant 
was  too  busy  fighting  to  write  and  Lincoln  left 
him  to  his  own  devices.  After  the  ghastly  repulse 
at  Cold  Harbor,  on  the  3rd  of  June,  the  cry  of 
"Grant  the  Butcher!"  went  up  in  the  North,  the 
spirits  of  the  populace  sank,  and  there  were  all  the 
premonitions  of  another  storm  of  popular  wrath 
against  Grant.  But  Lincoln  bowed  his  head  be- 
fore the  blast  and  let  it  blow  over,  confident  that 
Grant  would  take  Richmond  as  he  had  promised  to 
do  when  they  had  first  met.  As  the  two  armies 
struggled  desperately  with  one  another  in  the 
tangles  of  the  Wilderness,  Grant  sat  whittling  and 
smoking  beneath  the  trees,  but  with  the  will  to 
victory  written  in  every  line  of  his  face.  After 
every  battle,  no  matter  what  the  result,  the  order 
was  always  "Advance!" 

After  Grant's  army  had  established  itself  about 
Petersburg,  Lincoln  went  down  to  City  Point  to 
visit  him.  The  President  presented  an  odd  appear- 
ing as,  mounted  on  Grant's  big  bay,  "Cincinnati," 
he  rode  through  the  ranks.  He  wore  a  high  silk 
hat  and  a  frock  coat,  soon  covered  with  dust,  and 

[218] 


LINCOLN  AND  GRANT 

his  trousers  worked  up  far  above  his  shoetops. 
Grant  suggested  that  they  ride  over  to  visit  the 
colored  troops  of  Smith's  corps,  who  had  made 
such  a  gallant  assault  on  the  Petersburg  redans  a 
few  days  before.  Lincoln  expressed  his  delight, 
saying  that  the  gallantry  of  the  colored  troops  had 
vindicated  him  in  his  advocacy  of  raising  colored 
regiments.  A  wild  scene  ensued  as  Lincoln  reached 
the  camp  of  the  negroes.  The  black  men  came 
cheering  and  singing  and  weeping  about  him  and 
greeted  him  as  the  Angel  of  the  Lord.  Comment- 
ing on  the  bravery  of  the  black  troops  Lincoln  said 
to  Grant,  "I  think,  General,  we  can  say  of  the  black 
boys  what  a  country  fellow  said  when  he  went  to  a 
theatre  in  Chicago  and  saw  Forrest  playing  Othello. 
He  was  not  very  well  up  in  Shakespeare,  and  didn't 
know  that  the  tragedian  was  a  white  man  who  had 
blacked  up  for  the  purpose.  After  the  play  was 
over  the  folks  who  had  invited  him  to  go  to  the 
show  wanted  to  know  what  he  thought  of  the 
actors,  and  he  said,  'Waal,  layin'  aside  all  sectional 
prejudices  and  any  partiality  I  may  have  for  the 
race,  derned  ef  I  don't  think  the  nigger  held  his 
own  with  any  on  'em.' " 

In  the  fall  of  1864  the  October  elections  in  Penn- 
sylvania had  gone  against  the  Republican  party. 
There  could  be  no  doubt  about  the  victory  in  the 
national  elections  in  November,  but  there  was  the 
fear  of  a  weakened  prestige  for  the  administration 
if  Pennsylvania  and  New  York  should  go  Demo- 
cratic. McClellan,  native  son,  was  the  Democratic 
candidate,  and  a  vigorous  campaign  was  being  con- 
ducted by  his  managers  in  the  state.    McClure  had 

[219] 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

another  midnight  conference  with  Lincoln  at  the 
White  House.  When  the  subject  of  the  forth- 
coming election  was  introduced  the  President  said, 
"Well,  what's  to  be  done?"  McClure  suggested 
that  as  Grant's  army  was  quiet  before  Petersburg, 
and  Sheridan's  beyond  Winchester,  5,000  Penn- 
sylvania soldiers  be  furloughed  from  each  army  and 
sent  home  so  that  they  might  vote. 

Lincoln's  face  brightened  at  the  suggestion. 
Then  McClure  added,  "Of  course,  you  can  trust 
Grant  to  make  the  suggestion  to  him  to  furlough 
5,000  Pennsylvania  troops  for  two  weeks?"  To  his 
surprise  a  shadow  fell  upon  Lincoln's  face  and  he 
was  silent.  McClure  exclaimed,  "Surely,  Mr. 
President,  you  can  trust  Grant  with  a  confidential 
suggestion  to  furlough  Pennsylvania  troops?" 
Lincoln  still  was  silent,  evidently  distressed.  After 
a  minute  or  two  of  silence,  McClure  said,  "It  can't 
be  possible  that  Grant  is  not  your  friend;  he  can't 
be  such  an  ingrate?"  After  a  little  hesitation  Lin- 
coln answered,  "Well,  McClure,  I  have  no  reason 
to  believe  that  Grant  prefers  my  election  to  that 
of  McClellan."  When  he  recovered  from  his  anger 
and  astonishment,  McClure  told  the  President  that 
Meade  was  a  soldier  and  a  gentleman,  and  that  an 
order  to  him  would  be  sufficient.  Lincoln  an- 
swered, "I  reckon  that  can  be  done." 

McClure,  thus  warned  about  Grant,  said  to  Lin- 
coln, "What  about  Sheridan?"  At  that  the  sad 
face  of  the  President  lightened  up  and  he  ex- 
claimed, "Oh,  Phil  Sheridan;  he's  all  right!"  The 
troops  were  sent  home  and  swelled  the  Republican 
majority  to  14,364. 

[220] 


LINCOLN  AND  GRANT 

When  Grant  was  retiring  from  the  Presidency 
McClure  met  him  at  Drexel's  bank  in  Philadel- 
phia and  sounded  him  out  as  to  his  feelings  towards 
Lincoln  and  McClellan  during  the  election  of  1864. 
Grant  responded  that  it  would  have  been  obviously 
unbecoming  on  his  part  to  have  given  a  public 
expression  against  a  general  whom  he  had  suc- 
ceeded as  commander-in-chief. 

Whatever  may  be  said  today  about  Grant's  atti- 
tude during  the  election,  the  fact  remains  that  one 
of  the  sorrows  and  burdens  of  Lincoln's  heart  was 
that  he  could  not  feel  that  his  chief  general  cared 
greatly  whether  he  was  victorious  or  not  in  the 
contest  with  McClellan.  Truly  he  was  a  man  of 
sorrows  and  acquainted  with  grief.  McClure  thinks 
that  Grant  was  at  fault  in  never  in  any  way  recog- 
nizing the  debt  of  gratitude  which  he  owed  to  Lin- 
coln for  retaining  him  in  command  in  the  west 
when  the  popular  clamor  against  him  was  so 
strong.  The  election  of  1864  gave  him  a  chance  to 
do  this,  but  he  did  not  avail  himself  of  it.  Even 
the  most  scrupulous  will  be  inclined  to  think  that 
Grant  could  have  taken  a  little  more  interest  in 
Lincoln's  re-election  without  in  any  way  com- 
promising his  position  as  commander  of  the  army, 
especially  since  McClellan  had  been  nominated  by 
a  convention  which  had  declared  the  war  a 
"failure".  Grant  had  described  himself  as  "by  no 
means  a  Lincoln  man,"  referring  to  the  political 
campaigns  in  the  west  before  the  war.  On  the 
other  hand,  Lincoln  may  have  mistaken  Grant's 
reticence  for  an  indifference  which  did  not  exist. 

On  March  20,  1865,  Grant  telegraphed  the  Presi- 

[221] 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

dent,  "Can  you  not  visit  City  Point  for  a  day  or 
two?  I  would  like  very  much  to  see  you,  and  I 
think  the  rest  would  do  you  good."  Lincoln  ac- 
cepted the  invitation  and  arrived  on  the  24th,  bring- 
ing with  him  Mrs.  Lincoln  and  their  youngest  boy, 
"Tad";  the  eldest  son,  Robert,  was  now  a  mem- 
ber of  Grant's  staff.  Grant  sensed  the  collapse  of 
Lee's  army,  the  fall  of  Petersburg  and  the  capture 
of  Richmond  and  wanted  Lincoln  to  be  in  at  the 
death.  The  President  was  in  great  good  humor 
and  regaled  the  officers  at  headquarters  with  his 
anecdotes.  It  was  during  this  visit  that  he  had 
the  famous  interview  with  Grant,  Sherman  and 
Porter  on  board  the  River  Queen.  Referring  to  his 
recent  meeting  with  the  Confederate  Commission- 
ers at  Hampton  Roads,  Lincoln  asked  Grant  if  he 
had  noted  the  enormous  overcoat  which  Alexander 
H.  Stephens,  a  very  small  man,  was  wearing.  Grant 
said  that  he  had.  "Well,"  said  Lincoln,  "did  you 
see  him  take  it  off?  Didn't  you  think  it  was  the 
biggest  shuck  and  the  littlest  ear  that  ever  you  did 
see?"  Grant  afterwards  related  this  to  General 
Gordon,  who  in  turn  told  Stephens,  much  to  the 
latter's  delight. 

As  they  sat  one  night  about  the  campfire  Lin- 
coln in  his  anecdotal  method  was  prophesying  that 
England  would  regret  the  stand  she  had  taken  dur- 
ing the  war,  illustrating  his  point  with  the  story  of 
a  western  barber  who,  in  order  to  get  at  the  beard 
of  a  hollow-cheeked  man,  thrust  his  finger  in  the 
man's  mouth  and  pressed  out  the  cheek.  But  in  a 
careless  moment  he  cut  through  the  man's  cheek 
and  into  his  own  finger.    At  the  end  of  this  parable, 

[  222  ] 


LINCOLN  AND  GRANT 

Grant  looked  up  and  said,  "Mr.  President,  did  you 
at  any  time  doubt  the  final  success  of  the  cause?" 
"Never  for  a  moment,"  was  the  reply  of  the  Presi- 
dent as  he  leaned  forward  in  his  camp  chair  and 
raised  his  hand  by  way  of  emphasis. 

When  Petersburg  was  taken  Lincoln  gave  Grant 
an  affectionate  greeting  at  his  headquarters  in  the 
captured  town  and  said  to  him,  "Do  you  know, 
General,  I  had  a  sort  of  sneaking  idea  all  along 
that  you  intended  to  do  something  like  this:  but 
I  thought  sometime  ago  that  you  would  so  maneu- 
ver as  to  have  Sherman  come  up  and  be  near 
enough  to  co-operate  with  you."  Grant  replied 
that  he  had  concluded  it  would  be  better  to  let  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  deliver  the  finishing  blow 
to  Lee's  army,  for  if  the  army  under  Sherman  was 
even  near  the  scene  of  surrender,  the  old  cry  about 
the  superiority  of  the  western  troops  would  be 
raised  and  it  would  be  claimed  that  they  had  won 
the  war. 

After  entering  Richmond  amid  the  tears  and 
cheers  of  the  negroes,  Lincoln  returned  to  Wash- 
ington. There  on  the  fatal  Friday,  April  14th,  Grant 
met  with  Lincoln  and  the  Cabinet.  Grant  ex- 
pressed some  anxiety  as  to  Sherman's  situation,  not 
having  heard  from  him  for  some  time,  but  Lincoln 
then  assured  Grant  that  good  news  would  soon 
come  in,  for  on  the  night  before  he  had  dreamed 
the  dream  which  had  always  preceded  great  events. 
In  a  strange  vessel  he  was  rapidly  approaching  a 
dark  shore.  This  dream  he  had  had  before  An- 
tietam,  Murfreesboro,  Gettysburg,  and  Vicksburg. 
Grant  responded  that  Murfreesboro  was  no  victory 

[223] 


LINCOLN  AND  HIS  GENERALS 

and  had  no  important  results.  But  the  President 
insisted  that  the  dream  was  the  precursor  of  great 
news  from  Sherman,  for  he  knew  of  no  other  im- 
portant event  pending. 

But  another  great  event  was  at  the  door,  and 
that  night  it  would  enter  to  shock  the  world,  al- 
though neither  Lincoln  nor  any  of  his  advisers  was 
conscious  of  its  near  approach.  Lincoln  invited  Gen- 
eral Grant  and  Mrs.  Grant  to  accompany  him  and 
Mrs.  Lincoln  to  the  theatre  that  night.  Grant  said 
they  would  go  if  in  the  city,  but  if  his  other  mat- 
ters could  be  attended  to  he  planned  to  leave 
Washington  that  night  and  go  to  visit  his  children, 
who  were  in  school  at  Burlington,  N.  J.  On  the  way 
to  the  station  that  night  Grant  was  shadowed  by  a 
man  who  had  frightened  Mrs.  Grant  by  his  close 
scrutiny  at  the  hotel  during  the  day.  When  the 
photographs  of  Booth  were  published  they  at  once 
recognized  him  as  the  man  who  had  shadowed 
them.  When  taking  the  ferry  at  the  Delaware 
River,  at  Philadelphia,  Grant  received  the  telegram 
announcing  the  assassination  of  Lincoln  and  hur- 
ried back  to  Washington.  Some  time  after  the  as- 
sassination he  received  an  anonymous  letter  say- 
ing that  the  writer  had  been  selected  by  Booth  to 
board  Grant's  train  at  the  station  in  Washington 
and  kill  him.  The  conductor  had  refused  him  en- 
trance and  he  was  thankful  that  he  had  thus  been 
spared  committing  a  murder. 

United  in  their  great  labors  for  the  salvation  of 
the  country,  it  was  only  by  one  of  those  little 
chances  upon  which  great  issues  turn  that  Grant 
and  Lincoln  were  not  united  in  death  at  the  as- 

[224] 


LINCOLN  AND  GRANT 

sassin's  hand.  Grant's  last  message  to  Lincoln 
was  when  he  spoke  at  the  dedication  of  the  great 
obelisk  at  Springfield,  when  he  said,  "From  March, 
1864,  to  the  day  when  the  hand  of  the  assassin 
opened  a  grave  for  Mr.  Lincoln,  the  President  of 
the  United  States,  my  personal  relations  with  him 
were  as  close  and  intimate  as  the  nature  of  our  re- 
spective duties  would  permit.  To  know  him  per- 
sonally was  to  love  and  respect  him  for  his  great 
qualities  of  heart  and  head,  and  for  his  patience 
and  patriotism.  With  all  his  disappointments  from 
failures  on  the  part  of  those  to  whom  he  had  in- 
trusted commands,  and  treachery  on  the  part  of 
those  who  had  gained  his  confidence  but  to  betray 
it,  I  never  heard  him  utter  a  complaint,  nor  cast  a 
censure  for  bad  conduct  or  bad  faith.  It  was  his 
nature  to  find  excuses  for  the  his  adversaries.  In 
his  death  the  nation  lost  its  greatest  hero;  in  his 
death  the  South  lost  its  most  just  friend." 

Three  score  and  four  years  have  passed  since 
the  beginning  of  the  Civil  War.  But  even  so,  we 
are  still  too  near  to  that  stirring  epoch  to  say  with 
assurance  how  many  of  its  chief  actors  will  have 
an  abiding  place  in  the  history  of  the  nation.  It  is 
quite  likely  that  a  century  hence  some  of  the  men 
dealt  with  in  this  book  will  be  not  even  names. 
But  of  this  at  least  I  think  we  can  be  sure:  Lincoln 
and  Grant  belong  to  history.  Their  names  and 
their  fame  are  secure.  Whoever  else  shall  be  for- 
gotten, they  will  be  remembered  as  long  as  it 
shall  please  God  to  give  America  a  name  and  a 
place  among  the  nations  of  the  earth. 

[  END  ] 
[225] 


AUTHORITIES 

The  chief  mine  of  information  concerning  the 
American  Civil  War  is  the  great  collection  of  or- 
ders, reports  and  findings  known  as  the  War 
Records,  and  published  by  a  generous  and  grateful 
Government.  But  in  addition  to  this  priceless  col- 
lection there  has  arisen  a  vast  literature  of  a  more 
personal  nature.  Nearly  every  chief  figure  of  the 
Civil  War  has  written  a  book,  or  had  a  book  writ- 
ten about  him.  For  the  purpose  of  my  investiga- 
tion such  books  as  the  Personal  Memoirs  of  U.  S. 
Grant,  Memoirs  of  W .  T.  Sherman,  McClellan's 
My  Own  Story,  Butler's  Book,  by  General  Ben 
Butler,  McClure's  Lincoln  and  Men  of  War  Times, 
Gideon  Welles'  Diary,  etc.,  have  proved  very  helpful. 
I  have  consulted,  too,  the  many  excellent  biographies 
of  the  generals  of  the  war,  personal  letters,  and  such 
classics  of  the  Civil  War  literature  as  Nicolay  and 
Hay's  Lincoln,  John  C.  Ropes'  Story  of  the  Civil  War, 
and  the  notable  series  of  papers,  Battles  and  Leaders 
of  the  Civil  War.  In  addition  to  this  wide  range  of 
written  sources,  it  has  been  my  very  great  pleasure  and 
rare  privilege,  during  the  years  of  my  study,  to 
talk  with  the  survivors  of  the  great  conflict,  both 
officers  and  soldiers.  What  an  opportunity  this 
has  been  can  be  appreciated  if  one  stops  to  reflect 
that  ten  years  hence  the  veterans  of  the  Civil  War 
will  be  seen  no  more  on  our  streets.  From  this 
rich  oral  tradition  I  was  able  to  learn  much  that 
had  not  been  written  in  books. 


[226] 


Abraham  Lincoln  Book  Shop 

CHICAGO,  ILL. 


